Tokenomics:
When Tokens Beat Equity

Katya Malinova & Andreas Park

Key Challenges for the Crypto Community

Technology

Legal/Regulation

Economic functions

What is the right governance structure for systems?

\(\Rightarrow\) political economy

How should we design tokens as contracts?

\(\Rightarrow\) corporate finance

How do platform payment means interact with outside world

\(\Rightarrow\) open-economy macro

How much do we have to pay operators to maintain the chain?

\(\Rightarrow\) mechanism design

Key Economic Questions for Blockchain Design

Meanwhile, crypto markets are staging a comeback ... this time in "Decentralized Finance"

Total value locked in DeFi applications

Is there economic merit to tokens?

Do tokens solve an economic problem?

State of Debate on Tokens

Financing mechaniPlatforms

Literature

Sockin and Xiong (2018)
Li and Mann (2020)
Bakos and Halaburda (2019)
Cong, Li, and Wang (2018)
Canidio (2020)
Chod, Trichakis, Yang (2019)

Catalini and Gans (2019)
Chod and Lyandres (2020)
Davydiuk, Gupta, and Rosen (2019)
Lee and Parlour (2019)
Garratt and van Oordt (2019)

Financing mechanism

Platforms

Blockchain Tech Stack: Where would tokens matter?


Infrastructure
 

reward and
internal currency

usage fee
or
incentive


usage fee
 


Service
 


Application
 

Tech Stack Layer

Role of Token

A Simple Model of Token-Based Financing

entrepreneur wants to produce a good or service
 

Setup cost for production \(C_0\)
 

Marginal cost of producing \(c\)
 

Demand is uncertain: revealed after the setup cost has been paid but before production.
 

Inverse demand \(p(q)=x-q\)

\( x\) is uniform on \([0,\theta]\).

\(x_i\)

\(x_j\)

\(x_k\)

 \(c\)

price

If financing with own funds  

\(\Rightarrow\) entrepreneur
     maximizes monopoly profits

\(\Rightarrow\) produces
     monopoly quantity

demand

marginal cost

marginal revenue

Equity financing 

\(\Rightarrow\) max \((1-\alpha)\)(monopoly profits) 

=> no distortion

\(q^m=(x-c)/2\)

\(MR=x-2q\)

\(p(q)=x-q\)

Benchmark: own funds

Benchmark: equity

general idea: sell future output

two approaches for token sales

sell a fraction of future revenue

sell units of future output

Token Financing

  • we call it revenue sharing
  • formally: sell \(\alpha_t\) of \(T\) tokens
  • produce \(q\) units a require \(T/q\) tokens per unit
  • we call this output presale
  • formally: sell \(t\) tokens
  • produce \(q\) units and keep revenue from \(q-t\) tokens

price

demand

marginal cost

marginal revenue

Entrepreneur does not internalize the effect of an extra output unit on the token value for the tokenholders!

Result: overproduction

entrepreneur issues \(t\) tokens

   for \(x\le t\): earns zero 

   for \(x>t\): solves \[\max_q  q (x-q-t)-cq.\]

 

effectively solves
     \(\max_q\) s.t. \(MR(q)+t=c\)

 

Output Presale

price

demand

marginal cost

marginal revenue

\(\Rightarrow\) "tilts" marginal revenue for
     entrepreneuer left because
     get only fraction of revenue

\(\Rightarrow\) solves \((1-\alpha)\)MR(q) = c

Result: underproduction

NB: Similar to underinvestment in Chod and Lyandres (2020)

Revenue Sharing

revenue sharing: underproduction

output presale: overproduction

\(c\)

\(MR\)

"does not internalize" = externality

address externality: TAX!

here: tax future token income

incremental token income gets shared

\(\Rightarrow\) combine the two to get the monopoly quantity!

  • issue \(t\) tokens ex ante
  • share \(\alpha_t\) of new tokens
  • token share \[\alpha_t=\frac{t}{c+t}\]

Is token financing inferior?

Is token financing inferior? No!

Presell \(t\) tokens.

As with equity, the entrepreneur receives the full NPV.

The entrepreneuer produces optimally at \(q^t=q^m\)

If \(q<t\)  \(\Rightarrow\) redeem at rate \(t/q\) and tokenholders receive refund of \(c(t-q)\).

If quantity produced \(q>t\), then share \(\alpha_t\) of revenue from incremental \(q-t\) tokens with tokenholders

Formal Result: Optimal Token Contract

  • costs her \(0\)
  • \(\theta\sim U(0,\theta_l)\)
  • \(\theta_l<\theta_h\)

Idea:

entrepreneur can influence expected demand

  • costs her \(C_e\)
  • \(\theta\sim U(0,\theta_h)\)

with effort

without effort

common topic in corporate finance

very relevant in "decentralized" world where developers are scattered around the globe

also applicable to, e.g. established firms that do something new

assume \[\textit{NPV}(\text{effort})>0>\textit{NPV}(\text{no effort})\]

Token Issuance with Moral Hazard

Investors (equity or token holders) only finance the project if the entrepreneur undertakes the effort

Solve for the optimal funding conditional on the entrepreneur taking the effort
 

Derive conditions such that the entrepreneur undertakes effort

Token Issuance with Moral Hazard

1.

2.

Key insight: a token contract incentivizes effort better than equity (similarly to canonical debt vs. equity insights)

Optimal token contract has debt features:

    get nothing if demand is low (only original
    tokenholders get anything)
 

    benefit if demand is high

all projects that can be financed by equity can be financed by the optimal token contract but

Token Issuance with Moral Hazard

some projects that can be financed by optimal tokens contracts cannot be financed by equity.

Simple model of revenue-based ICO vs equity financing from the standard corporate finance + IO toolbox

Theorem 1: Without frictions,  an optimal token contract finances the same
                      projects as equity

Theorem 2: With entrepreneurial moral hazard,

          any equity-financeable project can be financed by an optimal token

          some token-financeable projects cannot be financed by equity

​\(\Rightarrow\) There is economic and conceptual merit to token financing

Summary

@katyamalinova

malinovk@mcmaster.ca

slides.com/kmalinova

sites.google.com/site/katyamalinova/

Presentation of "Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity" at the Bundesbank virtual autumn conference, 10-11 September 2020

By Katya Malinova

Presentation of "Tokenomics: When Tokens Beat Equity" at the Bundesbank virtual autumn conference, 10-11 September 2020

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