Michael Brolley
Marius Zoican
U.K.-based evidence (Aquilina, Budish, O'Neill, 2020) shows that latency arbitrage races are:
| Speed bumps | Batch auctions | |
|---|---|---|
| Liquidity | 😃😃 | 😃😃 |
| Exchange revenue | 😞 | 😞😞 |
| Implementation difficulty | 😐 | 😞😞 |
| Regulatory challenges | 😐 | 😞 |
Two parameters:
M1 and M2 arrive at same time if:
M2 Inbound < M1 Inbound + AEL + MRT
Two important outcomes:
How does the fee magnitude impact revenues?
Co-location fees do not scale with trading activity and
they need to be paid in advance on all exchanges.
We calibrate caps on a constant fee structure:
| Speed bumps | Batch auctions | Micro-burst fees | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liquidity | 😃😃 | 😃😃 | 😃 |
| Exchange revenue | 😞 | 😞😞 | 😃 |
| Implementation diff. | 😐 | 😞😞 | 😐/😃 |
| Regulatory hurdle | 😐 | 😞 | 😐/😃 |