Spy vs. Spy
A modern study of mic bugs operation and detection
Veronica Valeros
@verovaleros
Sebastian Garcia
@eldracote
MatesLab Hackerspace
bit.ly/HITBsvs


Audio eavesdropping is a threat

Audio eavesdropping is a threat

A brief tour through the last century FM mic bugs
History: The Thing

History: The Thing

History: KGB bug

History: TI-574A


History: TI-574A
History: OPEC

Mic Technology Advances
From lasers to malware

Mic Technology Advances
From lasers in the air to malware

Lets Experiment!
FM and GSM wireless stationary microphone bugs
F908

Frequency: 113.5MHz
Range: 500m
Battery: 9v
Price: 33 USD
MicroSpy

Frequency: 102MHz
Range: 500m
Battery: 9v
Price: 15 USD
Ear-1

Frequency: 102.2MHz
Range: 500m
Battery: 9v
Price: 18 USD
Beurer BY04

Frequency:
864MHz
Range:
500m
Battery:
3x AAA
Price:
65 USD
Mini A8

Frequency: EU GSM
Range: world-wide
Battery: li-ion 3v
Price: 9.29 USD

Comparison
Listening Experiments

Listening Experiments
No need for a van in front of your house

Listening Experiments

Listening Experiments
-
Hard to do it professionally
-
Listening was hard. Very.
Geolocation
-
Attackers need to be close
-
Good for you, filters your attackers
-
Bad for them, they need to be close
-
Bad for you, they are close
-
-
Nobody can help from the Internet
-
Bad for you
-
Contact a company if you are in a life-threatening situation.
Salamandra
SDR-based, free software detection and location of hidden microphones
https://github.com/eldraco/Salamandra
USB SDR device

DVB-T+DAB+FM
Normal FM Radio Station

Mic F908

Mic F908

Detection Feature
-
Trained thresholds with ~85 experiments
-
Fixed the thresholds for the best detection

Location Feature


Real Life Experiments
Real Life Experiments
-
Seeker goes out. Hider hides mic (or not)
-
Seeker gets in. Speaks passwords. Hider tries to catch them
-
Measure time to detection
-
Measure time to location
-
Measure recall: (passwords heard / total passwords)
Real Life Experiments


Real Life Experiments

Real Life Experiments

Real Life Experiments

Real Life Experiments
-
Hiding is hard
-
Power, behavior, know your target, physical access
-
-
Location is hard
-
Listening is hard
-
Detection is fast
Audio Improvements
Original
Improved
Don't use music to conceal your conversation
Conclusions
-
Audio eavesdropping is a real threat. Don't be fooled.
-
Now you know how it works.
-
Now you know how to protect yourself.
Try Salamandra, find mics.
Advance the field. Help others.
Questions?

Veronica Valeros
@verovaleros
vero.valeros@gmail.com
Sebastian Garcia @eldracote
eldraco@gmail.com



Spy vs. Spy: A modern study of mic bugs operation and detection
By eldraco
Spy vs. Spy: A modern study of mic bugs operation and detection
HITB GSEC 2017 presentation of a research about spying microphones and how to detect them. TL;DR: Don't be fooled. Audio eavesdropping is a real threat. We built a free software tool to detect and locate hidden mic bugs.
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