Laura Greenstreet, Nick Harvey, Victor Sanches Portella
Player
Adversary
\(n\) Experts
0.5
0.1
0.3
0.1
Probabilities
1
0
0.5
0.3
Costs
Player's loss:
Loss of Best Expert
Player's Loss
Knows \(T\) (fixed-time)
Multiplicative Weights Update method:
Optimal for \(n,T \to \infty\) !
If \(n\) is fixed, we can do better
Worst-case regret for 2 experts:
Cover's Algorithm
\(O(T)\) time per round
Dynamic Programming
\(\{0,1\}\) costs
\(O(1)\) time per round
Stochastic Calculus
\([0,1]\) costs
[Cover '67]
Our Algorithm
Technique:
Discretize a solution to a stochastic calculus problem
[HLPR - FOCS '20]
How to exploit the knowledge of \(T\)?
We need to analyze the discretization error!
!
!
Online Learning
馃
Stochastic Calculus
We will look only at \(\{0,1\}\) costs
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
Equal costs do not affect the regret
Cover's algorithm relies on these assumptions by construction
Our alg. and analysis extends to fractional costs
Thought experiment: how much probability mass to put on each expert?
Cumulative Loss on round \(t\)
\(\frac{1}{2}\) is both cases seems reasonable!
Takeaway: player's decision may depend only on the gap between experts's losses
Gap = |42 - 20| = 22
Worst Expert
Best Expert
42
20
2
2
42
42
(and maybe on \(t\))
Player strategy based on gaps:
Choice doesn't depend on the specific past costs
on the Worst expert
on the Best expert
We can compute \(V^*\) backwards in time via DP!
Max regret to be suffered at time \(t\) with gap \(g\)
\(O(T^2)\) time to compute \(V^*\)
At round \(t\) with gap \(g\)
Max. regret for a game with \(T\) rounds
Computing the optimal strategy \(p^*\) from \(V^*\) is easy!
Cover's DP Table
(w/ player playing optimally)
Formula for the regret based on the gaps
Discrete stochastic integral
Moving to continuous time:
Random walk \(\longrightarrow\) Brownian Motion
\(g_0, \dotsc, g_t\) are a realization of a random walk
Useful Perspective:
Deterministic bound = Bound with probability 1
Formula for the regret based on the gaps
Random walk \(\longrightarrow\) Brownian Motion
Reflected Brownian motion (gaps)
Conditions on the continuous player \(p\)
Continuous on \([0,T) \times \mathbb{R}\)
for all \(t \geq 0\)
How to work with stochastic integrals?
It么's Formula:
\(\overset{*}{\Delta} R(t, g) = 0\) everywhere
ContRegret \( = R(T, |B_T|) - R(0,0)\)
Goal:
Find a "potential function" \(R\) such that
(1) \(\partial_g R\) is a valid continuous player
(2) \(R\) satisfies the Backwards Heat Equation
Different from classic FTC!
Backwards Heat Equation
Goal:
Find a "potential function" \(R\) such that
(1) \(\partial_g R\) is a valid continuous player
(2) \(R\) satisfies the Backwards Heat Equation
How to find a good \(R\)?
?
Suffices to find a player \(p\) satisfying the BHE
\(\approx\) Cover's solution!
Also a solution to an ODE
Then setting
preserves BHE and
How to analyze a discrete algorithm coming from stochastic calculus?
Discrete It么's Formula!
Discrete Derivatives
Surprisingly, we can analyze Cover's algorithm with discrete It么's formula
It么's Formula
Discrete It么's Formula
\(V^*\) satisfies the "discrete" Backwards Heat Equation!
Not Efficient
Efficient
Discrete It么 \(\implies\)
Regret of \(p^* \leq V^*[0,0]\)
BHE = Optimal?
Hopefully, \(R\) satisfies the discrete BHE
Discretized player:
We show the total is \(\leq 1\)
Cover's strategy
An Efficient and Optimal Algorithm in Fixed-Time with Two Experts
Technique:
Solve an analogous continuous-time problem, and discretize it
[HLPR '20]
How to exploit the knowledge of \(T\)?
Discretization error needs to be analyzed carefully.
BHE seems to play a role in other problems in OL as well!
Solution based on Cover's alg
Or inverting time in an ODE!
We show \(\leq 1\)
\(V^*\) and \(p^*\) satisfy the discrete BHE!
Insight:
Cover's algorithm has connections to stochastic calculus!