Masayuki Kudamatsu
17 January, 2018
For your term paper...
Does the legislative bargaining model explain
Why won't the Japanese government discourage
in the 21st century?
Background for discussion
Until 2010, Japan and South Korea
were the only countries with the practice of 新卒一括採用
According to Wikipedia (so it has to be double-checked...)
In 2010, South Korea
banned any form of age discrimination in hiring
which discouraged(?) 新卒一括採用
Background for discussion
In 2007, Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (経済財政諮問会議)
proposed to abolish 新卒一括採用(「労働ビッグバン」)
But both managers and labor unions opposed it
For your term paper...
Does the legislative bargaining model explain
Why won't the Japanese government discourage
in the 21st century?
Since 1945, interstate wars
have become less frequent
But civil wars
have been widespread
# of years of conflict
If we plot...
During 1960-2006
% of countries
with 1000+ deaths
per year
due to conflicts
Countries with 1000+ deaths per year
Countries with 25+ deaths per year
Image source: Figure 1 of Blattman and Miguel (2010)
Data source: Armed Conflict Database
In 2017
the following countries
had more than 3000 deaths per year due to civil wars
Source: Armed Conflict Database
Two groups of people in conflict
Each simultaneously allocates their time
between production & fighting
Wages
Prize from winning the war
Agricultural yields
Profits (for firm managers)
e.g.
Political power
Mineral export revenue
e.g.
National army & Rebels
That's the model.
To understand the optimal level of fighting for each group
we need to figure out, as usual, two things:
Extra benefit
Winning probability
doesn't go up much
if you have spent a lot
Fighting hours
Extra benefit
Extra benefit goes up if
Fighting hours
The winning prize
is higher
The opponent
fights longer
or
Extra cost
Wage per hour
Fighting hours
Extra cost
Wage per hour
Fighting hours
Recession reduces extra cost of fighting
Extra
Benefit / Cost
Wage per hour
Fighting hours
Optimal level
Extra
Benefit / Cost
Wage per hour
Fighting hours
Fight
more
Extra
Benefit / Cost
Wage per hour
Fighting hours
Fight
more
So far we considered each group's optimal behavior
But one group's behavior affects the other group's
e.g.
If you get attacked, you fight back
We need to find the equilibrium
Extra
Benefit / Cost
Wage per hour
Fighting hours
Fight
more
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Now consider how the equilibrium behavior changes
when one of the groups is impoverished
Extra
Benefit / Cost
Wage per hour
Fighting hours
Fight
more
Remember:
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Your
fighting hours
Enemy's fighting hours
Summary
You don't earn much by working
Fighting is relatively more attractive
The opponent is fighting back
Communist guerrillas
Paramilitary groups
Source: Acemoglu et al. (2009)
Colombia: among top 3 coffee exporters
In coffee-producing areas in Colombia, then
Lower world coffee prices = Lower wages for coffee farmers
Source: Figure 2 of Dube and Vargas (2013)
For each of 978 municipalities:
# of guerrilla attacks
# of paramilitary attacks
# of clashes between the two sides
# of casualities
in each year between 1988 and 2005
Amount of land for coffee cultivation in 1997
For each year between 1988 and 2005
World prices of coffee
Source: Figure 1A of Dube and Vargas (2013)
Years of low coffee prices | Years of high coffee prices | |
Coffee producing municipalities |
A |
B |
Others |
C |
D |
Source: Figure 4 of Dube and Vargas (2013)
Coffee price dropped by 68% from 1997 to 2003
The rise in conflict is larger for coffee areas than for the rest
by 18% - 31% of the average level
Source: p. 1403 of Dube and Vargas (2013)
The contest model explains what intensifies a war
If the two parties agree to split the winning prize
both are better off
Because then both parties work full-time to earn wage
The commitment model explains when a war cannot be avoided
but doesn't explain why a war cannot be avoided
Two parties, A & B, cannot agree on something
e.g.
North Korea
Wants to continue their nuclear weapon development
U.S.
Wants to stop it
1
Party A decides whether to compromise
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
1
Party A decides whether to compromise
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
2
Party B decides whether to stage a war
Suppose it's optimal for B to stage a war
if and only if A doesn't compromise
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Then it's optimal for A
to compromise when the war is more costly
However, there is always tomorrow.
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
Suppose in next period it's optimal for B
not to stage a war even if A doesn't compromise
e.g.
Skillful military leaders die
More difficult to recruit solidiers due to the economic boom
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
Peace
Then it's optimal for A
not to compromise when the war is more costly
e.g.
North Korea kept their nuclear weapon development
as they didn't believe that U.S. will otherwise attack them
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
If B anticipates that A won't compromise in the next period
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
It can be optimal
for B to go to war
even if
A compromises.
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
B may be militarily weaker
in next period
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
Then, A cannot commit
to compromise
in next period
Compromise
Doesn't
War
Peace
War
Peace
Compromise
Doesn't
War
War
Peace
Anticipating this
B prefers a war while
they are militarily strong
Difficult to measure
the anticipated changes
in military strength
Pick one model that is likely to explain the policy of your choice
Provide facts and evidence in favor of (or against) your argument
Also see Term Paper Guideline
Each of you have 8 minutes including discussions
Pick one model that is likely to explain the policy of your choice
Provide facts and evidence in favor of (or against) your argument
Also see Term Paper Guideline
Each of you have 8 minutes including discussions
For Term Paper Workshop
This lecture is based on the following academic articles:
Commitment Model
Garfinkel, Michelle R., and Stergios Skaperdas. 2006. "Economics of Conflict: An Overview." in Sandler, T., and K. Hartley (Eds.), Handbook of Defense Economics. Elsevier, pp. 649–709.
Contest Model
Evidence from Colombia
Dube, O., and J.F. Vargas. 2013. "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia." The Review of Economic Studies, 80(4): 1384–1421.
Powell, Robert. 2006. "War as a Commitment Problem." International Organization, 60 169–203.