pollev.com/chrismakler

Eric office hours at the SEA Study Night tonight!

Pete office hours Wednesday 3:30

(place TBD)

Makler office hour/review session on zoom Wednesday night

No section or homework this week!

Christopher Makler

Stanford University Department of Economics

Econ 51: Lecture 15

- Situations in which the actions of agents affect the payoffs of others
- Often caused by "missing markets"
- Markets (or more generally, everyone acting in their own self interest) will not generally solve the problems — equilibria are inefficient or inequitable

- One agent affecting another:
- Edgeworth Box
- Steel Mill and Fishery

- Many agents affecting each other:
- Market externalities
- Tragedy of the Commons

- One agent affecting another:
- Edgeworth Box
- Steel Mill and Fishery

- Many agents affecting each other:
- Market externalities
- Tragedy of the Commons

Not as much a "one size fits all" model,

but more of an **approach**:

- identify a "social welfare function" that tell us what the "socially optimal" outcome is
- model the incentives agents face, and understand why the "market equilibrium" outcome differs from the "socially optimal" one.
- try to find a way to adjust the incentives to achieve the socially optimal outcome
- usually involves getting the agents to
**internalize the externality**they are causing others

Two roommates, Ken and Chris.

Ken is a smoker who can smoke up to 10 hours per day.

Chris is a non-smoker and dislikes Ken's smoking.

Preferences

Each have preferences over how much Ken smokes (good 1) and money (good 2).

u^K(x_1^K,x_2^K) = k \ln x_1^K + x_2^K

u^C(x_1^C,x_2^C) = c \ln x_1^C + x_2^C

MRS^K = {k \over x_1^K}

MRS^C = {c \over x_1^C}

Preferences

Each have preferences over how much Ken smokes (good 1) and money (good 2).

u^K(s,m^K) = k \ln s + m^K

u^C(s,m^C) = c \ln (10 - s) + m^C

MRS^K = {k \over s}

MRS^C = {c \over 10-s}

Suppose we define **property rights** over smoking.

This is like an endowment:

Let's assume Chris and Ken each start with $100.

If we allow them to trade from their endowment, they'll end up on the contract curve — at an efficient allocation!

Under certain circumstances, the efficient amount of externality is independent of the original assignment of property rights.

**Base Model**: Profit Maximization

**Extension**: Production choices affect other's profit

**Conflict**: Steel mill only takes into account its **own cost**,

not **impact on the fishery**.

**Solution**: assign **property rights** and allow bargaining, or merge.

- Individuals solving their own optimization problem

disregard the external effects they have on others - Social marginal cost (SMC) = private marginal cost (PMC) + marginal external cost (MEC)
- Market equilibrium will occur where MB = PMC
- Social optimum is where MB = SMC

**Internalize** the externality so that **private marginal cost** equals **social marginal cost**.

Competitive equilibrium:

consumers set \(P = MB\),

producers set \(P = PMC \Rightarrow MB = PMC\)

With a tax: consumers set \(P = MB\),

producers set \(P - t = PMC\)

- Each individual, acting in their own best interest, overuses the common resource
- Possible solutions: regulation (issue permits); taxation (charge for use); privatization (avoid problem by making them not a commons at all)

Village of 35 people who can choose to **fish** or **hunt**.

Each fish is worth $10; each deer is worth $100. Every hunter gets one deer.

If \(L\) people fish, (and \(35 - L\) people hunt), total fish caught: \(f(L) = 40L - L^2\)

Total revenue from fishing:

Total revenue from hunting:

Average revenue per fisher:

Average revenue per hunter:

Marginal revenue from additional fish:

Marginal cost of having that person not hunt:

What's the effect of an increase in \(L\)?

10f(L)

400L-10L^2

100(35-L)

3500 - 100L

400-10L

100

100

400-20L

Suppose you needed to buy a fishing permit for a fee F.

What value of F would result in the optimal L*?

Suppose the village levied a tax of *t* per fish caught.

What value of *t* would result in the optimal L*?

Efficiency in the Edgeworth box comes from everyone

equating their own private marginal benefits and costs.

In the presence of externalities, personal decisions affect others.

If everyone just balances their own *personal* marginal benefits and costs,

it can have a negative (or positive) external effect on others.

Markets will not, in general, result in a Pareto efficient outcome on their own — there is a role for government intervention.

For the rest of this course, we're going to derive

a **general framework** for analyzing situations in which

everyone's payoffs are a result of everyone's actions.