Victor Sanches Portella
Computer Science
Player
Adversary
\(n\) Experts
0.5
0.1
0.3
0.1
Probabilities
1
0
1
0
Costs
Expected loss:
Player's Loss
Loss of Best Expert
No IID assumption
Differential Privacy
RL & Control
Comb.
Optimization
[Cover '67]
[H,L,P,R '20]
Player knows \(T\)
Player doesn't know \(T\)
<
Brownian Motion
Stochastic Calculus
PDEs
[G,H,SP '22]
SLOW
FAST
FAST
Question:
Regret with known \(T\)
Regret with unknown \(T\)
?
Question:
Regret with known \(T\)
Regret with unknown \(T\)
?
for large \(n\)
Stochastic Calculus seems helpful
Previous aproach needs \(n = 2\)
Total cost of each expert
Player's Loss
Loss of Best Expert
Usually Worst-case
Regret
=
[SP,H,L '22]
Question:
Regret with known \(T\)
Regret with unknown \(T\)
?
for large \(n\)
Stochastic Calculus seems helpful
Previous aproach needs \(n = 2\)
Player's Loss
Loss of Best Expert
Quantile Regret Bounds!
Questions?
[SP,H,L '22]
No IID assumption
Spam filtering
Click prediction
Repeated Games
Parameter-free Optimization
AdaGrad
Coin Betting
Applications
&
Connections
Boosting
Combinatorial Optimization
Differential Privacy
Non-stochastic Control
Reinforcement Learning
We will look only at \(\{0,1\}\) costs
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
Equal costs do not affect the regret
Cover's algorithm relies on these assumptions by construction
Our alg. and analysis extends to fractional costs
Thought experiment: how much probability mass to put on each expert?
Cumulative Loss on round \(t\)
\(\frac{1}{2}\) is both cases seems reasonable!
Takeaway: player's decision may depend only on the gap between experts's losses
Gap = |42 - 20| = 22
Worst Expert
Best Expert
42
20
2
2
42
42
(and maybe on \(t\))
[Cover '67]
[H,L,P,R '20]
Player knows \(T\)
Player doesn't know \(T\)
<
Brownian Motion
Stochastic Calculus
PDEs
[G,H,SP '22]
Probability on Worst expert
Gap between the 2 Experts
SLOW
FAST
FAST
Player strategy based on gaps:
Choice doesn't depend on the specific past costs
on the Worst expert
on the Best expert
We can compute \(V^*\) backwards in time via DP!
Max regret to be suffered at time \(t\) with gap \(g\)
\(O(T^2)\) time to compute \(V^*\)
At round \(t\) with gap \(g\)
Max. regret for a game with \(T\) rounds
Computing the optimal strategy \(p^*\) from \(V^*\) is easy!
Cover's DP Table
(w/ player playing optimally)
Player strategy based on gaps:
Choice doesn't depend on the specific past costs
on the Lagging expert
on the Leading expert
We can compute \(V^*\) backwards in time via DP!
Getting an optimal player \(p^*\) from \(V^*\) is easy!
Max regret-to-be-suffered at round \(t\) with gap \(g\)
\(O(T^2)\) time to compute the table — \(O(T)\) amortized time per round
At round \(t\) with gap \(g\)
Optimal regret for 2 experts
Optimal player \(p^*\) is related to Random Walks
For \(g_t\) following a Random Walk
Central Limit Theorem
Not clear if the approximation error affects the regret
The DP is defined only for integer costs!
Lagging expert finishes leading
Let's design an algorithm that is efficient and works for all costs
Bonus: Connections of Cover's algorithm with stochastic calculus
Theorem
Player \(p^*\) is also connected to RWs
For \(g_t\) following a Random Walk
Central Limit Theorem
Not clear if the approximation error affects the regret
The DP is defined only for integer costs!
Lagging expert finishes leading
[Cover '67]
# of 0s of a Random Walk of len \(T\)
Let's design an algorithm that is efficient and works for all costs
Bonus: Connections of Cover's algorithm with stochastic calculus
Formula for the regret based on the gaps
Discrete stochastic integral
Moving to continuous time:
Random walk \(\longrightarrow\) Brownian Motion
\(g_0, \dotsc, g_t\) are a realization of a random walk
Useful Perspective:
Deterministic bound = Bound with probability 1
Formula for the regret based on the gaps
Random walk \(\longrightarrow\) Brownian Motion
Reflected Brownian motion (gaps)
Conditions on the continuous player \(p\)
Continuous on \([0,T) \times \mathbb{R}\)
for all \(t \geq 0\)
How to work with stochastic integrals?
Itô's Formula:
\(\overset{*}{\Delta} R(t, g) = 0\) everywhere
ContRegret \( = R(T, |B_T|) - R(0,0)\)
Goal:
Find a "potential function" \(R\) such that
(1) \(\partial_g R\) is a valid continuous player
(2) \(R\) satisfies the Backwards Heat Equation
Different from classic FTC!
Backwards Heat Equation
Goal:
Find a "potential function" \(R\) such that
(1) \(\partial_g R\) is a valid continuous player
(2) \(R\) satisfies the Backwards Heat Equation
How to find a good \(R\)?
?
Suffices to find a player \(p\) satisfying the BHE
\(\approx\) Cover's solution!
Also a solution to an ODE
Then setting
preserves BHE and
How to work with stochastic integrals?
Itô's Formula:
\(\overset{*}{\Delta} R(t, g) = 0\) everywhere
ContRegret is given by \(R(T, |B_T|)\)
Goal:
Find a "potential function" \(R\) such that
(1) \(\partial_g R\) is a valid continuous player
(2) \(R\) satisfies the Backwards Heat Equation
Different from classic FTC!
Backwards Heat Equation
[C-BL 06]
From Cover's algorithm, we have
We can find \(R(t,g)\) such that
\(\overset{*}{\Delta} R = 0\)
\(\partial_g R = Q\)
Potential \(R\) satisfying BHE?
Player \(Q\) satisfies the BHE!
By Itô's Formula:
(BHE)
How to analyze a discrete algorithm coming from stochastic calculus?
Discrete Itô's Formula!
Discrete Derivatives
Surprisingly, we can analyze Cover's algorithm with discrete Itô's formula
Itô's Formula
Discrete Itô's Formula
An Efficient and Optimal Algorithm in Fixed-Time with Two Experts
Technique:
Solve an analogous continuous-time problem, and discretize it
[HLPR '20]
How to exploit the knowledge of \(T\)?
Discretization error needs to be analyzed carefully.
BHE seems to play a role in other problems in OL as well!
Solution based on Cover's alg
Or inverting time in an ODE!
We show \(\leq 1\)
\(V^*\) and \(p^*\) satisfy the discrete BHE!
Insight:
Cover's algorithm has connections to stochastic calculus!
Multiplicative Weights Update method:
Optimal for \(n,T \to \infty\) !
If \(n\) is fixed, we can do better
\(n = 2\)
\(n = 3\)
\(n = 4\)
Player knows \(T\) !
Minmax regret in some cases:
What if \(T\) is not known?
Minmax regret
\(n = 2\)
[Harvey, Liaw, Perkins, Randhawa FOCS 2020]
They give an efficient algorithm!
Optimal regret (\(V^* = V_{p^*}\))
For \(g > 0\)
For \(g = 0\)
Path-independent player:
If
round \(t\) and gap \(g_{t-1}\) on round \(t-1\)
on the Lagging expert
on the Leading expert
Choice doesn't depend on the specific past costs
for all \(t\), then
gap on round \(t\)
A discrete analogue of a Riemann-Stieltjes integral
A formula for the regret
Maximum regret-to-be-suffered on rounds \(t+1, \dotsc, T\) when gap on round \(t\) is \(g\)
Path-independent player \(\implies\) \(V_p[t,g]\) depends only on \(\ell_{t+1}, \dotsc, \ell_T\) and \(g_t, \dotsc, g_{T}\)
Regret suffered on round \(t+1\)
Regret suffered on round \(t + 1\)
Maximum regret-to-be-suffered on rounds \(t+1, \dotsc, T\) if gap at round \(t\) is \(g\)
We can compute \(V_p\) backwards in time!
Path-independent player \(\implies\)
\(V_p[t,g]\) depends only on \(\ell_{t+1}, \dotsc, \ell_T\) and \(g_t, \dotsc, g_{T}\)
We then choose \(p^*\) that minimizes \(V^*[0,0] = V_{p^*}[0,0]\)
Maximum regret of \(p\)
For \(g > 0\)
Optimal player
Optimal regret (\(V^* = V_{p^*}\))
For \(g = 0\)
For \(g > 0\)
For \(g = 0\)
Main idea
\(R\) satisfies the continuous BHE
Approximation error of the derivatives
Lemma
Multiplicative Weights Update method:
Optimal for \(n,T \to \infty\) !
If \(n\) is fixed, we can do better
Worst-case regret for 2 experts
Player knows \(T\) (fixed-time)
Player doesn't know \(T\) (anytime)
Question:
Is there an efficient algorithm for the fixed-time case?
Ideally an algorithm that works for general costs!
\(O(T)\) time per round
Dynamic Programming
\(\{0,1\}\) costs
\(O(1)\) time per round
Stochastic Calculus
\([0,1]\) costs
[Harvey, Liaw, Perkins, Randhawa FOCS 2020]
[Cover '67]