Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Limiting the number of alternatives can be a challenge
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Limiting the number of alternatives can be a challenge
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Limiting the number of alternatives can be a challenge
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Tricky when things are valued differently by different groups
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Tricky when things are valued differently by different groups
Where the rubber hits the road
Need to estimate C & B in each time period
We don't know the true supply & demand curves
Harder...
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Need to estimate C & B in each time period
We don't know the true supply & demand curves
Harder...
Harder to obtain value / WTP...
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Harder to obtain value / WTP...
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Harder to obtain value / WTP...
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
If comparing with the status quo,
decision rule:
If multiple projects, the largest NPV represents most efficient allocation of resources
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Allocative efficiency
Pareto efficiency
CBA is a framework for measuring efficiency
What do we know about maximizing efficiency?
Do we know a system or principle that maximizes social welfare?
In reality, no market is perfect
Real world markets rarely achieve the ideal of “perfect competition”
Still, models of PC can give us insights about real-world markets
Approximately correct in some situations
Informative about what happens when key assumptions are relaxed
Perfect competition is our benchmark
All market participants are price takers, i.e.,
can’t influence price at which they buy/sell
Perfect competition: assumptions
All market participants are price takers, i.e.,
can’t influence price at which they buy/sell
Perfect competition: assumptions
smooth D curves + no market power
price driven to MC by new entrants (ex?)
perfect substitutes; chars don't vary
perfect knowledge of price, utility, quality
no 'wedge' between selling & buying price
private C & B = social C & B
If there is a market failure, government intervention can improve efficiency & increase social welfare
If there is current regulation / "interference" in a market without clear market failures, then "less policy" could enhance welfare
Perfect competition: why is this relevant?
Remember that government policies that distort otherwise well-functioning markets do two things:
1. transfer surplus
2. create DWL
Perfect competition: why is this relevant?
Remember that government policies that distort otherwise well-functioning markets do two things:
1. transfer surplus
2. create DWL
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
Perfect competition: why is this relevant?
Remember that government policies that distort otherwise well-functioning markets do two things:
1. transfer surplus
2. create DWL
Specify the set of alternative projects
Decide who counts (standing/referent group)
Identify impact categories & select indicators
Predict impacts over life of project
Monetize all impacts
Discount benefits & costs to get present values
Compute NPV of each alternative from (1)
Conduct sensitivity analysis
Make recommendation
👉🏻
Demand curves as measures of benefits
P
Q
We measure the benefit of a good / service using WTP
therefore the (inverse) demand curve measures benefits
Total Benefits (TB) from consuming a given quantity
= area under the demand curve
Demand curves as measures of benefits
P
Q
q*
Total Benefits (TB) from consuming a given quantity
= area under the demand curve
Consumers are willing to pay TB
but pay only
Demand curves as measures of benefits
P
Q
q*
Consumers are willing to pay TB
but pay only
Total Benefits (TB) from consuming a given quantity
= area under the demand curve
Consumer Surplus
P
Q
q*
Consumers are willing to pay TB
but pay only
This means consumers get a surplus of benefits
hence Consumer Surplus (CS)
Consumer Surplus
P
Q
q*
Many policies / interventions / proposals
can be thought of as either:
a) changing prices, i.e. movement along D curve
b) shifting the D curve
Usually, changes in CS
approximate changes in WTP
Changes in Consumer Surplus
P
Q
q*
Many policies / interventions / proposals
can be thought of as either:
a) changing prices, i.e. movement along D curve
b) shifting the D curve
Usually, changes in CS
approximate changes in WTP
Changes in Consumer Surplus
P
Q
q*
Many policies / interventions / proposals
can be thought of as either:
a) changing prices, i.e. movement along D curve
b) shifting the D curve
Usually, changes in CS
approximate changes in WTP
and are approximated with linearity assumptions
Changes in Consumer Surplus
P
Q
q*
Usually, changes in CS
approximate changes in WTP
and are approximated with linearity assumptions
Changes in Consumer Surplus: elasticities
P
Q
q*
Usually, changes in CS
approximate changes in WTP
and are approximated with linearity assumptions
...assuming we know the demand curve!
(usually we don't)
this is where elasticities come in
Price elasticity of demand:
a measure of how responsive demand is to price changes
Changes in Consumer Surplus: demand shifters
P
Q
q*
What are some things
that "shift" demand?
changes in income
changes in expectations
changes in tastes
changes in prices of substitutes/ complements
Producer surplus
P
Q
q*
Just like the impact of policy changes can be measured by changes in CS, we can value impact on producers using PS
Producer surplus + Consumer surplus = TS
P
Q
q*
Ignoring the government for now,
we can compute total surplus (TS) as the sum of CS & PS
In well-functioning perfect competition market, total surplus (and hence net benefits)
are maximized
Gross Social Surplus vs Net
P
Q
q*
Government surplus = Net government revenue
For example, if the government gives a good away for free, some of that good is transferred to consumers as consumer surplus
That is not a "loss" but a transfer
It is important to separate transfers from losses:
Gross Social Surplus vs Net
P
Q
q*
TS = CS + PS + GS
In calculating net benefits, don’t ignore the opportunity costs of resources
Opportunity cost of factors used to 'produce' or deliver a program: area under the supply curve!
Thinking in terms of opportunity costs helps clarify why economists
(correctly) ignore sunk costs
In calculating net benefits, don’t ignore the opportunity costs of resources
How closely do government expenditures measure opportunity cost for…
jurors’ time in a criminal justice reform program that would increase the number of trials?
In calculating net benefits, don’t ignore the opportunity costs of resources
How closely do government expenditures measure opportunity cost for…
land on which a nuclear waste storage facility will be installed
In calculating net benefits, don’t ignore the opportunity costs of resources
How closely do government expenditures measure opportunity cost for…
labour for a reforestation program in a small rural community with high unemployment?
In calculating net benefits, don’t ignore the opportunity costs of resources
How closely do government expenditures measure opportunity cost for…
labor of current gvt employees needed to administer a new program?
assume that these employees are already on the gvt payroll, so diverting their time to admin involves no additional expenditure
Goal of CBA: improve allocative efficiency
(i.e. ensure that resources are used in their most productive capacity)
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency vs. Pareto Efficiency
We need some theory to correctly evaluate whether a proposed policy will increase efficiency
In a perfectly competitive market, allocative efficiency happens on its own
Shortage and surplus are quickly resolved through price adjustments
No efficiency grounds for intervention
Typical justification for intervention is a market failure