(P1) Famine is bad.
(P2) If it is within our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it.
(P3) There are things that are in our power to do to reduce famine that do not require sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
(P4) Hence: we ought, morally, to do those things.
(P5) We do not, currently, do those things.
(C) Our current practices are morally impermissible.
One ought to perform the action which, out of all of those available to one, will produce the best outcome.
Best outcome: the action which produces the most good, once bad has been subtracted.
One can either:
If everyone were willing to act, and we were to distribute what's asked of each equally, what should each of us do to realise the good or extinguish the relevant bad?
Full Compliance = Everyone doing their fair share to realise the good/extinguish the bad.
Partial Compliance = Only some doing their bit.
Consider a hypothetical famine which would cost £1000 to solve. Suppose there were 1000 of us. If we were all willing to act, and requirements distributed evenly, what would we need to do to eradicate the famine? We'd each have to give £1.
Full Compliance = Each other person giving £1
Partial Compliance = Not everyone giving £1.
What the Simple Principle requires of one depends on whether one is in a situation of full or partial compliance.
£1000 Famine + Full Compliance = £1 is optimal
£1000 Famine + only 10 complying = £100 optimal
Take-home message: the Simple Principle requires that one takes up the slack of the non-compliant.
Now consider a case of realistic famine, which would cost many billions to eradicate, e.g. Singer's Bengal case.
Full compliance would require a manageable sacrifice.
Partial compliance would require very demanding sacrifices indeed.
No principle of beneficence should make such demands!
Intuitively, no principle of beneficence should require us to do more, just because other people are doing less.
The Compliance Condition: "A principle of beneficence should not increase its demands on agents as expected compliance with the principle by other agents decreases." (p.278)
Two separate objections to the Simple Principle here.
OD Objection is an objection which concerns what demands a true principle of beneficence can make of agents.
Compliance Objection is an objection which concerns whether a principle of beneficence can require one to take up the slack of non-complying agents.
"Each agent is required to act optimally - to perform the action that makes the outcome best - except in situations of partial compliance with this principle. In situations of partial compliance it is permissible to act optimally, but the sacrifice each agent is required to make is limited to the level of sacrifice that would be optimal if the situation were one of full compliance..." (p.280)
What the Cooperative Principle requires from one is very different from what the Simple Principle requires from one.
In cases of partial compliance, what the Cooperative Principle requires is no more than it requires in a case of full compliance.
One argument moves from the intuitively plausible Compliance Condition, to the Cooperative Principle.
A second argument appeals to the supposedly compelling cooperative conception of beneficence.
On the cooperative conception of beneficence, beneficence is irreducibly a matter of one doing good together with others.
It's clear how Murphy's Cooperative Principle tackles the Compliance Objection. It's just built into the principle that it satisfies the Compliance Condition, after all.
But how does Murphy counteract the Over-Demandingness Objection?
(A) No principle of beneficence should, in cases of realistic famine + partial compliance, require agents to sacrifice significant amounts of their own well-being.
(B) There is a strict limit on what a principle of beneficence can require of one, whatever the context - for example no more than 80% of one's well-being.
In an extreme case of bad (for example: a zombie apocalypse), what each is required to do in a case of full compliance might still be quite demanding indeed.
(P2) If it is within our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally, to do it.
This principle runs into the OD Objection and the Compliance Objection.
Murphy rejects (P2).
"if everyone in circumstances like mine gave £5 to the Bengal Relief Fund, there would be enough to provide food, shelter, and medical care for the refugees; there is no reason why I should give more than anyone else in the same circumstances as I am; therefore I have no obligation to give more than £5."
(P1) If everyone in my situation gives £5 then there would be enough to help.
(P2) In those circumstances, there is no reason why I should give more.
(C) I have no obligation to give more than £5
(C) should say: If I am in a situation of full compliance, then I am under no obligation to give more than £5.
(P1) If everyone in my situation gives £5 then there would be enough to help.
(P2) I have no reason to give more than what I would be obliged to give were everyone compliant.
(C) I have no obligation to give more than £5.
This argument is now valid. Singer rejects (P2), Murphy accepts it.