Matt Hale
Assistant Professor of Cybersecurity
Nebraska University Center for Information Assurance
Mickey Hefley, Gabi Wethor, Matthew L. Hale
HICSS-51 2018, Waikoloa, HI
Slides available at: slides.mlhale.com/hicss2018/
What's the state of phishing? (context)
What are we doing about it? (contribution)
Is it performant? (evaluation)
Is it precise? (evaluation)
(roughly in that order)
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...the most sophisticated phishing websites would dupe about half (45%) of the people around you. Even average, less sophisticated, sites manage to convince more than 1 in 10 (13.7%).
http://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_hijacking_study_2014.pdf https://www.getcybersafe.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/nfgrphcs/nfgrphcs-2012-10-11-en.aspx
Sources: http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf
Sources: http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/05/PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy_PDF.pdf
(https://pipl.com/) Easily find personal information
(http://geosocialfootprint.com/) See a history of where you've been
(https://github.com/trustedsec/social-engineer-toolkit) Clone a legitmate site and install an information harvester in 2 steps
(sites not listed) Buy credit cards and SSNs for a few bucks
(Preventing Phishing Victimization using Bio-behavioral Markers of Cyber Trust)
Investigating what trust factors influence decision making with suspicious content
Some of this material is based on research sponsored in part by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), under award number FA9550-12-1-0457. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views expressed in this talk are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or U.S. Government.
Identify root causes of victimization
Identify user awareness gaps
Train participants to recognize suspicious content
Prevent victimization
Instrumentation and Tooling
R=0.523, df=61, p=0.01
Identify root causes of victimization
Identify user awareness gaps
Train participants to recognize suspicious content
Prevent victimization
Instrumentation and Tooling
HICSS 2018 Paper Contribution
Multiple types of data: Eye tracker, mouse movement, keypresses, and application data (macro level behaviors)
Stitching the various data together to present a picture that is more than the sum of its parts
The data alone is not enough, we want to understand how users behave and how behaviors lead to the creation of capturable data artifacts
The point. We envision a tool that can help researchers better understand behaviors that lead to phishing victimization - so they can develop better training tools to prevent them.
Photo credit GP3 Marketing materials (gazept.com)
#End of Docker Tangent
(Mouse data/Key data)
Mouse Movement: On a user mouse movement event, capture {x, y, w, h, t}, where x and y identify the pixel coordinates of the mouse, in two-dimensional screen space, x ≤ w and y ≤ h), w and h define the maximum screen size (in pixels), and t is the time when the mouse event occurred. uses the W3C standard high resolution time level 2 specification with worst-case resolvable timing skew of 5ms. Other mouse and keyboard events also use high res. timing.
Mouse Selection: On a user mouse up event, capture {ht, t} where ht is highlighted text and t is the high-resolution timestamp when the event occurred. If no text is highlighted this event is ignored.
Mouse Clicks: On user mouse down capture {x, y, w, h, t}. Similarly, to mouse movement, x and y define pixel positions in screen coordinate space, w and h define the max screen width and height, and t is the timestamp when the click event occurred.
Key Press: On a user key down event, capture {k, t}, where k is the Unicode character identifying the key pressed (as translated from its browser-specific keycode) and t is the time the event occurred
(eye movement data)
Eye Movement events are logged following the schema: {tid, cnt, et, t-tick, msg, cx, cy, fpogid, fpogd, fpogs, fpogv, fpogx, fpogy, bpogx, bpogy, bpogx, lpogx, lpogy, lpogv, rpogx, rpogy, rpogv leyex, leyey, leyez, lpupild, lpupilv, reyex, reyey, reyez, rpupild, rpupilv, lpcx, lpcy, lpd, lps, lpv, rpcx, rpcy, rpd, rps, rpv}
(macro "application level" behavioral data)
Session Timing: {sts, ste}, where sts and ste are high-resolution timestamps identifying the start and end times of the user’s session.
Time tracking (task): {tts, tte, tid}, where tts and tte are the start and end times that identify how long the user views content associated with the task, with id tid.
Likert scale: rates the trustworthiness of content as very trustworthy, trustworthy, unsure, untrustworthy, or very untrustworthy.
trust decision: {tid, lrt, tr}, where tid is the task id, lrt is trustworthiness captured by the Likert scale and tr is a Boolean indicating trust (true) or do not trust (false).
Idle time: When a user goes into an idle state, capture {it, et}. Where it and et are high resolution timestamps identifying the start and end times of user idling.
Happens via web sockets and rest API calls
Heatmap and event tracing component output allows researchers to reconstruct subject sessions.
(black line = mousing events)
Can also be viewed as a time series
1 of the 30 client performance captures. While fps is high (criteria 1), heap size is growing as the number of events are logged. Also there are many network requests that eventually stack up and queue)
~4500 eye events and 2850 mouse events per 30 second task
This violated Criteria 2.
We fixed this problem by introducing a batch commit strategy - reducing the heap size and eliminating network queing by sending more events to the server at once.
Web-socket server performance during 1 of the 30 captures shown in C-Advisor
Across the 30 tests, overall CPU utilization maxed out at 33% (at full simulated load) Ubuntu Server 16.04.2 on ESXi (pooled 4ghz CPU resources). Memory usage did not exceed 150MB and was, on average less than 100MB.
800µs
333ns
5µs - 100ms
(by type)
©2018 Matthew L. Hale or as listed
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Assistant Professor, Cybersecurity
mlhale@unomaha.edu
twitter: @mlhale_