Williams' Dictum

Joe Cunningham

Early Career Mind Network, Warwick

27/04/2016

Overview

The Good Case

• There is a normative reason for S to Φ: the fact that p 

• S knows that p

• S knows p to be a normative reason for them to Φ

• S Φs in a way that manifests such knowledge

• This underwrites the truth of a rationalising explanation of why S Φs producible using 'S Φs because p'

The Bad Case

• S believes that p

• S takes p to be a normative reason for them to Φ

• S Φs in a way that manifests such beliefs

• This underwrites the truth of a rationalising explanation of why S Φs producible using `S Φs because S Bp'

• S does not Φ in response to the normative reason that p

The Highest Common Factor View

• The rationalising explanation to which S's Φ-ing is subject in the good case is, in some suitable sense, the same as the rationalising explanation to which their Φ-ing is subject in the bad case.

• It follows that we cannot simply identify responding to the normative reason that p with the explanation in the good case.

Davidson's Version of (HCF)

• Good case: S's belief that p is what explains why S Φs

• Bad case: S's belief that p is what explains why S Φs

• Responding to the normative reason that p factors into Φ-ing because SBp + p is a reason for S to Φ & S's belief is knowledge

Dancy's Version of (HCF)

• Good case: the fact (obtaining state of affairs) that p is what explains why S Φs, enabled by SBp

• Bad case: the non-obtaining states of affairs that p is what explains why S Φs, enabled by SBp

• Responding to the normative reason that p is a good case explanation but where p is known

Williams' Dictum

Explanations vs. Kinds Thereof

What is a Kind of Explanation?

Two Readings of Williams' Dictum

Two Readings of (HCF)

Clarifiction of (HCF)-Weak

• The particular explanation which holds in the good case requires for its truth that p is a normative reason for S to Φ, e.g. the fact that p or S's knowledge that p is the explanans. The particular explanation which holds in the bad case doesn't, e.g. the non-obtaining state of affairs that p or S's belief that p is the explanans.

• But how the explanans of each explanations makes the agent's Φ-ing intelligible is the same in both cases: by being a factor that constitutes the appearance of a normative reason for S to Φ. It's just that, in the good case, this role is played by a normative reason-involving condition.

Reply to Hornsby

• Hornsby (2008) argues that S Φs because p only if SKp. She infers from this that (HCF) is false.

• The inference is invalid because the proponent of (HCF)-weak can agree with Hornsby's epistemic thesis by allowing that it is S's knowledge that p which is part of the explanans in the good case, whilst denying that this is part of how the explanans makes the explanandum intelligible.

Reply to Roessler

• Roessler (2014) argues that in reasoning to the conclusion to Φ, it seems to the agent that they come to Φ in a way that is determined by what normative reasons there are. This is intended to tell against (HCF).

• Again, the proponent of (HCF) weak can allow that the explanation which holds in the good case takes as its explanans a normative reason, or a normative reason-involving condition, whilst denying that this is how it makes its explanandum intelligible.

A Fresh Argument I

• A standard good case: S goes to the cupboard in response to the fact that it contains chocolate. That it contains chocolate is a reason for S to go, she knows that fact and knows it to have the normative status it does, and acts in a way that manifests such knowledge.

• A variant involving akrasia: that the cupboard contains chocolate is a reason for S to go, but is a reason that's outweighed by the countervailing consideration that she's on a diet. Knowing all this, S goes to the cupboard anyway, thus manifesting weakness of will.

A Fresh Argument II

• In the standard case, the fact that the cupboard contains chocolate seems to S to exert its influence on S's will in so far as it is a reason for her to go. This is not the way things seem for S in the akrasia case.

• How to cash out this qua reason aspect? A natural suggestion: it seems to S that how the reason is motivating S is by being a normative reason. 

• But for p to motivate S to Φ is for p to be (part of) the explanans of the rationalising explanation of S's Φ-ing. So this is tantamount to saying that how p gets to explain why S Φs, from S's own point of view, is by being a normative reason.