Designer uncertainty and agent uncertainty

Martin Biehl (Cross Labs)

Nathaniel Virgo (Earth-Life Science Institute)

Made possible via funding by:

Overview

  • Designing artificial agents using probabilistic inference
  • Designer uncertainty / problem uncertainty
  • Agent uncertainty
  • Recap

Designing artificial agents

When we design artificial agents  we usually know something about

  • dynamics of environment \(E\) the agent will face
  • sensor values \(S\) available to it
  • actions \(A\) it can take
  • goal \(G\) it should achieve

 

Then want to find

  • dynamics of memory \(M\)
  • selection of actions \(A\)
  • that achieve the goal (or make it likely)

We show how

  • express problem of designers of artificial agents face
  • designers can incorporate their own uncertainty into the problem and leave it to the artificial agent to resolve it
  • to ensure that the artificial agent has a Bayesian interpretation and therefore it's own well defined uncertainty

Perspective: design as planning

Designing artificial agents

Formally represent what we know and what we don't know via Bayesian network with

  • known Markov kernels (white)
  • unknown Markov kernels (grey)
  • goal-achieved-variable \(G\)

Designing artificial agents

  • Bayesian network:
    1. Set of random variables \(X=(X_1,..,X_n)\)
    2. each variable \(X_i\) has associated
      • node \(i \in V\) in a directed acyclic graph
      • Markov kernel \(p(x_i|x_{\text{pa}(i)})\) defining its dependence on other variables
    3. Joint probability distribution factorizes according to the graph:
      \[\newcommand{\pa}{\text{pa}}p(x) = \prod_{v\in V} p(x_v | x_{\pa(v)}).\]

Designing artificial agents

  • Bayesian network:
    • We distinguish:
      • known kernels \(B\subset V\)
      • unknown kernels \(U\subset V\)
      • then:
        \[\newcommand{\pa}{\text{pa}}p(x) = \prod_{u\in U} p_u(x_a | x_{\pa(a)}) \, \prod_{b\in B} \bar p_b(x_b | x_{\pa(b)})\]

Designing artificial agents

Find unknown kernels \(p_U:=\{p_u: u \in U\}\)

  • maximize probability of achieving the goal:

    \[p_U^* = \text{arg} \max_{p_U} p(G=1).\]
    a.k.a. planning as inference [*]
  • equivalent to maximum likelihood inference
  • automates design of agent memory dynamics and action selection (but hard to solve)

 

[*] Matthew Botvinick and Marc Toussaint. Planning as inference. Trends in cognitive sciences, 16(10):485–488, 2012.

Example: 2-armed bandit

  • Constant hidden "environment state" \(\phi=(\phi_1,\phi_2)\) storing win probabilities of two arms
  • agent action is choice of arm \(a_t \in \{1,2\}\)
  • sensor value is either win or lose sampled according to win probability of chosen arm \(s_t \in \{\text{win},\text{lose}\}\)
    \[p_{S_t}(s_t|a_{t-1},\phi)=\phi_{a_{t-1}}^{\delta_{\text{win}}(s_t)} (1-\phi_{a_{t-1}})^{\delta_{\text{lose}}(s_t)}\]
  • goal is achieved if last arm choice results in win \(s_3=\text{win}\)
    \[p_G(G=1|s_3)=\delta_{\text{win}}(s_3)\]
  • memory \(m_t \in \{1,2,3,4\}\) is enough to store all different results.

 

Example: 2-armed bandit

  • Environment contains two arms with fixed win probabilities

    \[p_U^* = \text{arg} \max_{p_U} p(G=1).\]
    a.k.a. planning as inference [*]
  • equivalent to maximum likelihood inference
  • automates design of agent memory dynamics and action selection (but hard to solve)


[*] Matthew Botvinick and Marc Toussaint. Planning as inference. Trends in cognitive sciences, 16(10):485–488, 2012.

Two situations:

  • designer uncertain about environment dynamics
  • agent supposed to deal with different environments

Explicitly reflect this by

  • additional variable \(\phi\)
  • prior distribution over \(\phi\)

 

Designer uncertainty

Then

  • agent will find out what is necessary to achieve goal
  • i.e. it will trade off exploration (try out different arms) and exploitation (winning)
  • comparable to meta-learning

 

Designer uncertainty

Can also make another kind of uncertainty explicit

  • choose model that agent should have of causes of its sensor values
  • fix memory dynamics \(p_M(m_t|s_t,m_{t-1})\) such that it has consistent Bayesian interpretation w.r.t chosen model
  • only action kernels \(p_A(a_t|m_t)\) unknown

Agent uncertainty

Then by construction

  • know a consistent Bayesian interpretation
  • i.e.\ an interpretation map \(\psi:M \to PH\)
  • well defined agent uncertainty in state \(m_t\) via Shannon entropy \[H_{\text{Shannon}}(m_t):=\sum_{h} \psi(h||m_t) \log \psi(h||m_t)\]
  • information gain from \(m_0\) to \(m_t\) by KL divergence \[D_{\text{KL}}[m_t||m_0]:=\sum_h \psi(h||m_t) \log \frac{\psi(h||m_t)}{\psi(h||m_0)}\]

Agent uncertainty

Note:

  • can then also turn this information gain into a goal to create intrinsically motivated agent
  • (some trick is needed...)

Agent uncertainty

  • Considered design of artificial agents as planning task
  • formalized planning task as inference problem in Bayesian network
  • can explicitly reflect designer's uncertainty / knowledge
  • resulting agents automatically trade of exploration and exploitation
  • constructing interpretable agent memory allows calculation of (subjective) agent uncertainty and information gain

Recap

Perspective: "design as inference"

Underlying perspective:

  • view design of artificial agents as planning task:
    • usually planning means find (own) actions that achieve a goal
    • when designing an artificial agent also create a kind of "plan" but
      • it will be executed by something else (e.g. computer)
      • must explicitly plan "internal actions" like what to remember (memory update)

Perspective: "design as inference"

Underlying perspective:

  • design of artificial agents similar to planning task:
    • usually planning means find (own) actions that achieve a goal
    • when designing an artificial agent to achieve a goal:
      • also create a kind of "plan" but
      • plan will be executed by something else (e.g. computer)
      • plan must include "internal actions" like plan of what to remember (memory update)

Underlying perspective:

  • known: planning can be done by probabilistic inference

 

\(\Rightarrow\) if we formulate agent design problems as planning problems they become inference problems

Perspective: "design as inference"

Perspective: design as planning

Underlying perspective:

  • view design of artificial agents as planning task:
  • use formal way to represent this planning task (planning as inference)
  • gives us formal way to design agents

 

 

design as planning \(\to\) planning as inference

\(\Rightarrow\) design as inference?

General setting

 

Assume

  • want to achieve some goal
  • know:
    • the environment you want to achieve it in
    • actions you can take
    • observations you will be able to make

Then

  • planning is the process of finding actions that lead to goal

POMDPs

Formalize as POMDP:

  • Known:
    • goal
    • environment/world state \(W\) with dynamics: \(p(w_{t+1}|w_t,a_t)\)
    • observations / sensor values \(S\): \(p(s_t|w_t)\)
  •  

Planning as inference

Terminology:

  • Planning:
    • finding policy parameters that maximize probability of achieving a goal
  • Maximum likelihood inference:
    • finding model parameters that maximize probability of data

Planning as inference

What is it good for?

 

Automatically find a probabilistic policy to achieve a goal.

 

What do you need to use it?

  • probabilistically specified problem!
    • dynamics of environment (including influence of actions)
    • inputs / sensor values / observation available to policy
    • goal
    •  

Planning as inference

Combination:

  • Planning as inference (PAI):
    • Consider the achievement of the goal as the only available data
    • ensure policy parameters are the only model parameters
    • then maximizing likelihood of data maximizes likelihood of achieving the goal

 

 

\(\Rightarrow\) can use max. likelihood to solve planning!

Maximum likelihood inference

Given:

  1. Statistical model:
    • set \(X\) of possible observations
    • parameterized set \(\{p_\phi:\phi \in \Phi\}\) of probability distributions \(p_\phi(x)\) over \(X\)
  2. Observation \(\bar x \in X\)

 

Find parameter \(\phi^*\) that maximizes likelihood of the observations:

\[\phi^*=\text{arg} \max_\phi p_\phi(\bar x)\]

Maximum likelihood inference

Example: Maximum likelihood inference of coin bias

  1. Statistical model:
    • \(X=\{(x_1,...,x_n): x_i \in \{\text{heads},\text{tails}\}\}\)
    • \(\{p_\phi(x)=  \phi^{c_{\text{heads}}(x)} (1-\phi)^{c_{\text{tails}}(x)}:\phi \in [0,1]\}\)
  2. Observation \(\bar x \in X\)

Then:

\[\phi^*=\text{arg} \max_\phi p_\phi(\bar x)=\frac{c_{\text{heads}}(\bar x)}{c_{\text{heads}}(\bar x)+c_{\text{tails}}(\bar x)}\]

 

Maximum likelihood inference

Example: Maximum likelihood inference of coin bias

  1. Statistical model:
    • observations are sequences of outcomes \(X=\{(x_1,...,x_n): x_i \in \{\text{heads},\text{tails}\}\}\)
    • parameterized set of distributions \(\{p_\phi:\phi \in [0,1]\}\) with
      \[p_\phi(x)=  \phi^{c_{\text{heads}}(x)} (1-\phi)^{c_{\text{tails}}(x)}\]
      here \(c_{\text{heads}}(x)\) , \(c_{\text{tails}}(x)\) count occurrences of heads/tails in \(x\)
  2. Observation \(\bar x \in X\)

Find parameter \(\phi^*\) that maximizes likelihood of the observations:

\[\phi^*=\text{arg} \max_\phi p_\phi(\bar x)\]

Maximum likelihood inference

Example: Maximum likelihood inference of coin bias

  1. Statistical model:
    • observations are sequences of outcomes \(X=\{(x_1,...,x_n): x_i \in \{\text{heads},\text{tails}\}\}\)
    • parameterized set \(\{p_\phi:\phi \in \Phi=\[0,1\]\}\)  with
      \[p_\phi(x)= \prod_{i=1}^n \phi^{\delta_{\text{heads}}(x_i)} (1-\phi)^{\delta_{\text{tails}}(x_i)}\]
  2. Observation \(\bar x \in X\)

 

Find parameter \(\phi^*\) that maximizes likelihood of the observations:

\[\phi^*=\text{arg} \max_\phi p_\phi(\bar x)\]

Maximum likelihood inference

Example: Maximum likelihood inference of coin bias

  1. Statistical model:
    • observations are sequences of outcomes \(X=\{(x_1,...,x_n): x_i \in \{\text{heads},\text{tails}\}\}\)
    • parameterized set \(\{p_\phi:\phi \in \Phi=\[0,1\]\}\)  with
      \[p_\phi(x)= \prod_{i=1}^n \phi^{\delta_{\text{heads}}(x_i)} (1-\phi)^{\delta_{\text{tails}}(x_i)}\]
  2. Observation \(\bar x \in X\)

 

Find parameter \(\phi^*\) that maximizes likelihood of the observations:

\[\phi^*=\text{arg} \max_\phi p_\phi(\bar x)\]

Planning as inference

Note that for maximum lik

  1. Set of observations can be arbitrarily simple
  2. Set of probability distributions can be arbitrarily complicated

 

So we can use :

  1. Binary "goal-achieved-variable" with \(G=\{g,\neg g\}\) for observations
  2. Bayesian networks (with hidden variables) for specifying the sets of probability distributions

Planning as inference

  • Problem structures as Bayesian networks:

Planning as inference

Bayesian network

goal

  • Represent goals and policies by sets of probability distributions:
    • goal must be an event i.e. function \(G(x)\) with
      • \(G(x)=1\) if goal is achieved
      • \(G(x)=0\) else.
    • goal manifold is set of distributions where the goal event occurs with probability one:
      \[M_G:=\{P: p(G=1)=1\}\]

Planning as inference

  • Find policies that maximize probability of goal via geometric EM algorithm:
    • planning as inference finds policy / agent kernels such that:
      \[P^* = \text{arg} \max_{P \in M_A} p(G=1).\]
    • (compare to maximum likelihood inference)

Bayesian network

goal

policies

Planning as inference

Practical side of original framework:

  • Represent
    • Planning problem structure by Bayesian networks
    • Goal and possible policies by sets of probability distributions
  • Find policies that maximize probability of goal via geometric EM algorithm.

     

Bayesian network

goal

policies

Expected reward maximization

  • PAI finds policy that maximizes probability of the goal event:
    \[P^* = \text{arg} \max_{P \in M_A} p(G=1).\]
  • Often want to maximize expected reward of a policy:
    \[P^* = \text{arg} \max_{P \in M_A} \mathbb{E}_P[r]\]
  • Can we solve the second problem via the first?
  • Yes, at least if reward has a finite range \([r_{\text{min}},r_{\text{max}}]\):
    • add binary goal node \(G\) to Bayesian network and set:
      \[\newcommand{\ma}{{\text{max}}}\newcommand{\mi}{{\text{min}}}\newcommand{\bs}{\backslash}p(G=1|x):= \frac{r(x)-r_\mi}{r_\ma-r_\mi}.\]

Expected reward maximization

  • Example application: Markov decision process
    • reward only depending on states \(S_0,...,S_3\): \[r(x):=r(s_0,s_1,s_2,s_3)\]
    • reward is sum over reward at each step:
      \[r(s_0,s_1,s_2,s_3):= \sum_i r_i(s_i)\]

Planning as inference

  • Represent goals and policies by sets of probability distributions:
    • policy is a choice of the changeable Markov kernels
      \[\newcommand{\pa}{\text{pa}}\{p(x_a | x_{\pa(a)}):a \in A\}\]
    • agent manifold/policy manifold is set of distributions that can be achieved by varying policy
      \[\newcommand{\pa}{\text{pa}}p(x) = \prod_{a\in A} p(x_a | x_{\pa(a)}) \, \prod_{b\in B} \bar p(x_b | x_{\pa(b)})\]

Bayesian network

goal

policies

Planning as inference

  • Find policies that maximize probability of goal via geometric EM algorithm:
    • Can prove that \(P^*\) is the distribution in agent manifold closest to goal manifold in terms of KL-divergence
    • Local minimizers of this KL-divergence can be found with the geometric EM algorithm

Bayesian network

goal

policies

Planning as inference

  • Find policies that maximize probability of goal via geometric EM algorithm:
  1. Start with an initial prior, \(P_0 \in M_A\) .
  2. (e-projection)
    \[Q_t = \text{arg} \min_{Q\in M_G} D_{KL}(Q∥P_t )\]
  3. (m-projection)
    \[P_{t+1} = \text{arg} \min_{P \in M_A} D_{KL} (Q_t ∥P )\]

 

Bayesian network

goal

policies

Planning as inference

  • Find policies that maximize probability of goal via geometric EM algorithm:
  • Equivalent algorithm using only marginalization and conditioning:
  1. Initial agent kernels define prior, \(P_0 \in M_A\).
  2. Get  \(Q_t\), from \(P_t\) by conditioning on the goal:  \[q_t(x) = p_t(x|G=1).\]
  3. Get \(P_{t+1}\), by replacing agent kernels by conditional distributions in \(Q_t\):
    \[\newcommand{\pa}{\text{pa}} p_{t+1}(x) = \prod_{a\in A} q_t(x_a | x_{\pa(a)}) \, \prod_{b\in B} \bar p(x_b | x_{\pa(b)})\]
    \[\newcommand{\pa}{\text{pa}}  \;\;\;\;\;\;\;= \prod_{a\in A} p_t(x_a | x_{\pa(a)},g) \, \prod_{b\in B} \bar p(x_b | x_{\pa(b)})\]

Uncertain (PO)MDP

  • Assume
    • (as usual) transition kernel of environment is constant over time, but
    • we are uncertain about what is the transition kernel
  • How can we reflect this in our setup / PAI?
  • Can we find agent kernels that solve problem in a way that is robust against variation of those transition kernels?

Uncertain (PO)MDP

  • Extend original (PO)MDP Bayesian network with two steps:
    • parametrize environment transition kernels by shared parameter \(\phi\):
      \[\bar{p}(x_e|x_{\text{pa}(e)}) \to \bar{p}_\phi(x_e|x_{\text{pa}(e)},\phi)\]
    • introduce prior distribution \(\bar{p}(\phi)\) over environment parameter

Uncertain (PO)MDP

  • Same structure can be hidden in original network but in this way becomes a requirement/constraint
  • If increasing goal probability involves actions that resolve uncertainty about the environment then PAI finds those actions!
  • PAI results in curious agent kernels/policy.

Uncertain (PO)MDP

  • Same structure can be hidden in original network but in this way becomes a requirement/constraint
  • If increasing goal probability involves actions that resolve uncertainty about the environment then PAI finds those actions!
  • PAI results in curious agent kernels/policy.

Uncertain (PO)MDP

  •  Relevance for project:
    • agents that can achieve goals in unknown / uncertain environments are important for AGI
    • related to meta-learning
    • understanding knowledge and uncertainty representation is important for agent design in general

 

Related project funded

  • John Templeton Foundation has funded related project titled: Bayesian agents in a physical world
  • Goal:
    • What does it mean that a physical system (dynamical system) contains a (Bayesian) agent?

Related project funded

  • Starting point:
    • given system with inputs defined by
      \[f:C \times S \to C\]
    • define a consistent Bayesian interpretation as:
      1. model / Markov kernel \(q: H \to PS\)
      2. interpretation function \(g:C \to PH\)
    • such that \[g(c_{t+1})(h)=g(f(c_t,s_t))(h)=\frac{q(s_t|h) g(c_t)(h)}{\sum_{\bar h} q(s_t|\bar h) g(c_t)(\bar h)} \]

Related project funded

  • more suggestive notation:
    \[g(h|c_{t+1})=g(h|f(c_t,s_t))=\frac{q(s_t|h) g(h|c_t)}{\sum_{\bar h} q(s_t|\bar h) g(\bar h|c_t)} \]
  • but note: \(PH_i\) are deterministic random variables and need no extra sample space
  • \(H\) isn't even a deterministic random variable (what???)

Related project funded

  • Take away message :
    • Formal condition for when a dynamical system with inputs can be interpreted as consistently updating probabilistic beliefs about the causes of its inputs (e.g. environment)
    • Extensions to include stochastic systems, actions, goals, etc. ongoing...

Related project funded

  • Relevance for project
    • deeper understanding of relation between physical systems and agents will also help in thinking about more applied aspects  
    • a lot of physical agents are made of smaller agents and grow / change their composition, understanding this is also part of the funded project and is also directly relevant for the point "dynamical scalability of multi-agent systems" in the proposal

Two kinds of uncertainty

  • Designer uncertainty:
    • model our own uncertainty about environment when designing the agent to make it more robust / general
  • Agent uncertainty:
    • constructing an agent that uses specific probabilistic belief update method
      • exact Bayesian belief updating (exponential families and conjugate priors)
      • approximate belief updating (VAE world models?)

Two kinds of uncertainty

  • Designer uncertainty:
    • introduce hidden parameter \(\phi\) with prior \(\bar p(\phi)\) among fixed kernels
    • planning as inference finds agent kernels / policy that deal with this uncertainty

Two kinds of uncertainty

  • Agent uncertainty:
    • In perception-action loop:
      • construct agent's memory transition kernels that consistently update probabilistic beliefs about their environment
      • these beliefs come with uncertainty
      • can turn uncertainty reduction itself into a goal!

Two kinds of uncertainty

  • Agent uncertainty:
    • E.g: Define goal event via information gain :
      \[G=1 \Leftrightarrow D_{KL}[PH_2(x)||PH_0(x)] > d\]
    • PAI solves for policy that employs agent memory to gain information / reduce its uncertainty by \(d\) bits

Two kinds of uncertainty

  •  Relevance for project:
    • taking decisions based on agent's knowledge is part of the project

 

Progress

  • Successfully extended framework by features necessary for tackling goals of our project.
  • These are discussed next:
    • Expected reward maximization
    • Parametrized kernels
    • Shared kernels
    • Multi-agent setup and games
    • Uncertain (PO)MDP
    • Related project funded
    • Two uncertainties: designer and agent uncertainty
  • Relevance for project will be highlighted

Expected reward maximization

  • Relevance for project:
    • reward based problems more common than goal event problems ((PO)MDPs, RL, losses...)
    • extends applicability of framework

Parametrized kernels

  • Often we don't want to choose the agent kernels completely freely e.g.:
    • choose parametrized agent kernels
      \[p(x_a|x_{\text{pa}(a)}) \to p(x_a|x_{\text{pa}(a)},\theta_a)\]
  • What do we have to adapt in this case?
    • Step 3 of EM algorithm has to be adapted

Parametrized kernels

  • Algorithm for parametrized kernels (not only conditioning and marginalizing anymore):
    1. Initial parameters \(\theta(0)\) define prior, \(P_0 \in M_A\).
    2. Get  \(Q_t\), from \(P_t\) by conditioning on the goal:  \[q_t(x) = p_t(x|G=1).\]
    3. Get \(P_{t+1}\), by replacing parameter \(\theta_a\) of each agent kernel with result of:
       

Parametrized kernels

  • Relevance for project:
    • needed for shared kernels
    • needed for continuous random variables
    • neural networks are parametrized kernels
    • scalability

Shared kernels

  • We also often want to impose the condition that multiple agent kernels are identical
  • E.g. the three agent kernels in this MDP:

Shared kernels

  • Introduce "types" for agent kernels
    • let \(c(a)\) be the type of kernel \(a \in A\)
    • kernels of same type share
      • input spaces
      • output space
      • parameter
    • then \(p_{c(a)}(x_a|x_{\text{pa}(a)},\theta_c)\) is the kernel of all nodes with \(c(a)=c\).

Shared kernels

  • Example agent manifold change under shared kernels

Shared kernels

  • Algorithm then becomes
    1. Initial parameters \(\theta(0)\) define prior, \(P_0 \in M_A\).
    2. Get  \(Q_t\), from \(P_t\) by conditioning on the goal:  \[q_t(x) = p_t(x|G=1).\]
    3. Get \(P_{t+1}\), by replacing parameter \(\theta_c\) of all agent kernels of type \(c\) with result of:
       

Proposal

  • Exploit planning as inference setup to answer questions about:
    • Multiple, possibly competing goals

    • Coordination and communication from an information theoretic perspective

    • Dynamic scalability of multi-agent systems

    • Dynamically changing goals that depend on knowledge acquired through observations

       

Shared kernels

  • Relevance for project:
    • scalability (less parameters to optimize)
    • make it possible to have
      • multiple agents with same policy
      • constant policy over time

Multi-agent setup

Example multi agent setups:

Two agents interacting with same environment

Two agents with same goal

Two agents with different goals

Multi-agent setup

  • Note:
    • In cooperative setting:
      • can often combine multiple goals to single common goal via event intersection, union, complement (supplied by \(\sigma\)-algebra)
      • single goal manifold
      • in principle can use single agent PAI as before

Multi-agent setup

  • Note:
    • In non-cooperative setting:
      • goal events have empty intersection
        • no common goal
        • multiple disjoint goal manifolds

Multi-agent setup

Example non-cooperative game: matching pennies

  • Each player \(P_i \in \{1,2\}\) controls a kernel \(p(a_i)\) determining probabilities of heads and tails
  • First player wins if both pennies are equal second player wins if they are different

Multi-agent setup

Example non-cooperative game: matching pennies

  • Each player \(P_i \in \{1,2\}\) controls a kernel \(p(a_i)\) determining probabilities of heads and tails
  • First player wins if both pennies are equal second player wins if they are different

joint pdists \(p(a_1,a_2)\)

disjoint goal manifolds

agent manifold

\(p(a_1,a_2)=p(a_1)p(a_2)\)

Non-cooperative games

  • In non-cooperative setting
    • instead of maximizing goal probability:
      • find Nash equilibria
    • can we adapt PAI to do this?
      • established that using EM algorithm alternatingly does not converge to Nash equilibria
      • other adaptations may be possible...

Non-cooperative games

  • Counterexample for multi-agent alternating EM convergence:
    • Two player game: matching pennies
      • Each player \(P_i \in \{1,2\}\) controls a kernel \(p(a_i)\) determining probabilities of heads and tails
      • First player wins if both pennies are equal second player wins if they are different

Non-cooperative games

  • Counterexample for multi-agent alternating EM convergence:
    • Nash equilibrium is known to be both players playing uniform distribution
    • Using EM algorithm to fully optimize player kernels alternatingly does not converge
    • Taking only single EM steps alternatingly also does not converge

EM

EM

Non-cooperative games

  • Counterexample for multi-agent alternating EM convergence
    • fix a strategy for player 2 e.g. \(p_0(A_2=H)=0.2\)

Non-cooperative games

Text

  • run EM algorithm for P1
    • Ends up on edge from (tails,tails) to (tails,heads)
  • result: \(p(A_1=T)=1\)
  • then optimizing P2 leads to \(p(A_2=H)=1\)
  • then optimizing P1 leads to \(p(A_1=H)=1\)
  • and on and on...

Non-cooperative games

Text

  • Taking one EM step for P1 and then one for P2 and so on...
  • ...also leads to loop.

Cooperative games

  • Concrete example of agent manifold reduction under switch from single agent to multi-agent to identical multi-agent setup
    • Like matching pennies but single goal: "different outcome"
      • solution: one action/player always plays heads and one always tails
    • agent manifold:
      • single-agent manifold would be whole simplex
      • multi-agent manifold is independence manifold
      • multi-agent manifold with shared kernel is submanifold of independence manifold

Cooperative games

Multi-agents and games

  • Relevance to project:
    • dealing with multi-agent and multiple, possibly competing goals is a main goal of the project
    • basis for studying communication and interaction
    • basis for scaling up number of agents
    • basis for understanding advantages of multi-agent setups

Preliminary work

  1. Implementation of PAI in state of the art software (e.g. using Pyro)
  2. Planning to learn / uncertain MDP, bandit example.
  3. Do some agents have no interpretation e.g. the "Absent minded driver"? Collaboration with Simon McGregor.
  4. Design independence: some problems can be solved even if kernels are chosen independently others require coordinated choice of kernels, some are in between.
  5. Bayesian networks cannot change their structure dependent on the states of the contained random variables.

Preliminary work

  1. Implementation of PAI in state of the art software (e.g. using Pyro)

 

  • Proofs of concept coded up in Pyro
    • uses stochastic variational inference (SVI) for PAI instead of geometric EM
    • may be useful to connect to work with neural networks since based on PyTorch
  • For simple cases and visualizations also have Mathematica code

Preliminary work

2. Planning to learn / uncertain MDP, bandit example.

  • currently investigating PAI for one armed bandit
  • goal event is \(G=S_3=1\)
  • actions choose one of two bandits that have different win probabilities determined by \(\phi\)
  • agent kernels can use memory \(C_t\) to learn about \(\phi\)

 

Preliminary work

  1. Do some agents have no interpretation e.g. the "Absent minded driver"? Collaboration with Simon McGregor.
  • Driver has to take third exit
  • all agent kernels share parameter \(\theta = \)probability of exiting
  • optimal is \(\theta= 1/3\)
  • Is this an agent even though it may have no consistent intepretation?

Preliminary work

  1. Design independence:
    • some problems can be solved even if kernels are chosen independently
    • others require coordinated choice of kernels,
    • some are in between.
  • Two player penny game
  • goal is to get different outcomes
  • one has to play heads with high probability the other has to play tails
  • can't choose two kernels independently

Preliminary work

  1. Bayesian networks cannot change their structure dependent on the states of the contained random variables.
  • Once we fix the (causal) Bayesian network it stays like that ...

if x=1

Preliminary work

  1. Bayesian networks cannot change their structure dependent on the states of the contained random variables.
  • Once we fix the (causal) Bayesian network it stays like that ...

if x=1

But for adding and removing agents probably needed

Preliminary work

  1. Bayesian networks cannot change their structure dependent on the states of the contained random variables.
  • Once we fix the (causal) Bayesian network it stays like that ...
  • We are learning about modern ways to deal with such changes dynamically -- polynomial functors.

Thank you for your attention!

Uncertain MDP / RL

  • In RL and RL for POMDPs the transition kernels of the environment are considered unknown / uncertain

Two kinds of uncertainty

  • Saw before that we can derive policies that deal with uncertainty
  • This uncertainty can be seen as the "designer's uncertainty"
  • But we can also design agents that have models and come with their own well defined uncertainty
  • For those we can turn uncertainty reduction itself into a goal!

Two kinds of uncertainty

  • Agent uncertainty:
    • e.g. for agent memory implement stochastic world model that updates in response to sensor values
      • then by construction each internal state has a well defined associated belief distribution \(ph_t=f(c_t)\) over hidden variables
      •  
    • turn uncertainty reduction itself into a goal!
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