Politics through the Lens of Economics

Lesson 11: Term Limits and Media Freedom

Masayuki Kudamatsu

13 December, 2017

Discussion Time (Aim to be wrong!)

What evidence is needed

for the Political Agency Model to explain

Pro-natal policies in France

Fertility rate (births per woman)

for G7 countries over time

Background information

Fertility rate in France is among the highest in rich countries

Image source: Eurostat (2017)

Fertility rate across Europe in 2015

Background information

Fertility rate in France is among the highest in rich countries

Background information

Pro-natal policies in France

Paid maternity leave

Mothers get their full salary for 16 weeks of maternity leave, and 26 weeks if it’s her third child

Job guarantees (a mother can return to the job after her leave)

Subsidized daycare

Discussion Time (Aim to be wrong!)

What evidence is needed

for the Political Agency Model to explain

Pro-natal policies in France

Today's Road Map

Impact of Term Limits - Theory

Impact of Media Freedom

Impact of Term Limits - Evidence

Term limits in Japan

No term limit for any political offices in Japan

Term limit for LDP President is de facto non-binding

as most presidents resign within 2 years (Wikipedia)

cf.

Argument against term limits in Japan: "Unconstitutional"

"the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them"

Article 15

Article 22

Freedom of occupation

Motivation: 

Term limits across the world

US: Term limit for President and two-thirds of State Governors

Latin America and Africa

Term limits for presidents were introduced when democratized

cf. China:

de facto term limit (10 years)

Motivation: 

Term limits appear to be popular

21 US states introduced

term limits for legislators

by referendum in the '90s

Source: Table 1.1 of Carey et al. (2000)

Motivation: 

Many people in Africa support

term limits for their president

(surveyed in 2011-2013)

Source: Figure 1 of Dulani (2015)

Term limits appear to be popular

Motivation: 

Do term limits really benefit citizens?

This lecture extends the political agency model to show...

Term limits allow politicians to pick a good policy

(e.g. environment protection)

under a certain circumstances

Today's Road Map

Impact of Term Limits - Theory

Impact of Media Freedom

Impact of Term Limits - Evidence

Basic idea

For some policies, not every citizen cares about them

e.g. Policies for environment protection

Politicians act on such policies when electoral competition is fierce

Votes from minority groups count in a tight race

If so, term limits reduce such incentives of politicians, leading to:

No environment protection if minority groups are green

Environment protection if minority groups are brown

Model

Model ingredient #1: Players

Citizens

Politicians

Incumbent

(chooses a policy in period 1 and, if re-elected, in period 2)

Opposition candidate

(chooses a policy in period 2 if defeating the incumbent)

A small fraction of citizens only care about environment policy

The rest of citizens: indifferent about environment policy

Two types: Green & Brown

Green

in favour of environment protection

Brown

against environment protection

Model ingredient #1: Players (cont.)

A small fraction of citizens only care about environment policy

Model ingredient #2: Policies

Environment protection

Preferred by some citizens, but not by every citizen

Model ingredient #3: Politician type

Two types: Green & Brown

Green

in favour of environment protection

Brown

against environment protection

Both types want to stay in office (for prestige etc.)

Model ingredient #4: Information

Citizens do not know each politician's type

Expect a politician to be green with probability P

Citizens observe policy choice in period 1

e.g. through mass media

This part of the model is the same as in the previous lecture

Model ingredient #5: Timing of Events

Step 1: Period 1 Policy-making

Step 2: Election

The incumbent chooses a policy

Citizens vote for the incumbent or for the opposition

Step 3: Period 2 Policy-making

Winner of the election chooses a policy

This part of the model is the same as in the previous lecture

Analysis

Term-limited politician's optimization

Green politician

Protect environment

Brown politician

Forget about environment

Green citizens want a green politician to be in office in period 2

Brown citizens want a brown politician to be in office in period 2

Analysis #1

Case 1: Incumbent is popular

Incumbent supporters

Case 2: Opposition is popular

Opposition supporters

Case 3: Neck and neck, with more Green than Brown citizens

Case 4: Neck and neck, with more Brown than Green citizens

Optimization by citizens and period 1 politicians

Analysis

1st-term politician type

Green

Brown

1st-term policy

Protect

Election

Re-elected

Re-elected

2nd-term policy

Protect

Not protect

Not protect

Case 1: Incumbent is popular

Term limit has no impact

1st-term politician type

Green

Brown

1st-term policy

Protect

Election

Kicked out

Kicked out

2nd-term policy

Not protect

Case 2: Opposition is popular

Term limit doesn't bite

Case 1: Incumbent is popular

Incumbent supporters

Case 2: Opposition is popular

Opposition supporters

Case 3: Neck and neck, with more Green than Brown citizens

Case 4: Neck and neck, with more Brown than Green citizens

Optimization by citizens and period 1 politicians

Analysis

A proposed equilibrium

We now see whether the following set of actions

Green politician protects environment in period 1

Brown politician protects environment in period 1

with probability Q

Green citizens vote the incumbent

if and only if environment is protected in period 1

constitutes an equilibrium (i.e. no one benefits from deviation)

Green citizens' optimization at the election

Vote for the candidate who is more likely to be green

Probability of being green

Incumbent

Opposition

P
PP
?
??

Analysis #2

Probability that incumbent is green

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #2 (cont.)

Probability that incumbent is green

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #2 (cont.)

Protect

Incumbent's policy choice (according to the proposed equilibrium)

Q

1 - Q

Protect

Do not protect

Probability that incumbent is green

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #2 (cont.)

Protect

Incumbent's policy choice (according to the proposed equilibrium)

Q

1 - Q

Protect

Do not protect

P

Brown

(1 - P) * Q

If environment is protected...

Green

Vote for the incumbent if environment is protected

Probability of being green

Incumbent

Opposition

P
PP
\frac{P}{P+(1-P)*Q}
PP+(1P)Q\frac{P}{P+(1-P)*Q}
>
>>

P

Brown

(1 - P) * Q

If environment is protected...

Green

Green citizens' optimization at the election

Analysis #2 (cont.)

Probability that incumbent is green

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #2 (cont.)

Protect

Incumbent's policy choice (according to the proposed equilibrium)

Q

1 - Q

Protect

Do not protect

Brown

If environment is NOT protected...

Vote the opposition if environment is NOT protected

Probability of being green

Incumbent

Opposition

P
PP
0
00
<
<<

Green citizens' optimization at the election

Brown

If environment is NOT protected...

It is indeed optimal for green citizens

to vote the incumbent if and only if environment is protected

Analysis #2 (cont.)

Period 1 green politician's optimization

Protect environment

Get re-elected

& fulfil his/her desire

in both periods

Optimal behaviour: Protect environment

Analysis #3

Not protect environment

Get kicked out

& do not fulfil his/her desire

in either period

Period 1 brown politician's optimization

Protect environment

Get re-elected

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 2 only

Analysis #4

Not protect environment

Get kicked out

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 1 only

Benefit from period 1 policy

Expectedperiod 2 benefit

0

Period 1 brown politician's optimization

Protect environment

Get re-elected

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 2 only

Protect environment

Analysis #4

Not protect environment

Get kicked out

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 1 only

Benefit from period 1 policy

Expectedperiod 2 benefit

0

Not protect environment

Q

1-Q

Optimal behavior

A proposed equilibrium

The following set of actions

Green politician protects environment in period 1

Brown politician protects environment in period 1

with probability Q

Green citizens vote the incumbent

if and only if environment is protected in period 1

is indeed an equilibrium (i.e. no one benefits from deviation)

1st-term politician type

Green

Brown

Cost of pleasing Green citizens

Low

High

1st-term policy

Protect

Not protect

Election

Re-elected

Re-elected

Kicked out

2nd-term policy

Zero

Protect

Protect

Not protect

Case 3: Neck and neck, with more Green than Brown citizens

Term limit discourages environment protection

Case 1: Incumbent is popular

Incumbent supporters

Case 2: Opposition is popular

Opposition supporters

Case 3: Neck and neck, with more Green than Brown citizens

Case 4: Neck and neck, with more Brown than Green citizens

Optimization by citizens and period 1 politicians

Analysis

A proposed equilibrium

We now see whether the following set of actions

Green politician does not protect environment in period 1

with probability Q

Brown politician does not protect environment in period 1

Brown citizens vote the incumbent

if and only if environment is NOT protected in period 1

constitutes an equilibrium (i.e. no one benefits from deviation)

Brown citizens' optimization at the election

Vote for the candidate who is more likely to be brown

Probability of being brown

Incumbent

Opposition

1-P
1P1-P
?
??

Analysis #5

Probability that incumbent is brown

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #5 (cont.)

Probability that incumbent is brown

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #5 (cont.)

Protect

Incumbent's policy choice (according to the proposed equilibrium)

Q

1 - Q

Do not protect

Do not protect

Probability that incumbent is brown

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #5 (cont.)

Protect

Incumbent's policy choice (according to the proposed equilibrium)

Q

1 - Q

Do not protect

Do not protect

If environment is protected...

Green

Vote the opposition if environment is protected

Probability of being brown

Incumbent

Opposition

1-P
1P1-P
0
00
<
<<

Brown citizens' optimization at the election

Analysis #5 (cont.)

If environment is protected...

Green

Probability that incumbent is brown

Green

Brown

P

1 - P

Citizens' initial belief

Analysis #5 (cont.)

Protect

Incumbent's policy choice (according to the proposed equilibrium)

Q

1 - Q

Do not protect

Do not protect

If environment is NOT protected...

Green

P*Q

Brown

(1 - P)

Vote the incumbent if environment is not protected

Probability of being brown

Incumbent

Opposition

1-P
1P1-P
\frac{1-P}{PQ+1-P}
1PPQ+1P\frac{1-P}{PQ+1-P}
>
>>

Brown citizens' optimization at the election

Analysis #5 (cont.)

If environment is NOT protected...

Green

P*Q

Brown

(1 - P)

It is indeed optimal for brown citizens to vote the incumbent

if and only if environment is NOT protected

Period 1 brown politician's optimization

Protect environment

Get kicked out

& do not fulfil his/her desire

in either period

Optimal behaviour: NOT protect environment

Analysis #6

Not protect environment

Get re-elected

& fulfil his/her desire

in both periods

Period 1 green politician's optimization

Protect environment

Get kicked out

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 1 only

Analysis #7

Not protect environment

Get re-elected

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 2 only

Benefit from period 1 policy

Expectedperiod 2 benefit

0

Period 1 green politician's optimization

Protect environment

Get kicked out

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 1 only

Analysis #7

Not protect environment

Get re-elected

& fulfil his/her desire

in period 2 only

Not protect environment

Protect environment

Q

1-Q

Optimal behavior

Benefit from period 1 policy

Expectedperiod 2 benefit

0

1st-term politician type

Green

Brown

Cost of pleasing Brown citizens

High

Zero

1st-term policy

Not Protect

Not protect

Election

Re-elected

Re-elected

Kicked out

2nd-term policy

Low

Protect

Protect

Not protect

Case 4: Neck and neck, with more Brown than Green citizens

Term limit encourages environment protection

Summary (Predictions to be tested)

1

2

3

Term limit has no impact on environment policy

when the incumbent or the opposition is popular

Term limit discourages environment policy

when electoral competition is intense

and a minority of citizens are green

Term limit encourages environment policy

when electoral competition is intense

and a minority of citizens are brown

Implications

It's NOT necessarily desirable

to make policy-maker responsive to voters

Elections backfire when

policy-makers have a better idea of desirable policies for society

To seek re-election, policy-makers will choose

a policy that voters believe is correct.

e.g. Green politician vs Brown citizens

e.g. Green politician doesn't protect environment to be re-elected

Today's Road Map

Impact of Term Limits - Theory

Impact of Media Freedom

Impact of Term Limits - Evidence

Testing ground: US governors

About half of the 50 US states have term limits on their governors

Measurement

Environment policy

Annual per capita state govt expenditure (1970-2000)

on fish & game, forests & parks, and other natural resources

Account for 1.8% of total state expenditure

Source: List and Sturm (2006), pp. 1261-62

% of Green citizens

Members of 3 largest environment groups in 1987:

Greenpeace, Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation

(as % of state population)

Minimum 0.25% (Missisippi) / Maximum 2% (Vermont)

Naive way to estimate the impact of term limits

1. Take a US state with term limits

e.g. California (term limits introduced in 1990)

Naive way to estimate the impact of term limits

2. Compare policies during:

Years with 

governor 

term-limited

Years with 

governor 

not term-limited

vs

Example: Arnold Schwarzenegger

1st term

(2003-2006)

2nd term

(2007-2010)

vs

Naive way to estimate the impact of term limits

2. Compare policies during:

Years with 

governor 

term-limited

Years with 

governor 

not term-limited

vs

May be different also in US-wide policy trend

The endogeneity concern

crops up

Naive way to estimate the impact of term limits

2. Compare policies during:

Years with 

governor 

term-limited

Years with 

governor 

not term-limited

vs

Example: Arnold Schwarzenegger

1st term

(2003-2006)

2nd term

(2007-2010)

vs

Great Recession since 2008

Better way to estimate the impact of term limits

Compare to the difference in states without term limits

Arnold

Schwarzenegger

in California

2nd term

(2007-2010)

vs

1st term

(2003-2006)

Rick Perry in Texas

in office 2000-2015

2007-2010

2003-2006

vs

Better way to estimate the impact of term limits

Arnold

Schwarzenegger

in California

2nd term

(2007-2010)

vs

1st term

(2003-2006)

Rick Perry in Texas

in office 2000-2015

2007-2010

2003-2006

vs

vs

Compare to the difference in states without term limits

Empirical strategy: Difference-in-differences

Compare states with / without term limits

Years with
governor
term-limited 
Years with
governor
not term-limited
States with
term limits
States without
term limits

Impact of term limit

= (A - B) - (C - D)

A

B

C

D

Recap of predictions to be tested

1

2

3

Term limit has no impact on environment policy

when the incumbent or the opposition is popular

Term limit discourages environment policy

when electoral competition is intense

and a minority of citizens are green

Term limit encourages environment policy

when electoral competition is intense

and a minority of citizens are brown

Impact of term limits on environment spending

Source: List and Sturm (2006), p. 1267

Any states with large incumbent's vote share

1st-term

spending

2nd-term

spending

=

Impact of term limits on environment spending

Source: List and Sturm (2006), p. 1267

by 20% of average spending

Green states with incumbent's vote share closed to 50%

1st-term

spending

2nd-term

spending

>

Impact of term limits on environment spending

Source: List and Sturm (2006), p. 1267

by 9.2% of average spending

Brown states with incumbent's vote share closed to 50%

1st-term

spending

2nd-term

spending

<

Implications: Pro and Con of Term Limits

When citizens know which policy is bad (e.g. corruption)

Term limits allow politicians

to choose bad policy

When citizens DO NOT know which policy is bad (e.g. brown citizens)

Term limits allow well-informed politicians (e.g. green politicians)

not to choose what citizens believe is good

Today's Road Map

Impact of Term Limits - Theory

Impact of Media Freedom

Impact of Term Limits - Evidence

The impact of press freedom

within the framework of the political agency model

Citizens observe

incumbent's performance

before election

Better-than-expected

performance

Re-election

of incumbent

Incumbent delivers

what citizens need

Press Freedom

Testing ground: India's famine/disaster relief

State governments in India

are responsible for

Distribution of foods, drinking water, medicine, clothes, housing

Repairing damaged properties

Monitoring food production and impending disasters

Theoretical predictions

Political Agency Model predicts:

More media penetration

More relief provided by state government

When famine/disaster strikes

Measurement

When famine/disaster strikes

More media penetration

More relief provided by state government

grain production

flood damage

newspaper circulation per capita

Food distribution

Relief expenditure

Findings from annual data for 1958-1992

10% drop in grain production

Food distribution is increased by

 

in states with median

newspaper circulation

in states with 75 percentile

newspaper circulation

1.0%

2.3%

Similar result for relief expenditure in response to flooding

Implications

Press freedom is key to make the government accountable

for issues such as disaster relief and corruption

So this world map

is really worrisome

Next lecture...

Voter Turnout

This lecture is based on the following academic articles:

List, J. A., and D. M. Sturm. 2006. “How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(4): 1249–81.

Besley, T., and R. Burgess. 2002. “The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(4): 1415–51. 

Politics through the Lens of Economics (2017): Lecture 11 Term Limit and Media Freedom

By Masayuki Kudamatsu

Politics through the Lens of Economics (2017): Lecture 11 Term Limit and Media Freedom

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