Preferences over Experimental Populations

Neeraja Gupta

Luca Rigotti

Alistair Wilson

Preferences over Experimental Populations

Neeraja Gupta

Luca Rigotti

Alistair Wilson

$ \text{\textcircled{r}} $

Understanding an Economic Phenomena

Resources as an Academic

Understanding an Economic Phenomena

Resources as an Academic

Budget Constraints:

While we may want to separate resources from our ability to answer economic questions, for experimental studies, these will be related
Even if you have a huge research budget, you still might want to use that budget more efficiently

Understanding an Economic Phenomena

Resources as an Academic

Choices over Population:

Given options over where we collect experimental data, want to get the greatest bang for our buck
Where other methodological studies have examined whether an effect replicates across populations, we instead want to understand which population maximizes our inferential power

Basic Idea

You have a budget $\$Y$ budget for an experiment
Trying to uncover qualitative difference between:
- Treatment (A)
- Control (B)
Allow the populations to differ over:
- Costs per observation, $c$
- Attenuation in effect size, $\gamma$

Use a T-stat to formulate a preference:

Experimenter Preference

U(c,\gamma; Y) = \text{Pr} ( \left|T\right| > 1.96 )

T \propto \frac{(1-\gamma)\Delta_0}{\sqrt{c}}

where

T \propto \frac{\text{Effect size}}{\sqrt{\text{Obs. Cost}}}

Dual Problems

Iso-Power

Iso-Budget

Maximize power subject to budget

Minimize budget subject to power

Treatments

Our environment varies:

Four strategic games presented to the participants (random order at participant level)
A presentation effect: ($C$ action first vs. $D$ action first
The population/mode from which the sample was drawn:
- Standard Physical Lab (undergrads)
- Virtual Lab sample (undergrads)
- MTurk
- Prolific
- CloudResearch (Approved List)

Four Games

Both games C is individually dominant and socially efficient

Dom 1:

Dom 2:

Games differ in PD tension (PD1 more temptation)

PD 1:

PD 2:

(21,21)	(2,28)
(28,2)	(8,8)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

(19,19)	(8,22)
(22,8)	(9,9)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

(17,17)	(12,16)
(16,12)	(10,10)

$C$

$D$

(15,15)	(16,10)
(10,16)	(11,11)

$C$

$D$

We say that a participant makes a $\Sigma$-dominated choice if they choose an action dominated both according to their own payoff, but according to the joint payoff
Measure inattentive response via the proportion of participants that chose $D$ in either of the two DOM games

Dom 1:

Dom 2:

(17,17)	(12,16)
(16,12)	(10,10)

$C$

$D$

(15,15)	(16,10)
(10,16)	(11,11)

$C$

$D$

The two games differ in both the temptation to defect and the size of the gain from joint cooperation:

PD1: High gain but high temptation
PD2: Moderate gain but small temptation

(21,21)	(2,28)
(28,2)	(8,8)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

(19,19)	(8,22)
(22,8)	(9,9)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

PD 1:

PD 2:

(21,21)	(2,28)
(28,2)	(8,8)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

(19,19)	(8,22)
(22,8)	(9,9)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

PD 1:

PD 2:

Behavioral Prediction: Cooperation in these PD games has been predicted by the Rapoport ratio:

\[\rho = \frac{\pi(C,C)-\pi(D,D)}{\pi(D,C)-\pi(C,D)} \]

One-shot lab literature predicts (Charness et al 2016):

\[\Delta^0_{1\rightarrow 2} =\text{Coop}(PD1)-\text{Coop}(PD2)= -17.2\%\]

(17,17)	(12,16)
(16,12)	(10,10)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

Dom 1:

Your Action	Partner Action	Your Payoff	Partner Payoff
A	A
A	B
B	A
B	B

$17

$12

$16

$12

$10

Table ($A=C, B=D$):

(C,C)

(C,D)

(D,C)

(D,D)

(17,17)	(12,16)
(16,12)	(10,10)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

Dom 1:

Your Action	Partner Action	Your Payoff	Partner Payoff
A	A
A	B
B	A
B	B

$17

$12

$16

$12

$10

Table ($A=D, B=C$):

(C,C)

(C,D)

(D,C)

(D,D)

Population Costs

$22.08

$21.75

$3.01

$3.23

$4.36

Obs. Cost

$1.60

Fixed

1/4

1/4 x 1/10

Incentive

Physical Lab

Virtual Lab

Mech Turk

CloudResearch

Prolific

Lab

VLab

M-Turk

Cloud-R

Prolific

548

541

385

Sample

Dominated Response (Noise)

Fraction of participants choosing D in either DOM game
M-Turk exhibits substantial noise, with sensitivity to the first listed option
Other platforms have much lower noise

Arrows show response to action order

Dominated Response (Noise)

Estimate mixture model over:

Those choosing C in both DOM games
Those randomizing (uniformly)
Those choosing the first listed action

Type	Lab	VLab	M-Turk	Cloud-R	Prolific
1	0.86	0.78	0.44	0.84	0.83
2	0.14	0.22	0.45	0.16	0.15
3	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.02

Population Power $\gamma_\epsilon$

If dominated choices were only problem, Prolific and Cloud Research would be far superior
- Higher power due to low observation costs with low noise

Pure noise effects

PD Cooperation Static

Both M-Turk and Prolific exhibit null effect on the PD static
There are significant effects in the other populations

Arrows show PD-2 to PD-1

Observed PD-Static

Prolific's small response elasticity in PD static makes it worse than than Lab
Even though Cloud-R effect size is smaller than the lab, cheaper observation costs more than compensate

Total attenuation

Conclusions

Unfiltered M-Turk is unfit for purpose: noise in the response leads to a substantial reduction in power
Both Prolific and Cloud Research offer curated populations with low rates of dominated response - only slightly larger than those in the lab samples (but much cheaper per obs)
With respect to our study-specific behavioral comparative static (PD-game cooperation):
- Prolific shows very low elasticity of response (participants are overly cooperative, regardless of tension)
- CloudResearch exhibits about half the effect-size from the lab samples, but cheaper observations lead to substantially increased power

Rapoport ratio:

\[\rho = \frac{\pi(C,C)-\pi(D,D)}{\pi(D,C)-\pi(C,D)} \]

(21,21)	(2,28)
(28,2)	(8,8)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

(19,19)	(8,22)
(22,8)	(9,9)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

PD 1:

PD 2:

\rho=0.50

\rho=0.71

(14,14)	(5,25)
(25,5)	(13,13)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

(18,18)	(3,27)
(27,3)	(12,12)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

PD 3:

PD 4:

\rho=0.25

\rho=0.05

Rapoport ratio:

\[\rho = \frac{\pi(C,C)-\pi(D,D)}{\pi(D,C)-\pi(C,D)} \]

(19,19)	(8,22)
(22,8)	(9,9)

$C$

$D$

$C$

$D$

PD 2:

\rho=0.71

(14,14)	(5,25)
(25,5)	(13,13)

$C$

$D$

PD 3:

\rho=0.05

Look at the difference between these two extremes to examine whether a less subtle treatment can detect an effect

Look at Cooperation difference from PD2 to PD3

Preferences over Experimental Populations

Neeraja Gupta

Luca Rigotti

Alistair Wilson

Preferences over Experimental Populations

Neeraja Gupta

Luca Rigotti

Alistair Wilson

\( \text{\textcircled{r}} \)

\( \text{\textcircled{r}} \)

\( \text{\textcircled{r}} \)

Budget Constraints:

Choices over Population:

Basic Idea

Experimenter Preference

Dual Problems

Iso-Power

Iso-Budget

Treatments

Four Games

Dom 1:

Dom 2:

PD 1:

PD 2:

Dom 1:

Dom 2:

PD 1:

PD 2:

PD 1:

PD 2:

Dom 1:

Table (\(A=C, B=D\)):

Dom 1:

Table (\(A=D, B=C\)):

Population Costs

Dominated Response (Noise)

Dominated Response (Noise)

Population Power \(\gamma_\epsilon\)

PD Cooperation Static

Observed PD-Static

Conclusions

PD 1:

PD 2:

PD 3:

PD 4:

PD 2:

PD 3: