Dom Taylor
Philosophy, Religion, Catholic Studies, and Peace & Conflict Studies Librarian at the University of Manitoba
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constructionist vs. anti-constructionist stances on
the ACRL Framework
proliferation of information?
context and construction as essential tools stabilizing meaning and evaluating information
malapropisms as an entry point for lateral interpretation
citation as relationality, respect, and reciprocity
essential linguistic tool + guiding norm for information evaluation
Credibility is partially determined by the needs of the information user and the information creator’s standing within a context (ACRL, 2016).
For the sake of brevity, I will use the term 'construction' to denote both social construction and context.
The idea that our concepts, language, practices, and many of the objects we use could have been otherwise. Constructionist theorists place varying degrees of emphasis on this contingency (Hacking, 1999; Haslinger, 2012; Mallon, 2016)
The notion that various factors, such as history, social practices, linguistic conventions, and material conditions impact a community of interpreters in their communication and interpretation. Statements can have different meanings depending on the context (Hacking, 1999; Haslinger, 2012; Recanati, 2004).
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context and construction destabilize concepts and categories, ultimately undermining notions of "truth."
my answer to both questions is, "no."
Are dependent on concepts like truth, accuracy, and correctness
Can be leveraged to strengthen information evaluation practices
Are necessary for meaningful interpretation of information, including assertions
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Context, contingency, historicity, and construction. It is unnecessary to see concepts as given in an ahistorical sense.
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"Chien."
"Dog."
HARMONIZATION OF SHARED
"DOG"/"CHIEN" CONCEPT/CLASSIFICATION
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Assertions, in this context, are semiotic declarations, often expressed in the form of linguistic statements. Assertions are actions. We do things with assertions (e.g., we claim).
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Assertions are evaluable using truth-related concepts (e.g., accuracy). They can be true or false, in some sense.
When one asserts, one commits to a position, sincerely or insincerely, even if that position is modified and/or negotiated.
Implicit or explicit rules, guidelines, and/or responsibilities that are internal to and govern what counts as a warranted assertion. (Brandom, 1989; Lackey, 2007; McKinnon, 2015)
(Brandom, 1989, p. 641)
Assertion allows one to focus on if and how claims are warranted according to norms (McKinnon, 2015).
This is important in contexts where one can only indirectly evaluate information.
There is no pressing need to become entangled with the metaphysical truth, which is the target of constructionists critique and the source of anti-constructionist anxiety.
Since truth is often a lofty and/or ambiguous target, the goal of information evaluation is to identify warranted assertions/ claims that are "true enough" for a given context (Elgin, 2017).
A good starting point is situating assertions within the context of giving/asking for justifications. Does the assertion provide adequate and contextually relevant supportive reasons?
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One has to gauge to what degree the author has fulfilled their justificatory responsibility. Using contextual information and background knowledge (e.g., determining sincerity)
Your plan may be different if you are copyediting than if you are content editing.
Social practices may affect a norm so that an assertion counts as warranted in one context, but not another.
"There is pizza in the fridge."
"Is there pizza in the fridge?"
COORDINATION OF ACTIONS REGARDING PIZZA
Post-truth and/or post-truth-like ideas are raised by both constructionism and anti-constructionism.
Doesn't post-truth present a challenge to your notion of warrant? Isn't post-truth an example of assertions made without concern for warrant or the norms that determine warrant?
"Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping political debate or public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief" ("post-truth," 2018).
(i)The proliferation of false information
(ii) The attitude that truth is, at best, a convenient coincidence that can be superseded by ideological, instrumental, and/or emotional concerns
(iii) The attitude that acting on certain beliefs, specifically false ones, can be a good in and of itself.
(i)The proliferation of false information:
Misleading and inaccurate tweets of videos
(ii) The attitude that truth is, at best, a convenient coincidence that can be superseded by ideological, instrumental, and/or emotional concerns:
Inaccuracy was deemed less important than 'imminent threat.'
(iii) The attitude that acting on certain beliefs, specifically false ones, can be a good in and of itself:
There was something good about these misleading tweets--it was apparently a matter of national significance.
(i) The example shows a concern for truthfulness. Trump was challenged and, in his own way, attempted to justify his views.
(ii) Instrumental falsehoods are usually put forward and/or believed for a reason (e.g., another perceived justification or truth)
(iii) Assertions made for convenience or comfort are still conditioned by an interest in 'getting things right.'
(iv) Assertions made "by virtue of the absurd" seem, in most cases, to be less valuable than warranted assertions (Kierkegaard, 1843/2006, p.60). All things being equal, having warrant is a type of good in making assertions that nullifies the value of absurd.
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It is difficult to figure out how one can be sincerely post-truth. Given the conceptual/linguistic value of truth + value of warranted assertions over falsehoods.
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Saying that there is "no truth," "too many truths," or that interpreters don't care about truth, confuses the endorsement of cognitively primed assertions with warranted assertions.
Viciously circular. It implies that there is no concern for truth by being concerned with truth. There is still a widespread concern with getting things right.
Determining the warrant and meaning of assertions more or less on its own terms.
For textual documents, this includes:
Source: Wineburg, S., & McGrew, S. (2017). Lateral Reading: Reading Less and Learning More When Evaluating Digital Information (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 3048994). Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network.
Determining the warrant and meaning of an assertion through its context. For textual documents, this includes:
At a BBQ, a friend tells you, "I'm going to get a hutdog ."
"hut" + "dog"
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con/anti-con debate leads to theoretical paralysis. I have proposed an adjustment to remedy this.
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even making the case for post-truth or loosely constructionist ideas, one makes a case within a context that follows norms
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By Dom Taylor
Exploring the link between objectivity and social construction
Philosophy, Religion, Catholic Studies, and Peace & Conflict Studies Librarian at the University of Manitoba