Detecting the Cyclic Behavior of Malware with graph theory. The Cerber ransomware case
InBot2016
Sebastian Garcia
sebastian.garcia@agents.fel.cvut.cz
@eldracote
Live Slides: bit.ly/Inbot16
The Machine Discussion
-
Is it working?
-
Amount of Data
-
Validation/Results
-
Time
-
Adversaries, Coupled System
-
Are humans not working?
The Network Detection Issue
-
IoC are the best we have.
-
IoC are not enough, specially for new malware. Not to mention how malware evolves.
-
Payloads are usually not available (crowdsource).
-
Flows usually are. But what can we do from them?
The Markov's Problem
-
Stratosphere IPS Project.
-
Machine Learning to help protect NGO's network.
-
-
Model each connection as a string of letters and apply Markov Chains to model the behavior.
-
Works, but some connections looks exactly the same as normal ones. We can not differentiate them.
https://stratosphereips.org
The Proximity Controversy
-
Maybe, we are looking too closely.
-
TCP Behavior of Cerber Ransomware
The Proximity Controversy
-
Maybe, we are looking too closely.
-
UDP Behavior of Cerber Ransomware
The Cerber Internalization
-
Only suspicious connection, 31.184.234.0/24 range, UDP port 6892
-
hi0072895
-
ffc44638ecb00072870150ba
-
ffc44638ecb00d
-
-
In our capture, some Adobe legit update connection:
-
104.127.48.56 80/tcp
-
99,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,I,I,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,i,h,z,Z000Z,i,i,i,i,i,i
-
-
The Graph Idealization
-
Given that the malware connections are generated by an algorithm, they are related. We hypothesize that the relationship can be modeled.
-
Our model is a graph for each srcIP, where:
-
Each node is the tuple DstIP, DstPort, Proto.
-
The sequence of flows from one node to another in the network are the edges.
-
The Graph Idealization
-
Made by Daniel Šmolík, from the Stratosphere team
-
The more times an edge is found, the thicker it is.
-
The more times a node is repeated, the bigger it is.
-
The more times a node loops with it self, the color gets darker.
The Normal Behavior I
The Normal Behavior II
The Cerber Ransomware Contraption
The Cerber Ransomware Contraption
The Simple Analytic Analysis
-
# of nodes.
-
# of edges.
-
# of times a node loops with itself.
-
# of times an edge is repeated.
-
The percentage of repeating edges from the total edges.
Analyzing the Behavior of a Host
-
Cerber Ransomware
-
Nodes: 566, Edges: 702
-
Autolooping nodes: 20
-
Repeating edges: 590 (84%)
-
-
Normal I
-
Nodes: 98, Edges: 263
-
Autolooping nodes: 47
-
Repeating edges: 6 (2.2%)
-
-
Normal II
-
Nodes: 1072, Edges: 1881
-
Autolooping nodes: 95
-
Repeating edges: 4 (0.21%)
-
The Extreme Normality Case
Analyzing the Behavior of a Host
-
Extreme Normal
-
Nodes: 2,499, Edges: 32,023
-
Autolooping nodes: 219
-
Repeating edges: 318 (0.99%)
-
-
Other Normals
-
1.1%, 1%, 0.9%, 0.9%
-
-
Other Malware
-
Ctu179, Barys: 100%
-
Ctu186, Normal+Cerber: 99.75%
-
Ctu183, Locky: 97.95%
-
The Sality Case
(6.2%)
Conclusion and Thanks!
-
The relationships seem to be consistent.
-
The behavior of the malware can be modeled and used for detection.
-
We always need better experiments. Now working this approach with our NGOs.
-
Thanks Daniel Smolík for his work.
Sebastian Garcia
sebastian.garcia@agents.fel.cvut.cz
@eldracote
Detecting the Cyclic Behavior of Malware with graph theory. The Cerber ransomware case
By eldraco
Detecting the Cyclic Behavior of Malware with graph theory. The Cerber ransomware case
We still have problems to solve when it comes to detecting malware in the network. If the malware is new, there are not signatures, no IoCs, no threat information. If you have thousands of hosts you can not even analyze the payloads, or you don't have payloads and have to resort to NetFlows. In this limited context is where we developed a new idea to detect the behavioral patterns of how a computer works in the network by analyzing its communications as a cyclic graph. Our technique applies new concepts to reduce the information being analyzed while retaining and graphing the major features. We test our concept on dozens of Normal and Malware traffic, which gives significance to the work. In particular we will show a demo with the analysis of a Cerber ransomware capture. The takeaway is: the way you use your computer leaves traces in the network, and those traces can be used to detect when you are infected.
