Katya Malinova PRO
I am an Associate Professor, Mackenzie Investments Chair in Evidence-Based Investment Management at the DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University, Canada.
Technology
Legal/Regulation
Economic functions
Total value locked in DeFi applications
Is there economic merit to tokens?
Do tokens solve an economic problem?
Financing mechaniPlatforms
Sockin and Xiong (2018)
Li and Mann (2020)
Bakos and Halaburda (2019)
Cong, Li, and Wang (2018)
Canidio (2020)
Chod, Trichakis, Yang (2019)
Catalini and Gans (2019)
Chod and Lyandres (2020)
Davydiuk, Gupta, and Rosen (2019)
Lee and Parlour (2019)
Garratt and van Oordt (2019)
Financing mechanism
Platforms
entrepreneur wants to produce a good or service
Setup cost for production \(C_0\)
Marginal cost of producing \(c\)
Demand is uncertain: revealed after the setup cost has been paid but before production.
Inverse demand \(p(q)=x-q\)
\( x\) is uniform on \([0,\theta]\).
\(x_i\)
\(x_j\)
\(x_k\)
\(c\)
price
If financing with own funds
\(\Rightarrow\) entrepreneur
maximizes monopoly profits
\(\Rightarrow\) produces
monopoly quantity
demand
marginal cost
marginal revenue
Equity financing
\(\Rightarrow\) max \((1-\alpha)\)(monopoly profits)
=> no distortion
\(q^m=(x-c)/2\)
\(MR=x-2q\)
\(p(q)=x-q\)
general idea: sell future output
two approaches for token sales
sell a fraction of future revenue
sell units of future output
price
demand
marginal cost
marginal revenue
Entrepreneur does not internalize the effect of an extra output unit on the token value for the tokenholders!
Result: overproduction
entrepreneur issues \(t\) tokens
for \(x\le t\): earns zero
for \(x>t\): solves \[\max_q q (x-q-t)-cq.\]
effectively solves
\(\max_q\) s.t. \(MR(q)+t=c\)
price
demand
marginal cost
marginal revenue
\(\Rightarrow\) "tilts" marginal revenue for
entrepreneuer left because
get only fraction of revenue
\(\Rightarrow\) solves \((1-\alpha)\)MR(q) = c
Result: underproduction
NB: Similar to underinvestment in Chod and Lyandres (2020)
revenue sharing: underproduction
output presale: overproduction
\(c\)
\(MR\)
"does not internalize" = externality
address externality: TAX!
here: tax future token income
incremental token income gets shared
\(\Rightarrow\) combine the two to get the monopoly quantity!
Presell \(t\) tokens.
As with equity, the entrepreneur receives the full NPV.
The entrepreneuer produces optimally at \(q^t=q^m\)
If \(q<t\) \(\Rightarrow\) redeem at rate \(t/q\) and tokenholders receive refund of \(c(t-q)\).
If quantity produced \(q>t\), then share \(\alpha_t\) of revenue from incremental \(q-t\) tokens with tokenholders
Idea:
entrepreneur can influence expected demand
with effort
without effort
common topic in corporate finance
very relevant in "decentralized" world where developers are scattered around the globe
also applicable to, e.g. established firms that do something new
assume \[\textit{NPV}(\text{effort})>0>\textit{NPV}(\text{no effort})\]
Investors (equity or token holders) only finance the project if the entrepreneur undertakes the effort
Solve for the optimal funding conditional on the entrepreneur taking the effort
Derive conditions such that the entrepreneur undertakes effort
1.
2.
Key insight: a token contract incentivizes effort better than equity (similarly to canonical debt vs. equity insights)
Optimal token contract has debt features:
get nothing if demand is low (only original
tokenholders get anything)
benefit if demand is high
all projects that can be financed by equity can be financed by the optimal token contract but
some projects that can be financed by optimal tokens contracts cannot be financed by equity.
Simple model of revenue-based ICO vs equity financing from the standard corporate finance + IO toolbox
Theorem 1: Without frictions, an optimal token contract finances the same
projects as equity
Theorem 2: With entrepreneurial moral hazard,
any equity-financeable project can be financed by an optimal token
some token-financeable projects cannot be financed by equity
\(\Rightarrow\) There is economic and conceptual merit to token financing
@katyamalinova
malinovk@mcmaster.ca
slides.com/kmalinova
sites.google.com/site/katyamalinova/
By Katya Malinova
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I am an Associate Professor, Mackenzie Investments Chair in Evidence-Based Investment Management at the DeGroote School of Business, McMaster University, Canada.