Women in Market Microstructure Workshop, Denver, June 2026
gold &silver
sterling
USD
???
pre-1800
British imperial trade
post-Bretton Woods
"Pax" Americana
1944-
multi-lateral stablecoins
MXN
USD
THB
Micro-founded mechanism: AMM attracts volume \(\to\) attracts liquidity \(\to\) lowers per-trade costs
Identify parameter region where the AMM designer prefers vehicle routing but cross-pair traders don't
Identify parameter region where multi-asset pool improves vehicle routing; extend to \(n\) small currencies
1
2
3
A pool of reserves + a pricing rule \(R_0\cdot R_1=k\). Three things to know:
① Price = slope
S = R₀ / R₁
② Trade walks the curve
price moves → impact
③ LPs shift it out
more depth, same price
Liquidity pool
\(R_0\) (USD)
\(R_1\) (MXN)
liquidity invariant \[R_0\cdot R_1=k\]
marginal price \[S=\frac{R_0}{R_1}\]
pool depth (at market price)
\[D=R_0+S\cdot R_1=2R_0\]
larger pool \(\to\) smaller price impact
define a trade's price impact:
\[\frac{S^{\text{paid}}-S^{\text{initial}}}{S^{\text{initial}}}\]
\(S^{\text{paid}}\): average rate over the whole trade — the VWAP of "walking" the pool
Proposition: A trade of size \(\Delta\) incurs a price impact of \(\frac{2\Delta}{D}\)
A trade ("swap") moves the price along the curve.
Liquidity providers have no positional gains on a round trip → they earn on AMM fees.
Fees accrue on all volume; adverse selection only on the imbalance.
buy & hold
AMM LP: concave relative to buy & hold
exchange rate change
holding value one currency rel. to other
Adverse selection, priced from returns + volume alone.
Our closed form (Learning from DeFi):
\(\mathbb{E}[\text{IL}] = \dfrac{\sigma^2}{8}\)
The AMM fee must cover it.
Our work and this talk is all V2
Constant product (Uniswap) is the prevalent AMM — but other pricing curves exist.
Decentralized Exchanges for Stablecoins · Huang, Rostova & Song
Flatter curves suit same-currency stable pairs (USDT–USDC).
We take this to FX: view passive, competitive V2-style LP as a conservative benchmark for the status quo.
A model of an AMM: the AMM fee that minimizes trading cost (price impact + fee) → a measure of per-period adverse selection, calibrated to equities.
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Status Quo (SQ)
Two bilateral USD pools. MXN/THB route through USD
Three Bilateral Pools (BP)
One pool per pair. No forced routing but fragmented capital and volume
Single multilateral pool (MP)
all three currencies in one pool; direct trading of all pairs
Same approach as single pool: LP break even, cost-minimizing planner
Split the capital and each pair gets a book only ⅓ as deep — price impact rises. Pool it, and every dollar backs all three pairs.
⅓ D
⅓ D
⅓ D
USD/MXN
USD/THB
MXN/THB
capital split 3 ways
pool the capital →
D
every dollar backs all 3 pairs
price impact, split capital:
\[\frac{2\Delta}{D/3}=\frac{6\Delta}{D}\]
price impact, pooled:
\[\frac{2\Delta}{\frac{2}{3}D}=\frac{3\Delta}{D}\]
liquidity invariant (equal weights) \[R_0\cdot R_1\cdots R_n = k\]
marginal rate vs numeraire \((S_0\equiv 1)\) \[S_i=\frac{R_0}{R_i}\]
pool depth (at market prices) \[D=\sum_i S_i R_i = n\,R_0\]
Lemma (equal thirds). Each currency holds one third of pool depth: \(\;S_i R_i = \dfrac{D}{3}\)
Price impact. A trade \(i\to j\) touches 2 of 3 currencies — backed by \(\tfrac{2}{3}D\):
\[\Pi=\frac{2\Delta}{\frac{2}{3}D}=\frac{3\Delta}{D}\]
Impermanent loss — our closed-form approximation:
\[\mathbb{E}[\text{IL}]=\frac{\Sigma}{18},\quad \Sigma=\sigma_{01}^2+\sigma_{02}^2+\sigma_{12}^2\]
extends bilateral \(\;\sigma^2/8\) · this is what the AMM fee must cover
① LPs commit liquidity
until fee revenue covers expected IL — this pins down depth D.
② Designer picks fee F
to minimize price impact + fee — depth substitutes out, leaving the cost.
Real FX is not symmetric: dollar pairs dominate volume, cross pairs are (or would be) thinly traded
volume \(V\)
volatility \(\sigma\)
volume \(V\)
volatility \(\sigma\)
volume \(v\times V\)
volatility \(s\times\sigma\)
\(v\) cross-pair volume, relative to a vehicle pair
\(s\) cross-pair volatility, relative to a vehicle pair
— typically \(v<1\), cross pairs are thin
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Status Quo (SQ)
Two bilateral USD pools. MXN/THB route through USD
Three Bilateral Pools (BP)
One pool per pair. No forced routing but fragmented capital and volume
Single multilateral pool (MP)
all three currencies in one pool; direct trading of all pairs
narket designer considers the volume-weighted costs for all groups
multi-currency pool is better than three bilateral pools
vehicle routing beats three pools
three bilateral pools are better than vehicle routing
multi-currency pool beats vehicle routing
but: small traders would prefer their own pool
MXN/THB
Many small currencies: which to pool?
Optimal weights (AMM curve design)
More broadly: multi-asset AMM
Equities: easy — returns + volume, observed.
FX: bilateral volume is unobserved — because of vehicle routing.
Trade data as a proxy?
Vehicle-currency routing is not a coordination failure.
In a wide parameter region it is welfare-maximizing. The dollar earns its role.
But it embeds a cross-subsidy.
Small-pair traders — smaller firms, emerging economies — pay twice so majors pay less.
A multilateral pool resolves the tension.
In the empirically relevant region it beats routing, and the cross-pair trader individually prefers it. Capital multiplexes across all pairs.
The collective of small currencies, not any one challenger, is the threat.
"High enough correlation" threshold collapses as the number of currencies grows.
Design the stablecoin FX layer accordingly.
Closed-form fees and optimal weights are ready for implementation.