Tokenomics:
When Tokens Beat Equity

Katya Malinova & Andreas Park

Key Challenges for the Crypto Community for 2019

Technology

Legal/Regulation

Economic functions

What is the right governance structure for systems?

\(\Rightarrow\) political economy

How should we design tokens as contracts?

\(\Rightarrow\) corporate finance

How do platform payment means interact with outside world

\(\Rightarrow\) open-economy macro

How much do we have to pay operators to maintain the chain?

\(\Rightarrow\) mechanism design

Key Economic Questions for Blockchain Design

Is there economic merit to tokens?

Do tokens solve an economic problem?

State of Debate on Tokens

This paper & nascent literature: tokens can achieve more economically than just regulatory arbitrage

Blockchain Tech Stack: Where would tokens matter?


Infrastructure
 

reward and
internal currency

usage fee
or
incentive


usage fee
 


Service
 


Application
 

Tech Stack Layer

Role of Token

Tokens as Seignorage Money to Power a Network

Infrastructure

reward and internal currency

Sustainability of network security

        Chiu & Koeppl (2016), Budish (2018)

How do cryptocurrencies have value?

        Biais, Bisiere, Bouvard, Casamatta (2016),
        Schilling and Uhlig (2018)        

Cryptocurrencies as payment for "real" costs

        Sockin and Xiong (2018)

Development and subsequent seignorage 

         Canidio (2018), Catalini and Gans (2018)

Blockchain Platforms: Economic Transactions with "Decentralization"

Two-sided markets with fixed roles

        Consumers - Producers

        Consumers - Intermediaries - Producers

Traditional economy

Multi-sided or peer-to-peer markets

        Consumers = Producers

        requires platform building

Decentralized economy

Traditional "centralized" economy

Service Platform Tokens: Enabling Decentralization?

usage fee or incentive

Service

How do you get people to contribute to a peer to peer platform?

         Li and Mann (2018)

How do you finance development without future income flow?

         Canidio (2018)

What is the relationship between token prices and platform adoption?

         Cong, Li, and Wang (2018)

Tokens as Payments: a New Financing Tool?

usage fee

Application

What can (utility) tokens finance that traditional securities cannot? 

Chod and Lyandres (2018):

  • Token \(\Rightarrow\) underinvestment, except under VC under-diversification

Davydiuk, Gupta, and Rosen (2018)

  • Token retention policy is a quality signaling tool                             

Lee and Parlour (2018)

  • Tokens as crowdfunding tool that allows producers to extract untapped customer surplus

Malinova and Park (2018)

  • Tokens \(\equiv\) output pre-sale; generically equivalent to debt and equity and better than equity under moral hazard

A Simple Model of Token-Based Financing

entrepreneur wants to produce a good or service
 

Setup cost for production \(C_0\)
 

Marginal cost of producing \(c\)
 

Demand is uncertain: revealed after the setup cost has been paid but before production.
 

Inverse demand \(p(q)=x-q\)

\( x\) is uniform on \([0,\theta]\).

\(x_i\)

\(x_j\)

\(x_k\)

 \(c\)

price

If financing with own funds  

\(\Rightarrow\) entrepreneur
     maximizes monopoly profits

\(\Rightarrow\) produces
     monopoly quantity

demand

marginal cost

marginal revenue

Equity financing 

\(\Rightarrow\) max \((1-\alpha)\)(monopoly profits) 

=> no distortion

\(q^m=(x-c)/2\)

\(MR=x-2q\)

\(p(q)=x-q\)

Benchmark: own funds

Benchmark: equity

general idea: sell future output

two approaches for token sales

sell a fraction of future revenue

sell units of future output

Token Financing

  • we call it revenue sharing
  • formally: sell \(\alpha_t\) of \(T\) tokens
  • produce \(q\) units a require \(T/q\) tokens per unit
  • we call this output presale
  • formally: sell \(t\) tokens
  • produce \(q\) units and keep revenue from \(q-t\) tokens

price

demand

marginal cost

marginal revenue

Entrepreneur does not internalize the effect of an extra output unit on the token value for the tokenholders!

Result: overproduction

entrepreneur issues \(t\) tokens

   for \(x\le t\): earns zero 

   for \(x>t\): solves \[\max_q  q (x-q-t)-cq.\]

 

effectively solves
     \(q\) s.t. \(MR(q)+t=c\) 

Output Presale

price

demand

marginal cost

marginal revenue

\(\Rightarrow\) tilts marginal revenue for
     entrepreneuer left because
     get only fraction of revenue

\(\Rightarrow\) solves \((1-\alpha)\)MR(q) = c

Result: underproduction

NB: Similar to Chod and Lyandres (2018)

Revenue Sharing

revenue sharing: underproduction

output presale: overproduction

\(c\)

\(MR\)

"does not internalize" = externality

address externality: TAX!

here: tax future token income

incremental token income gets shared

\(\Rightarrow\) combine the two to get the monopoly quantity!

  • issue \(t\) tokens ex ante
  • share \(\alpha_t\) of new tokens
  • token share \[\alpha_t=\frac{t}{c+t}\]

Is token financing inferior?

Is token financing inferior? No!

Presell \(t\) tokens.

As with equity, the entrepreneur receives the full NPV.

The entrepreneuer produces optimally at \(q^t=q^m\)

If \(q<t\)  \(\Rightarrow\) redeem at rate \(t/q\) and tokenholders receive refund of \(c(t-q)\).

If quantity produced \(q>t\), then share \(\alpha_t\) of revenue from incremental \(q-t\) tokens with tokenholders

Formal Result: Optimal Token Contract

  • costs her \(0\)
  • \(\theta\sim U(0,\theta_l)\)
  • \(\theta_l<\theta_h\)

Idea:

entrepreneur can influence expected demand

  • costs her \(C_e\)
  • \(\theta\sim U(0,\theta_h)\)

with effort

without effort

common topic in corporate finance

very relevant in "decentralized" world where developers are scattered around the globe

also applicable to, e.g. established firms that do something new

assume \[\textit{NPV}(\text{effort})>0>\textit{NPV}(\text{no effort})\]

Token Issuance with Moral Hazard

Investors (equity or token holders) only finance the project if the entrepreneur undertakes the effort

Solve for the optimal funding conditional on the entrepreneur taking the effort
 

Derive conditions such that the entrepreneur undertakes effort

Token Issuance with Moral Hazard

1.

2.

Key insight: a token contract incentivizes effort better than equity (similarly to canonical debt vs. equity insights)

Optimal token contract has debt features:

    get nothing if demand is low (only original
    tokenholders get anything)
 

    benefit if demand is high

all projects that can be financed by equity can be financed by the optimal token contract but

Token Issuance with Moral Hazard

some projects that can be financed by optimal tokens contracts cannot be financed by equity.

Simple model of revenue-based ICO vs equity financing from the standard corporate finance + IO toolbox

Theorem 1: Without frictions,  an optimal token contract finances the same
                      projects as equity

Theorem 2: With entrepreneurial moral hazard,

          any equity-financeable project can be financed by an optimal token

          some token-financeable projects cannot be financed by equity

​\(\Rightarrow\) There is economic and conceptual merit to token financing

Summary

@financeUTM

andreas.park@rotman.utoronto.ca

slides.com/ap248

sites.google.com/site/parkandreas/

youtube.com/user/andreaspark2812/

Remote presentation of "Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity" at Unisinos Business School

By Andreas Park

Remote presentation of "Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity" at Unisinos Business School

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