Masayuki Kudamatsu
4 October, 2017
Masayuki Kudamatsu
4 October, 2017
Who am I, by the way?
Born and bred
in Tokyo
Study PhD
in London
Do research
in Stockholm
Democracy in Africa
helps more babies survive
Connections
AND good job performance
promote politicians in China
Aim of this course #1
Aim #2 of this course
Therefore
And
I might be wrong. You might know better.
We all strive to solve a problem.
Reference: Acemoglu, Laibson, and List Economics, chapters 1-2.
Economists investigate:
Buy iPhone X or not
Economists investigate:
Apple: how many iPhone X to produce
Economists investigate:
Get married or not
Economists investigate:
Study now or later
Economists investigate:
Vote for LDP or not
Economists think:
Economists think:
It meets each individual's objective
Economists think:
Within the budget
Within 24 hours a day
Among the list of candidates
Example:
(Is it the best?)
Intellectual fun
Learning English
Love politics
etc.
(Is it affordable?)
Another fun course
Difficult to get credit
etc.
Economists also investigate:
Price of low-cost airline tickets
Economists also investigate:
Traffic jam
Notice:
Notice:
Many people choose to drive
Notice:
Many people choose to drive
More traffic jam
Notice:
Many people choose to drive
More traffic jam
Some start using public transport
Notice:
Many people choose to drive
More traffic jam
Some start using public transport
Less traffic jam
Notice:
Many people choose to drive
More traffic jam
Some start using public transport
Less traffic jam
Economists think:
Example:
Proof
of a great course
More students
join the course
Example:
Proof
of a great course
More students
join the course
Less interaction with me
during lectures
Some students
drop out
Example:
Proof
of a great course
More students
join the course
Less interaction with me
during lectures
Some students
drop out
Proof
of a bad course
More students
drop out
Example:
Proof
of a great course
More students
join the course
Less interaction with me
during lectures
Some students
drop out
Proof
of a bad course
More students
drop out
More interaction with me
during lectures
No more students
drop out
Example:
Proof
of a great course
More students
join the course
Less interaction with me
during lectures
Some students
drop out
Proof
of a bad course
More students
drop out
More interaction with me
during lectures
No more students
drop out
The adjustment process continues
Example:
Proof
of a great course
More students
join the course
Less interaction with me
during lectures
Some students
drop out
Proof
of a bad course
More students
drop out
More interaction with me
during lectures
No more students
drop out
The adjustment process continues
Economists think:
building
Our knowledge comes from
and checking if the models are
Economists think:
building
Our knowledge comes from
and checking if the models are
Simplified
representation
of the world
Economists think:
building
Our knowledge comes from
and checking if the models are
Simplified
representation
of the world
Economists think:
building
Our knowledge comes from
and checking if the models are
Many models
logically possible
Economists think:
building
Our knowledge comes from
and checking if the models are
Many models
logically possible
Allow us to pick the best model
Economists think:
building
Our knowledge comes from
and checking if the models are
To check a model's consistency with data, economists:
and
Example:
You: No, because China is still not a democracy.
Economist: But that could just be an outlier.
Figure 1 from Acemoglu et al. (2008)
Economist: No, that's a correlation, not a causality.
You: The higher GDP per capita, the more democratic
to tease out causality from correlations
cf. drug tests
e.g. weather
e.g. close elections
II
+
+
Summary
(an overview of the course)
Each politician proposes a policy (say, a tax rate)
Citizens vote for a politician whose policy is closest to their ideal
A politician with the largest number of votes wins
Theorem says:
All politicians propose a policy that divides citizens in half:
e.g. 50% prefer a higher rate; 50% prefer a lower rate.
Each citizen decides whether to become a candidate for office
Each citizen chooses which candidate to vote for
Winning candidate enacts his/her own preferred policy.
Equilibrium: median citizen may not run for office.
Each politician is also a citizen.
Voters can be grouped into three:
Loyal
to ruling party
Loyal
to opposition
Not loyal to any
(swing voters)
The model predicts:
Politicians (both ruling party and opposition) propose
not loyal voters.
Conflict between politicians and citizens (e.g. corruption)
Ruling party politicians
choose a policy
Citizens
choose which to vote for:
ruling party or opposition
Winning party politicians
choose a policy in the next period
One legislator proposes a policy
All legislators vote on the proposal
If a majority vote in favour
the proposal is enacted
Otherwise
the status quo policy stays
(an overview of the final part of the course)
Lobbyists
bid against each other
for a policy favour
Lobbyists
inform politicians
of which policy is good
Two models
How interest groups affect policy-making
Don't go to vote
if the probability
that your vote is decisive
is very small
Go to vote
by a sense of civic duty
Two models
Why do voters go to poll?
Useful for
understanding
the intensity of wars
Fight because
the enemy
cannot commit
to peace in the future
Three models
Why people fight each other?
Fight because
the enemy's strength
is underestimated
That's the end of today's academic material.
will be based on an
(Solve a problem, not a quiz)
you think will improve our society
can explain why the policy is not enacted
At the beginning of each lecture, you can declare the policy of your choice so no one else can choose the same one.
Email a PDF copy to kudamatsu@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp by
Our last lecture
Exam period
24 January
30 January - 9 February
For your information:
at Room 603 of OSIPP
(number 6 in the map)
will be available at
by the beginning of each lecture
It refers to at least 4 (very) different academic fields
Marxist economics
19th-century Economics (and Political Science)
A sub-field of international relations in political science
A field of economics, formerly known as public choice
An extra note on the term