Winter School in Political Economy

Lecture 1

Development

Set-up of the lecture

  • Podcast
  • Institutions and growth
  • Developmental state
  • Institutions and industrial policy
  • Development and vulnerability
  • Historical perspective

Podcast

Podcast

  • Discuss a topic from the first week of the course

  • It can be empirical or theoretical or combine empirics and and theory

  • Make sure that you spell out your key point and core argument first

  • You can use Power Point (.ppsx), but keep it a single slide!

  • You can use dedicated apps

  • Think of your favourite podcast

  • Get inspired with (VoxEU, Chatham House, Brugel)

  • Keep it between 6 and 8 minutes

  • Do not rush

  • Think of it as a recorded presentation

Growth

What drives growth

  • Geography – weak effect on income
  • Integration – strong effect on institutions & weak effect on income
  • Institutions – strong effect on income

What drives growth

  • Three types of institutions:

    • Market regulating (e.g. environmental protection agency)

    • Market stabilising (e.g. central bank)

    • Market legitimising (e.g. pension system)

  • Conditionality mis-match
    • Short-term programmes versus long-term changes
    • Uncomfortable return of culture
    • What about the EU?

What drives growth

  • Institutions, economic growth and the direction of change

  • Growth and the division of benefits

    • Middle-income trap as a political problem

  • Opportunity cost of institution-building
  • Historical, anecdotal and quantitative evidence

Developmental state

Developmental state

  • If institution are indeed drivers of growth, how they come about?

  • Competent bureaucracy cooperating with organised private sector to spur growth (rather than seek rent) is rare

Developmental state

  • South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore versus Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand
  • Conditions for a developmental state:

    • Credible threat of unrest if living standards decrease

    • National security threat

    • Scarcity of easy revenues

Developmental state

  • Size of the governing coalition and pressure for side-payments

  • External threat requiring generous spending on the military

  • How to accommodate the need for side payment and the cost of defence?

    • Natural resources

    • Upgrading

  • Pressure for competent bureaucracy and cooperation with the industry
  • CEE today as another example

 

Developmental state

Developmental state

Industrial policy

Industrial policy

  • Low starting point

  • Dependent market economy – profit driven multinationals

    • Geography, wages and skills
  • Negative outlook of DME versus empirical evidence
  • Not as liberal as assumed
    • Tariffs and non-tariff barriers
    • Good and bad FDI
    • Grooming and supervising
  • Role of the EU

Development and vulnerability

Development and vulnerability

  • Turning economic networks into political weapons

    • Obstacle to development

    • E.g. exclusion from a banking system (SWIFT)

  • The renewalist argument is back
  • Monopoly position always profitable (e.g. Visa or Fedex), now also weaponised

Development in a historical perspective

Development in a historical perspective

  • The rise of West is far from obvious

    • China is superior until 15th century

    • GDP per capita matches until the industrial revolution

  • West is not homogenous

Development in a historical perspective

  • China is superior to the West until 15th century

    • Technology

    • Civil service

    • GDP per capita comparable until the industrial revolution

  • What explains growth in China?
    • Flat income distribution

    • good healthcare and education

    • Removal of privileged elite

    • 4,000 years of culture

  • Limit to growth in China

 

Development in a historical perspective

  • Venice between 800 and 1350

    • Geographical advantage; long-distance trade generated a number of private fortunes

    • Constraints on the (hereditary) executive

  • Modern finance: risk-sharing, capital raising (colleganza)
  • Social mobility and rise of prosperity
    • Around 50% of colleganza involved commoners between 1050 and 1250
  • From 1300 the most affluent merchants focus on stiffing political and economic competition
    • Barriers to entry high-profit sectors of trade

 

Thank you and see you in the Q&A

Winter School in Political Economy Lecture 1

By Dawid Walentek

Winter School in Political Economy Lecture 1

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