The fact that it's cold outside prompts Jasmine to return indoors.

It prompts me to do likewise.

But my reason for returning indoors can be that it is cold. Not so for Jasmine: she cannot act for reasons, only persons can.

That I have no milk is my reason for going to the shop

That he promised is his reason for going to pick up his wife

That the plants are dying is my reason for watering them

...and so on. Acting for reasons is an entirely everyday phenomenon.

That it is their daughter's birthday is their reason for planning a party

(i) There is a fact, typically about the external world, which makes it the case that S ought to Φ

(ii) S knows that that fact obtains, and knows it to be a reason for them to Φ

(iii) S Φs in a way that manifests such knowledge

For S to Φ in a way that manifests their knowledge of their reason is at least partly for it to be the case that:

(iv) S's Φ-ing is explained by the fact that is their reason in a distinctive sort of way

That it's cold outside explains why I return indoors and why Jasmine does likewise, but it explains the former in different sort of way to the latter.

The view just sketched should be our default view.

But philosophers like Donald Davidson have attacked it.

They say our reasons are never facts about the world, but our beliefs in such facts.

So far, I've been focusing on good cases of rational action.

But there are bad cases possible too.

These are cases in which one acts under the mistaken belief that there is a reason present.

e.g. I run away from a bear I hallucinate coming towards me.

(P1) In the bad case, S Φs for the reason that they believe that p

(P2) The reason for which S Φs in the bad case is the same as the reason for which S Φs in the good case

(C) S Φs for the reason that they believe that p in the good case too

Here is an presupposition common to both premises of the argument just examined:

In bad cases, one acts for a reason

On the contrary, when we're blamelessly mistaken about what our reason is, we don't act for a reason at all.

Acting for a reason is not the same thing as acting rationally.

There is a seems/is distinction applicable to acting for reasons.