> in relation to collective bargaining

- Distinction local/central in the literature

 

Livernash, E. R. (1963). “The relation of power to the structure and process of collective bargaining”. The Journal of Law and Economics, 6, 10-40.

 

"Management has its strongest power position when it has a reasonably large number of plants, geographically dispersed, producing on a nonintegrated basis, with plant bargaining by different unions with different expiration dates. But any form of plant bargaining, so long as production in one plant is not dependent on production in other plants and provided contract expiration dates do not coincide, gives management a strong bargaining position.” p. 24-25

> in relation to collective bargaining

- Distinction local/central in the literature

 

Kinnie, N. (1982), "Bargaining Structures in Multi‐Plant Companies." Employee Relations, 4(1), 23-26.

> Local bargaining gives more flexibility

 

Block, R., & Berg, P. (2009). “Joint Responsibility Unionism: A Multi-Plant Model of Collective Bargaining under Employment Security”. ILR Review, 63(1), 60-81

> Local cooperation between unions and management can help the firm increase profitability rather than wages, to maximize employment

 

Zagelmeyer, S. (2005). The employer's perspective on collective bargaining centralization: an analytical framework. Int. J of HR Managmnt, 16(9), 1623-39.

> Geographical concentration of plants favors centralized bargaining because of high comparability of working conditions in a homogenous labor market

 

> in relation to collective bargaining

- Distinction local/central in the literature

- Lacking data to validate systematic claims

Swidinsky, R. (1981). “The Effect of Bargaining Structure on Negotiated Wage Settlements”. Relations industrielles / Industrial Relations, 36 (2), 371–385.

 

2300 agreements in the Canadian private sector

Compares single-plant and multi-plant firms on wages settlements

> does not consider the level of bargaining within the firm

Organisation of the firm:

- Productive

- Geographical

 

Within the firm = locational choices for plants & HQs

- with CLAP/FLORES (France), BSD (UK), AES (US) etc.

Aarland, K., Davis, J. C., Henderson, J. V., & Ono, Y. (2007). “Spatial organization of firms: The decision to split production and administration”. The RAND Journal of Economics, 38(2), 480-494.

 

Henderson, J. V., & Ono, Y. (2008). Where do manufacturing firms locate their headquarters?. Journal of Urban Economics, 63(2), 431-450.

> depends on industry, size, geographical dispersion

Organisation of the firm:

- Productive

- Geographical

 

Within the group = locational choices for firms (FDI, mergers and acquisition)

- ORBIS (world)

 

 

Bohan, C., & Gautier, B. (2013). Multilevel analysis of Corporations Networks: A comparison between agro-food and automobile strategies for Urban Development. In Methods for Multilevel Analysis and Visualisation of Geographical Networks (pp. 155-176). Springer, Dordrecht.

Organisation of the firm:

- Productive

- Geographical

Within the firm & group:

- ORBIS (world)

- LIFI (France)

- CLAP (France)

Finance, O. (2016). Les villes françaises investies par les firmes transnationales étrangères: des réseaux d'entreprises aux établissements localisés (Doctoral dissertation, Paris 1)

> Size and regional effect of cities receiving FDI through multinationals

> to test structural hypotheses on strategic choices by employers on the bargaining level, using a large representative sample of workplaces of multi-facility firms.

 

 

TO WHICH EXTENT CAN THE STRUCTURAL ORGANISATION OF FIRMS DETERMINE THE PRESENCE AND LEVEL OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING?

Hypothesis:

> The productive and geographical organisation of firm affect the level of centralisation in collective bargaining.

 

 

Central bargaining in large, geographically dispersed, "clone" companies

 

vs.

 

 

Local bargaining in small, geographically compact, functionally integrated companies

 

 

> Multi-establishment firm (i = 1...N)

 

 

 

 

 

Sunk cost of bargaining at the establishment level c>0. At the firm level, the employer enjoys increasing returns in her bargaining technology: the cost c(N) is increasing but concave in the number of covered establishments, and 0 < c (2) < 2c.

 

> Bargaining power of workers' representative

Our model suggests three testable hypotheses:

 

H1: The geographic dispersion of establishments favours negotiation at central/company level.

 

H2: The heterogeneity of size/activity of establishments favours negotiation at the establishment level.

 

H3: The number of establishments belonging to the firm is positively related to a firm level bargaining.

 

There can also me mixed strategies for the employer:

- conducting bargaining at both central and local level

- pooling some establishments into a single negotiation but not all, especially the ones that are far from HQs, to make it hard for employee representatives to coordinate their actions and mobilize workers.

 

This leads to:

 

H4: The distance of a particular establishment from its head office may favour its inclusion in a multi-establishment bargaining.

 

Despite reputation for industrial dispute,

 

of companies with 10+ employees on given year in the 2010s:

 

<2% experienced a strike action

 

15% conducted collective bargaining

       - of which 80% reached an agreement

 

 

> Only recognised unions can bargain with the employer

 

In establishments with 50+ employees: a union is recognised when it attracted >10% votes at last professional election 

 

> When unions are present, employers have to open, each year, collective bargaining on legal list of topics:

 

 

 

...except if agreement on given topic in past 4 years still valid. NB: reaching an agreement is not mandatory! >30% votes

 

 

- wages

- profit sharing schemes

- working time

 

 

- gender equality

- quality of work life

(Until Summer 2016)

Level of bargaining: local vs company

= discretionary choice of the employer in multi-establishment firms.