Masayuki Kudamatsu
1 November, 2017
For your term paper...
Does the Citizen Candidate Model explain
Remember when a model can explain reality?
Background for discussion #1
Image source: Washington Post (2017)
Worksplace
Church
School
Military
Shop
Other
Background for discussion #1 (cont.)
Image source: Washington Post (2017)
Background for discussion #2
Image source: Pew Research Center (2013)
Does the Citizen Candidate Model explain
Aim to give a wrong answer!
Main lessons from
citizen-candidate model
Median voter's ideal policy
is not necessarily adopted
Policy choice depends on
which citizens run for office
Evidence suggests
Politicians choose their own ideal policy, not the median voter's
to understand policy-making
Two dimensions to consider
Occupation
Income
Family background
Education
IQ test score
Leadership
Media sometimes report politicians' previous occupation
Image source: www2.ttcn.ne.jp/honkawa/5217.html
Naitonal legislators' previous job
across major rich countries
But these statistics are not meaningful
unless it's compared to the entire population
That's a difficult data exercise
except for one country...
Politician's job is a crude measure of representation/competence
Their father's job/income: more relevant as "social class"
Competence should be measured by IQ test etc.
Data: about 50,000 municipal councillors during 1982-2010
Botkyrka municipal council meeting
Image source: www.aina.org/news/20140131142534.htm
(Many national politicians used to be municipal councillors)
If politician's father is perfectly representative of the population
Share
1%
Income percentile
0
100
Obtain income distribution for every adult Swede in 1979
Then see where each politician's father is located in the distribution
Swedish Politicians DO represent the entire population
in terms of father's income
Figure 4 of Dal Bo et al. (2016) "Who Becomes a Politician?"
While Swedish doctors or CEOs DO NOT
Figure 5 of Dal Bo et al. (2016) "Who Becomes a Politician?"
Figure 7 of Dal Bo et al. (Feb. 2016) "Who Becomes a Politician?"
Swedish politicians DO represent the entire population
in terms of father's occupation
(farmers overrepresented, though)
Measure competence by:
Cognitive skills (i.e. IQ test score)
Leadership
"Residual ability"
= Income difference that cannot be explained by
age, education, occupation, and location
Swedish politicians are
more competent
than the population
with similar parental income
Figure 12 of Dal Bo et al. (Feb. 2016) "Who Becomes a Politician?"
Swedish politicians are
more competent
than the population
with similar parental jobs
Figure 13 of Dal Bo et al. (Feb. 2016) "Who Becomes a Politician?"
We do not know whether the same is true for other countries
due to the lack of data
Consider a citizen-candidate model:
Step 1: Each citizen decides whether to run for office
Running for office is costly
Step 2: Each citizen decides whom to vote
Candidate wins by plurarity
Step 3: Winning candidate picks a policy to implement
Modify a citizen-candidate model so that
Citizens differ in competence, not in their ideal policy
Competent citizens
earn higher wages in private sector
prefer a better policy
Step 3: Winning candidate picks a policy to implement
Competent citizens pick a better policy
Step 2: Each citizen decides whom to vote
They vote for competent citizens, if they run for office
Optimization at each step
Optimization at Step 1: whether to run for office
Competent
Incompetent
Benefit from running for office
Competent candidate:
more likely to win
Competent
Incompetent
Cost of running for office
Foregone
earning
difference
Optimization at Step 1: whether to run for office
Competent
Incompetent
Net benefit from running for office
Loss
Gain
Optimization at Step 1: whether to run for office
Competent
Incompetent
Loss
Gain
Run for office
Keep working
in private sector
Optimization at Step 1: whether to run for office
Competent
Incompetent
Loss
Gain
Optimization at Step 1: whether to run for office
If being a politician is more rewarding...
Competent
Incompetent
Competent citizens also run for office
and more likely to win in election
Gain
If being a politician is more rewarding...
Competent
Incompetent
Gain
Being a politician is more rewarding when...
Politicians are well-paid (relative to private sector wage)
Source: OECD and The Economist (2013)
Image source: qz.com/183305/in-italy-members-of-parliament-make-five-times-more-than-the-average-worker/
Being a politician is more rewarding when...
Politicians are prestigious
Source: The Harris Poll
% of respondents saying the occupation is prestigious
(US, in 2015)
Doctor | 90% |
Scientist | 89% |
Firefighter | 80% |
Banker | 44% |
Politician | 40% |
Video game designer | 37% |
Real estate agent | 32% |
most politicians
are
competent
Politicians
are
prestigious
Competent
citizens
enter into politics
most politicians
are
incompetent
Politicians
are not
prestigious
Competent
citizens
stay away from politics
Evidence from Italian mayors
Mayor's salary jumps
from 2,169 euro to 2,789 euro (per month)
across the municipal population of 5,000 in Italy
We can use regression discontinuity design
to see whether a politician's pay rise induces
competent citizens to enter into politics
Evidence from Italian mayors
A pay rise induces
more educated citizens to run
Candidates
Winners (i.e. Mayors)
Figures 1 and 2 of Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013)
And they win
Fact #1: Politicians are less educated than in democracy
Democracy
Autocracy
Figure 1 of Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
Fact #1: Politicians are less educated than in democracy
Figures 3 and 4 of Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011)
Both good performance and social connections
are key to become a top politician in China
Figure 1 of Jia et al. (2015)
Fact #2:
Cabinet ministers in Africa
represent the population distribution of ethnicity
Figure 1 of Francois et al. (2015)
Fact #3:
Cameroon
Cabinet ministers in Africa
represent the population distribution of ethnicity
Figure 1 of Francois et al. (2015)
Fact #3:
Sierra Leone
In citizen-candidate model
Voters do not believe
any other electoral promise
than candidate's ideal
What should politicians do if their ideal policy is not popular?
Citizen-candidate model:
a politician can commit to his/her own ideal policy only
policy
politician A
Consider two politicians with different ideal policies
policy
politician A
politician B
If these two politicians form a political party
the party can commit to any policy in between
policy
politician A
politician B
To understand why, consider a policy not in between
policy
politician A
politician B
To understand why, consider a policy not in between
policy
politician A
politician B
Both politicians are better off by moving this policy to the left
The party AB cannot commit to this policy
policy
politician A
politician B
Same is true for any policy not in between
The party AB cannot commit to any policy not in between
policy
politician A
politician B
Now consider a policy in between
Moving this policy towards A's ideal policy
B is worse off and thus never agrees to A
policy
politician A
politician B
Now consider a policy in between
Moving this policy towards B's ideal policy
A is worse off and thus never agrees to B
policy
politician A
politician B
Now consider a policy in between
Suppose
Suppose
neither A nor B can win an election himself/herself
but this policy allows the party AB to win an election
policy
politician A
politician B
Now consider a policy in between
Then
Both A and B are willing to promise this policy
The party AB can commit to this policy
And any deviation is vetoed by one of them
policy
politician A
politician B
Same is true for any policy in between
The party AB can commit to any of these policies
Consider two policy issues (e.g. redistribution & whom to subsidise)
Redistribution
Group-specific
subsidy
Consider three groups of citizens where no group has a majority
Redistribution
Group-specific
subsidy
Rich
Poor
Special
Interest
Redistribution
Group-specific
subsidy
Rich
Poor
Special
Interest
Without political party
Poor will run for office and win in equilibrium
(by the same logic as here)
Redistribution
Group-specific
subsidy
Rich
Poor
Special
Interest
What if Rich and Special Interest form a political party?
Rich
Special
Interest
The party cannot commit to any policy not on the line in between
Both better off by moving to a policy on the line
Redistribution
Group-specific
subsidy
Rich
Poor
Special
Interest
Both Rich and Special Interest prefer these policies to Poor's ideal
Redistribution
Group-specific
subsidy
Rich
Poor
Special
Interest
The party obtains the majority of votes by offering these policies
This theory of political party may explain the rise of BJP in India
India: world's biggest democracy ever since its independence in 1947
Congress Party had been dominant
BJP won general elections in late 1990s
It's a coalition of the wealthy and
(poor) Hindu fundamentalists
Summary
Swedish politicians are
Representative of the whole population in terms of social class
More competent than the average Swede
Competence citizens become politicians
if being a politician compensates for their income loss
One role of political parties:
Allow politicians to commit to policies other than their ideal
These insights wouldn't have been obtained
if we hadn't had the citizen-candidate model
Model of politics #3
Voters care about more than one policy issues
Can be used to analyze pork-barrel politics
This lecture is based on the following academic articles:
Dal Bó, Ernesto, et al. 2016. "Who Becomes a Politician?" Unpublished paper.
Caselli, Francesco, and Massimo Morelli. 2004. “Bad Politicians.” Journal of Public Economics 88: 759–82.
Gagliarducci, Stefano, and Tommaso Nannicini. 2013. “Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection.” Journal of the European Economic Association 11(2): 369–98.
Levy, Gilat. 2004. “A Model of Political Parties.” Journal of Economic Theory 115(2): 250–77.