Duality of Firms and Directors
in Board Interlock Networks
Diliara Valeeva
KU Leuven
University of Amsterdam
Center for Business Network Analysis Seminar | University of Greenwich | 23 October 2020
Valeeva, D., Heemskerk, E. M., & Takes, F. W. (2020). The duality of firms and directors in board interlock networks:
A relational event modeling approach. Social Networks, 62, 68-79.
Open access: https://bit.ly/2HeF9s6
Board interlock
Takes, F.W. & Heemskerk, E.M. Soc. Netw. Anal. Min. (2016) 6: 97. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13278-016-0402-5
“Interlocks occur between organizations,
but they are created by individuals”
(Mizruchi 1996: 277)
How do board interlock ties form?
2
INDIVIDUALS
X
Y
2
FIRMS
A
B
Broken ties argument
A
B
FIRMS
fast tie reconstruction
slow tie reconstruction
firms matter more
individuals matter more
"Duality of persons and groups"
Breiger (1974)
1-mode
2-mode
2
FIRMS
A
B
2
INDIVIDUALS
X
Y
FIRMS
INDIVIDUALS
A
B
Y
X
Strategies to form ties
(1) reinforcement
(2) expansion
X
X
Y
Z
X
Y
Z
Problem
reinforcement
expansion
one-mode FIRMS
one-mode INDIVIDUALS
two-mode
FIRMS and INDIVIDUALS
Data and Methods
- Denmark
- 1994-2014
- 3,304 firms
- 10,377 individuals
- 14,893 board appointments
- Relational Event Modeling
Hypotheses
Predictors of new ties
- Popularity of directors
- Six-cycles
- Danish and male directors
- Banks and financial firms
Conclusions
- Complementary rather than conflicting interests of firms and individuals
- Duality of agents is typical for social systems and should not be ignored
Other projects
Diliara Valeeva
@diliara_valeeva
d.valeeva@kuleuven.be
CORPNET
@uvaCORPNET
corpnet.uva.nl
Duality of firms and directors
By Diliara Valeeva
Duality of firms and directors
Presentation for the Centre for Business Network Analysis (University of Greenwich). Presentation of the ''The duality of firms and directors in board interlock networks: A relational event modeling approach" (2020) paper. URL open access: https://bit.ly/2HeF9s6
