Masayuki Kudamatsu
11 October, 2017
(for your written assignment)
1 Motivation & Main Idea
5 Conclusion
4 Deal with counter arguments
3 Cases for Main Idea
2 Background
Main idea: Statement that you will prove to be the case
"Median Voter Theorem cannot explain why the gun control hasn't been adopted in the United States."
Motivation: Reasons why we should care about your statement
1st paragraph
"The lack of the gun control in the U.S. causes the high murder rate in the country..." (then cite statistics etc.)
Better to be short, at most 2 paragraphs
e.g.
e.g.
Any information that will repeatedly be used in the arguments below
Description of political institutions in the U.S.
History of (lack of) gun control in the U.S.
2nd paragraph
DO NOT include unnecessary information in this paragraph
e.g.
Better to be short unless it's really necessary to provide lots of information beforehand
Reasons why the main idea is correct
"Opinion polls suggest the vast majority of Americans are in favour of gun control." (and then cite statistics)
3rd paragraph
e.g.
Use more than one paragraph if there are many reasons
Reasons why the counter-arguments are wrong
"The majority of Americans may not trust in government to enforce gun control. But ..."
4th paragraph
e.g.
Talk to people to learn the list of counter-arguments
Use more than one paragraph if there are many counter-arguments
It's okay to admit the limitation of your argument
Restate the main idea
"For all the reasons described above, the Median Voter Theorem cannot explain why Americans have failed to adopt the gun control.
5th paragraph
e.g.
Then add a statement for future
"We need a better theory of politics so that we will be able to find a solution to stop Americans from dying by gunshots."
e.g.
Read pages 24-108 twice
First, before starting to write
Second, when done with the first draft
The book also discusses how to write
Novels (pp. 110-183)
Blog posts (pp. 186-242)
for
Similar economic policies between LDP and DPJ in the mid-2000s.
Figure 3 of Kubo (2016)
"Third Way" by Tony Blair (Prime Minister 1997-2007)
Image sources:
Donald Trump advocates for big government
(Talking about healthcare) Everybody’s got to be covered. This is an un-Republican thing for me to say... Everybody’s going to be taken care of much better than they’re taken care of now. ...the government’s gonna pay for it.
Image/quote source: thefederalist.com/2016/01/27/5-times-trump-told-you-he-loves-big-government/
("Model of the World")
(Optimization + Equilibirum)
(Empiricism)
We break down this question into three:
50% below
50% above
The voter whose ideal policy takes the median value
II
Value-added tax rate across OECD countries in 2015
Source: OECD (2017) "Goods and services as percentage of total taxation" Government At A Glance 2017
Voters care about one single policy
Two candidates compete
Winner keeps electoral promise
In a model of the world where:
Voters care about one single policy
Two candidates compete
Winner keeps electoral promise
There are so many policy issues
But an opinion on one policy often predicts the one on another
abortion
marijuana
same-sex marriage
e.g.
We can bundle policies into a few
Social: Conservative vs Liberal
Economic: Small vs Big government
Diplomatic: Hawk vs Dove
Assumption #1
Voters care about one single policy
Two candidates compete
Winner keeps electoral promise
But do voters care about
only one bundle of policies?
Very strong assumption
But simple enough as a starting point
Assumption #1
Voters care about one single policy
Two candidates compete
Winner keeps electoral promise
Quite common for plurality elections
e.g. Osaka gubernational election in 2015
Assumption #2
Voters care about one single policy
Two candidates compete
Winner keeps electoral promise
But not plausible for proportional representation electoral system
Proportional representation
Plurality
Mixed
Assumption #2
Voters care about one single policy
Two candidates compete
Winner keeps electoral promise
Assumption #3
Perhaps unrealistic assumption
Voters care about one single policy
Two candidates compete
Winner keeps electoral promise
Plausible if breaking promise means defeat in next election
Assumption #3
Image source: https://blogs.yahoo.co.jp/nisekoannnuburi/26318040.html
To see why the theorem holds,
use the two defining features of economics:
optimization & equilibrium
Look at voters' optimization
Figure out which candidate wins
Consider candidate's optimization
Check whether it's the equilibrium
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Voter's
ideal
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Voter's optimization
Choose the candidate whose promise is closer to their ideal policy
Step 1
Voter's
ideal
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Choose the candidate whose promise is closer to their ideal policy
Voter's optimization
Step 1
Voter's
ideal
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Choose the candidate whose promise is closer to their ideal policy
Voter's optimization
Step 1
Voter's
ideal
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Choose the candidate whose promise is closer to their ideal policy
Voter's optimization
Step 1
Choose the candidate whose promise is closer to their ideal policy
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Voter's optimization
Step 1
This is each voter's best affordable option
Which candidate wins?
Depends on where the median voter is
50% below
50% above
Median
Step 2
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Case 1
Which candidate wins?
Step 2
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Case 2
Which candidate wins?
Step 2
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Case 3
Which candidate wins?
Step 2
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Case 4
Which candidate wins?
Step 2
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Case 5
Which candidate wins?
Step 2
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Which candidate wins?
Step 2
Summary
Candidate's optimization
Consider Case 1: A is closer to median
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Step 3
But B is better off by choosing x instead
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
x
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
We're now in case 2: B is closer to median
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
A is then better off by choosing x instead.
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
x
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
We're back to Case 1: A is closer to median
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Median
Voter
Both candidates want to be closer to median than the other
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
A wants to pick x to be closer to median than B
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
x
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
How about Case 3?
B wants to pick x to be closer to median than A
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
x
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
In Case 4
In Case 5, each wants to be closer to median to win for sure
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Median
Voter
Both candidates want to be closer to median than the other
Candidate's optimization
Step 3
In all cases
What is the equilibrium?
Step 4
Remember what the equilibrium is?
What is the equilibrium?
Candidates change their policy when neither picks median
Policy
A
B
Median
Voter
Step 4
Candidate picks median if the other already picks median
Policy
A
Median
Voter
B
What is the equilibrium?
Step 4
When both promise median...
Policy
A & B
Median
Voter
What is the equilibrium?
Step 4
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B
When both promise median...
What is the equilibrium?
Step 4
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B
When both promise median...
What is the equilibrium?
Step 4
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B
When both promise median...
Neither A nor B benefits from changing their choice
What is the equilibrium?
Step 4
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B
This is the equilibrium!
When both promise median...
Neither A nor B benefits from changing their choice
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B
This is the equilibrium!
Winning candidate will then implement
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B
Equilibrium is stark, not very realistic
Policy
Candidate A's promise
Candidate B's promise
Median
Voter
But the main lesson is the centripetal force in politics
Economics is sometimes a bit like a fairy tale
Unrealistic, but a lesson relevant for reality
Limitations of Median Voter Theorem
Important to understand for you to figure out
whether the Theorem can explain the policy of your choice
for term paper
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #1
e.g. economic policy + foreign policy
We take up this issue in Lecture 6: Probabilistic Voting Model
When voters care about more than one policy
Hawk
Dove
Small govt.
Big govt.
When politicians cannot commit to electoral promise
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #2
Plausible if politicians have their own ideal policy
With no commitment,
Winning candidate will be the one
whose ideal policy is closest to median
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #2
Policy
A wins!
B
Vote for A
Vote for B
Median
Voter
Then why the median voter doesn't become a candidate?
We will look at this issue in Lecture 4: Citizen-candidate Model
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #2
Policy
A
B
Median
Voter
("I will run for office!")
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #3
e.g. Tokyo gubernatorial election in 2016
image source: headlines.yahoo.co.jp/hl?a=20160719-00010001-bfj-soci
When there are more than two candidates
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B & C
Suppose all three parties promise median voter's ideal policy
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #3
When there are more than two candidates
Policy
Median
Voter
A & B
Any party (say, C) wants to deviate a little
C
(almost 50%)
(each gets 25%)
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #3
When there are more than two candidates
We need to consider what determines # of candidates
When there are more than two candidates
Limitation of Median Voter Theorem #3
We will look at this issue in Lecture 4: Citizen-candidate Model
As we see
economists start with a simple (if unrealistic) model of the world
Using this simple model as the benchmark
economists modify the model to understand the world further
image source: babsreviews.com/online-marketing-this-week.html
Remember the 3rd defining feature of economics?
Collect many observations to see if we get the graph below
median voter's ideal policy
politician's policy
We do see this graph for homogeneous districts in U.S. (Gerber and Lewis 2004)
median voter's ideal policy
politician's policy
But that's not enough because...
Voters' ideal policy may change in response to politician's choice
Both voters and politicians may respond to common shock
We need an exogenous change in median voter's ideal policy
Women care more about children
Female suffrage will move the median voter's ideal policy more child-friendly
Natural experiment:
Spending on child health
Median
before
women's suffrage
Men
Women
Spending on child health
Median
after
women's suffrage
Median
before
women's suffrage
Figure I of Miller (2008)
Municipal health spending rose after women's suffrage
Figure II of Miller (2008)
Hygiene campaign spending
Child mortaliry dropped after women's suffrage
Figure IV of Miller (2008)
(accounting for 10% of the decline during 1900-1930)
Policy
A
B
Median
Voter
Politicians tend to pick the policy closer to median
We will apply the Median Voter Theorem to understand...
Income Redistribution
image source: whitewraithe.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/richpoor.jpg
We will apply the Median Voter Theorem to understand...
Democratization
image source: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liberty_Leading_the_People
Medium Voter Theorem
Chapter 1 of Gelbach (2013)
Evidence for Medium Voter Theorem
This lecture is based on the following academic articles and books: