How Do Groups Speak
&
How are They Understood?
Discussion
ASSA Meetings
January 2026
Alistair Wilson
Theory Motivation
- With a single expert disclosing evidence we can generically construct fully revealing outcomes via skepticism
- But with disclosure by a group (with heterogeneous interests) we have to make a decision over who to be skeptical of
- This is the opposite result from Cheap Talk, where multiple senders can theoretically lead to full revelation
- From Onuchic and Ramos, the equilibrium outcomes will depend on:
- preferences of the group members
- how they reach decisions
Behavioral Motivation
- We know that lab participants do not make full use of skepticism (Jin, Luca and Martin 2021)
- This is partially mechanical as it's a boundary test, but the result is clear
- What happens with groups where attributing blame is more complicated?
- Are we more skeptical of participants with more decision power?
- How does the degree of our skepticism respond to the voting rule?
Really nice Results!
- In ordinal terms we find:
- Most skepticism in the individual treatments, though similar level to the Leader treatment
- More skepticism in Unilateral than Consensus
- Asymmetric updating in the Leader treatment
- Data suggests that cognitive load is related to subjects ability to be skeptical
- Wonder if there is a way to make this less ad hoc?
Critiques
- A lot of the incentivized rounds do not contain informative data on skepticism, lower opportunity to learn
- Incentives are relatively weak
- This is almost every paper testing a theory with an expectation over an initial uniform prior
- How robust are conclusions when we have approximate null predictions for skepticism in several treatments
- Survey questions: not clear what they are incentivizing?
- elicits modal belief with a uniform eqbm. posterior
- Not clear that the Individual control is right comparison
- With a frequentist design, I wonder if this would converge more clearly to equilibrium?
- Would be good to make clear the contribution/identification over Behnk, Hao and Reuben (2022)
Lots of Interesting Questions Remain
- In larger groups how much decision power is necessary for blame?
- Is skepticism in proportion to disclosure power or does it respond asymmetrically?
- If we have unilateral/consensus + within-group transfers what happens?
- If we switch to a frequentist version of this would it all converge to the equilibrium outcomes?
Thank you! 🙏
Skepticism-Discussion
By Alistair Wilson
Skepticism-Discussion
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