Andreas Park
Broker
Exchange
Internalizer
Wholeseller
Darkpool
Venue
Settlement
Traditional Institutions
Investors
Illustration of pricing: limit order book = discriminatory pricing
quantity
price
Q
p(Q)
Pdp(Q)=∫0Qp(q) dq
Decentralized Trading
Actually ...
→ simply connect with MetaMask (or similar wallet)
AMM Pricing
Constant Liquidity (Product) AMM
Key Components
The Pricing Function
Liquidity Deposit ⇒ slope of the price curve
The Pricing Function (just a little more)
More on UniSwap v3
More on UniSwap v3
marginal "limit order book" price
γ(s)=(a−s)2ac
pu=15
pd=7
u=2
p0=10 (that's exogenous, not a choice)
More on UniSwap v3
marginal "limit order book" price
γ(s)=(a−s)2ac
pu=15
pd=7
u=2
p0=10 (that's exogenous, not a choice)
= find the right curve
= find the right "a∗"
More on UniSwap v3
marginal "limit order book" price
γ(s)=(a−s)2ac
pu=15
pd=7
u=2
d=?
required cash deposit Δc(d)= the amount that I pay for d
Liquidity Supply and Demand in an Automated Market Maker
Basics of Liquidity Provision
balanced flowfees earned onF∫DVμ(DV)+∫0∞when the return is Radverse selection loss(Δc(q∗)−q∗pt(R)+from arbitrageursfees earnedF⋅Δc(q∗)) ϕ(R)dR≥0.
q∗ is what arbitrageurs trade to move the price to reflect R
Basic idea of liquidity provision: earn more on balanced flow than what you lose on price movement
fee income+adverse selection losswhat I sold it for−value of net position≥0
in AMMs:
protocol fee
in tradFi: bid-ask spread
Sidebar: we can quantify how much a PASSIVE LP loses when the price moves by R
for orientation:
initial depositadverse selection loss when the return is R=R−21(R+1)
see Barbon & Ranaldo (2022)
Basics of Liquidity Provision
Liquidity provision measured as "collective" deposit α of token's market cap as function of
E[DL(R)]+F⋅E[another function of R]+F⋅initial depositE[dollar volume]≥0.
what I sold it for−value of net position+fee income≥0
The Decision of the Liquidity Demander
Fπ=E[∣R−1∣/2]+E[DV]1(−2q E[DL]+−2qE[DV] E[DL]).
this is from Malinova and Park (2023); similar result is in Hasbrouk, Riviera, Saleh (2023)
Empirical Work
Lehar and Parlour (2021)
Barbon & Ranaldo (2023)
Other notables:
Malinova & Park (2023): AMM applied to equities would reduce trading costs by 30%
Concerns around Automated Market Makers
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
Problem: Public Mempools allow sandwich (MEV) attacks
From Vitalik Buterin's post on the topic:
https://ethresear.ch/t/improving-front-running-resistance-of-x-y-k-market-makers/1281
Theorem (Park 2023):
Hypothetical example
The Bigger Picture: MEV Extraction
read more at: "Battle of the Bots: Flash Loans, Miner Extractable Value and Efficient Settlement", Lehar & Parlour, 2023