Why Nations Fail Ilustrated

Lecture 10

Collapse of the State

Consequences of persistent extractive institutions

December 11, 2018

Masayuki Kudamatsu

Chapter 13, pp. 329-332, pp. 1-4 & 61

Week Ten

Chapter 13

Weeks 8-10: Persistence of Extractive Institutions

Week Eight

Chapter 9

Week Nine

Chapter 12

Colonization of

Southeast Asia by

Europeans in 17c

Slave trade in

sub-Saharan

Africa

British colonization

of South Africa

in 19c

Guatemala

Sierra Leone 

Ethiopia

before/after

the 1974 coup

US South

before/after

American Civil War

Zimbabwe

Argentina

Colombia

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Extractive Economic Institutions

Extractive Political Institutions

Today's theme:

Extractive institutions cause the collapse of the state

Collapse of the State

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Image Source: parcel2go.com

Origin of extractive institutions in Zimbabwe

British colonized the area as Southern Rhodesia

1901

Very rich farmlands

Migration of Europeans

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

White settlers in Southern Rhodesia in 1922

Origin of extractive institutions in Zimbabwe (cont.)

1923

Self-government granted from Britain

Apartheid regime introduced

in a similar fashion to South Africa's Natives Land Act of 1913

Land apportionment in 1965

Iron Law of Oligarchy in Zimbabwe

1980

Independence as a result of guerrilla wars by black citizens

Extractive political institutions emerged by 1990

20,000 killed in Matabeleland, the opposition's heartland

Two main political parties merged in 1987

to effectively become a one-party state

with Robert Mugabe as president

Senate abolished in 1990

with some legislative seats

reserved for Mugabe's appointees 

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

Iron Law of Oligarchy in Zimbabwe (cont.)

Extractive economic institutions inherited from colonial days

Regulations on prices and international trade

Obligatory agricultural marketing boards

(Insecure property rights / Restricted entry into new business

(cf. Sierra Leone before & after independence in Lecture 9)

Difficult for black citizens to become rich

White citizens remain as the main business class

Worsening extractive institutions in Zimbabwe

2000

Expropriation of white farmers' land

Allocated to the ruling party's elite

Collapse of agricultural outputs & food price

Government prints money to buy foods, leading to hyperinflation

Image source: Wikimedia Commons

Zimbabwe today

Per capita income in 2008: half of 1980

GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$)

Unemployment rate in 2009

94%

Zimbabwe today (cont.)

Cumulative # of cholera cases 18 Aug 2008 - 11 Jan 2009

Outbreak of cholera in 2008-09

(Deadliest in Africa in 15 years)

Extractive Economic Institutions

Extractive Political Institutions

Today's theme:

Extractive institutions cause the collapse of the state

Collapse of the State

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Image Source: parcel2go.com

Sierra Leone in the 1980s

Consequences of persistent extractive institutions (Lecture 9)

Roads fell into pieces

Schools disintegrated

National TV broadcast stopped in 1987

Transmitters sold by cash-strapped ministry

Radio tower fell down in 1989

No pay for civil servants, teachers, paramount chiefs

Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002)

Rebels (RUF), with Liberians & Burkinabes,

crossed the border from Liberia

No state capacity to control the border

RUF indiscriminately killed citizens

No one volunteers to join the rebel army

Forcibly recruit child soldiers

Forced labor to extract diamonds

Government army did the same

Image Source: Medium.com

 

Consequences

80,000 died, with massive human rights abuse

Roads, houses, buildings destroyed

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

A school building in Koindu circa 2001-2005

Extractive Economic Institutions

Extractive Political Institutions

Today's theme:

Extractive institutions cause the collapse of the state

Collapse of the State

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Image Source: parcel2go.com

Colombia's extractive political institutions

Democracy

since 1958

Civil wars between government vs. communist guerrillas (1964-2016)

Inclusive

Extractive

Both

Plurality

and

Centralized

State

Either

Absolutist

or

Lack of

Centralization

Worsening extractive political institutions

Paramilitaries founded by Castano brothers in 1981

To protect themselves from communist guerrillas

Hired by landowners to protect their properties

Involved in extortion, kidnapping, murder

Source: Map 20 of Why Nations Fail

1997

Form a nationwide organization

called AUC

Paramilitary presence, 1997-2005

Worsening extractive political institutions (cont.)

AUC started involved in politics from 2002

Fix elections by threatening voters

1/3 of congressmen/senators owed their 2002 election to AUC

Support President Alvaro Uribe in his re-election in 2006

AUC took over municipal governments

10% of rural lands expropriated

National politicians allow AUC to do so, to get elected

Collect taxes for their own pockets

Consequences

4,500,000 (10% of population) displaced in 2010

Citizens murdered both by FARC and AUC

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Image Source: parcel2go.com

Origin of extractive institutions in Argentina

Internal provinces such as La Rioja

Densely populated

before the Spanish conquest

Forced labor system

created by Spanish (Lecture 6)

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

Origin of extractive institutions in Argentina (cont.)

19th century:

Local warlord Facundo Quiroga

marched into Buenos Aires

Extractive institutions survive

Image Source:

Wikimedia Commons

Warlords of internal provinces made a truce

with central government in Buenos Aires

They agreed to leave each other alone

Extractive political institutions in Argentina

Oscillates between democracy and military dictatorship since 1930

During democratic periods, institutions are not inclusive

9,000 executed in the 1970s

Dominated by

President Peron (1946-55) and his followers

Votes bought in exchange of govt contracts & jobs

President Menem (a Peronist) extended term limits in 1990s

Extractive political institutions in Argentina (cont.)

Every president since Juan Domingo Peron (1946-55)

pack Supreme Court with their supporters

President's power: unconstrained

Expropriation by Argentine government

1991

Argentine peso tied to US dollar at 1:1 exchange rate

Many citizens deposit their money in US dollars

anticipating the devaluation of peso in the future

Export fell (Argentine goods became relatively expensive)

to tame hyperinflation since the 1980s (325% a year)

Initially successful with economic growth

1999

Brazil devalued its currency

Expropriation by Argentine government (cont.)

2001

Bank accounts frozen ("El Corralito")

US$ accounts forcibly converted to pesos at 1:1 rate

Then the peso devalued at 1:4

3/4 of citizens' assets

expropriated by government

Image Source: Wikimedia Commons

Protests against frozen bank accounts in 2002

economic institutions
Secure
for everyone
Property rights Insecure
for majority of people
Free Occupational
choice
Forced labor
Free Entry of new businesses Prevented by monopolies
Unbiased System of laws Biased for
the powerful/rich
Promoted Public service provision Discouraged

Economic Institutions

Inclusive

Extractive

Property rights

Secure for everyone

Insecure for majority of people

Occupational choice

Free

Forced labor

Entry of new businesses

Free

Prevented by monopolies

System of laws

Unbiased

Biased for the powerful / rich 

Public service provision

Provided

Limited

That is...

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Image Source: marketwatch.com

Expropriation by North Korean government

2009

Currency reform: 100 old wons = 1 new won

Had to be done within a week

Expropriation of citizens' private wealth

No more than 100,000 wons (about US$40)

Exchange for new currency

To punish those using black markets

To keep citizens remain poor

Image Source: Wikipedia

=

Expropriation by North Korean government (cont.)

The ruling elite: enjoy consuming luxury goods

Kim Jong-Il's pleasure palace

US's economic sanction in 2006

bans exporting luxury items to North Korea

Image Source: Daily Star

Communism as extractive institutions

Extractive political institutions

All power held by communist elite

Opponents purged and murdered

Extractive economic institutions

No private property

No market

economic institutions
Secure
for everyone
Property rights Insecure
for majority of people
Free Occupational
choice
Forced labor
Free Entry of new businesses Prevented by monopolies
Unbiased System of laws Biased for
the powerful/rich
Promoted Public service provision Discouraged

Economic Institutions

Inclusive

Extractive

Property rights

Secure for everyone

Non-existent

Occupational choice

Free

Forced labor

Entry of new businesses

Free

Market does not exist

System of laws

Unbiased

Biased for the powerful / rich 

Public service provision

Provided

Limited

That is...

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Image Source: parcel2go.com

Political institutions in Uzbekistan

Islam Karimov elected as president in 1991

Crack down opposition

750 demonstrators killed by police and army in 2005

No free media or NGOs allowed

Karimov keeps "winning" presidential elections

91.2% of votes in 2000

(the only opposition candidate also voted for Karimov)

88% of votes in 2007

(widely regarded as fraudulent)

First term extended by a referendum (99.6% in favor) in 1996

Economic institutions in Uzbekistan

Cotton: 45% of Uzbek exports

Its production is heavily regulated

Farmers must allocate 35% of their land to cotton

They get paid a small % of world price (cf. marketing board)

No incentive to maintain/renew combine harvesters

economic institutions
Secure
for everyone
Property rights Insecure
for majority of people
Free Occupational
choice
Forced labor
Free Entry of new businesses Prevented by monopolies
Unbiased System of laws Biased for
the powerful/rich
Promoted Public service provision Discouraged

Economic Institutions

Inclusive

Extractive

Property rights

Secure for everyone

Insecure for majority of people

Occupational choice

Free

Forced labor

Entry of new businesses

Free

Prevented by monopolies

System of laws

Unbiased

Biased for the powerful / rich 

Public service provision

Provided

Limited

That is...

Economic institutions in Uzbekistan (cont.)

2.7 million school children

forced to harvest cotton for 2 months from early September

Paid $0.03 for 20-60kg of harvest

World price: $1.40 per kg

Source: Why Nations Fail

economic institutions
Secure
for everyone
Property rights Insecure
for majority of people
Free Occupational
choice
Forced labor
Free Entry of new businesses Prevented by monopolies
Unbiased System of laws Biased for
the powerful/rich
Promoted Public service provision Discouraged

Economic Institutions

Inclusive

Extractive

Property rights

Secure for everyone

Insecure for majority of people

Occupational choice

Free

Forced labor

Entry of new businesses

Free

Prevented by monopolies

System of laws

Unbiased

Biased for the powerful / rich 

Public service provision

Provided

Limited

That is...

Economic institutions in Uzbekistan (cont.)

U.S company Interspan invested in tea production

By 2005, their market share reaches 30%

Then, Interspan's local personnel arrested, beaten up, tortured

By 2006, Interspan pulled out

President Karimov's family took over

economic institutions
Secure
for everyone
Property rights Insecure
for majority of people
Free Occupational
choice
Forced labor
Free Entry of new businesses Prevented by monopolies
Unbiased System of laws Biased for
the powerful/rich
Promoted Public service provision Discouraged

Economic Institutions

Inclusive

Extractive

Property rights

Secure for everyone

Insecure for majority of people

Occupational choice

Free

Forced labor

Entry of new businesses

Free

Prevented by monopolies

System of laws

Unbiased

Biased for the powerful / rich 

Public service provision

Provided

Limited

That is...

Consequences

1/3 of population live under poverty

Mean annual income: around $1,000

Books are banned; Internet censored

Today's Road Map

Zimbabwe

Sierra Leone (since the 1990s)

Colombia

Argentina

North Korea

Uzbekistan

Egypt

Image Source: parcel2go.com

Origin of extractive institutions in Egypt

1805-1848: Muhammad Ali

State bureaucracy, army, and tax system: modernized

1848-1954: British colonial rule with Ali's dynasty

1954 and afterwards: Military took over

Extractive economic institutions in Egypt

Major businesspeople: appointed as ministers

Put up the restriction on entry, to protect their monopoly

Media, Iron & Steel, Automotive, Alcoholic beverages, Cement, etc.

Receive government contracts and state bank loans

Won the auction for privatized state monopolies in 1990s

(cf. Carlos Slim of Mexico in Lecture 6)

economic institutions
Secure
for everyone
Property rights Insecure
for majority of people
Free Occupational
choice
Forced labor
Free Entry of new businesses Prevented by monopolies
Unbiased System of laws Biased for
the powerful/rich
Promoted Public service provision Discouraged

Economic Institutions

Inclusive

Extractive

Property rights

Secure for everyone

Insecure for majority of people

Occupational choice

Free

Forced labor

Entry of new businesses

Free

Prevented by monopolies

System of laws

Unbiased

Biased for the powerful / rich 

Public service provision

Provided

Limited

That is...

Consequences

40% of population earn less than $2 a day

Week 13

Chapter 6

Week 11

Chapter 14

United Kingdom

in 19c

 

United States

in early 20c

Republic of Venice

 

 

Roman Republic

Weeks 11-13: Survival of Inclusive Institutions

Botswana

 

 

US South

in the 1950s-1960s

 

Brazil

since the 1970s

Week 12

Chapter 11

Your to-do list until next class

Read Chapter 14 along with

pp. 455-460 on Brazil

and post questions on Prulu

1

2

3

Start collecting documents on political/economic events in your country

Assemble data for your country

Politics through the Lens of Economics (2018): Lecture 10

By Masayuki Kudamatsu

Politics through the Lens of Economics (2018): Lecture 10

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