Javier García-Bernardo
offshore financial centers and inequality
wealth Inequality is rising
Check this: https://mkorostoff.github.io/1-pixel-wealth/
2020
2021
2020
2021
~g
~r
rental income
dividends
capital gains
interest
r > g
growth rate
rate of return of capital
Long-term dynamics
Dawid
Javier
Source data: 2016 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances
Source: https://www.visualcapitalist.com/chart-assets-make-wealth/
Source: World Inequality Database
Wealthy people have access to better investments and lower taxation
A closer look at r
How to control inequality in an era of low-growth?
Option 1: Progressive tax on personal income
However... it does not affect r,
often the major driver
of inequality
However... we have been
reducing the progressiveness
of personal income tax
Option 2: Tax returns of capital to reduce r
Tax at the individual level:
- Tax dividend, interest and rental income
- Tax capital gains
Tax at corporate level:
- Tax corporate income
However...
- we have been reducing these taxes
How to control inequality in an era of low-growth?
Option 3: Tax wealth directly
How to control inequality in an era of low-growth?
offshore financial centers
Corporations: Move financial assets to OFCs (semi-legal)
+5€ (coffee)
-1€ (brand)
-4€ (costs)
Starbucks Spain
Starbucks NL
EBT: 0€
EBT: 1€
+1€ (brand)
+5€ (coffee)
-4€ (costs)
Cafe Pepe
EBT: 1€
Tax: 0€
Profit: 0€
Tax: 0.07€
Profit: 0.93€
Tax: 0.25€
Profit: 0.75€
Location of profits
Location of employees
the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Ireland and Singapore
Individuals create companies offshore and:
- Invest from there to avoid capital gains, dividend, interest or rent taxes until the profits are repatriated (mostly legal)
- Hide assets there (mostly illegal)
- Avoid inheritance tax by hiring a life insurance inside a trust
... lost of other dubious tax schemes involving shell companies offshore
OFCs “process” around $6 000 000 000 000 yearly.
offshore financial centers
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/06/opinion/income-tax-rate-wealthy.html
OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS
- So, which countries are OFCs?
- Definitions differ
- Highly contested and politicized
- Two approaches:
- Misalignment approaches (e.g. ratio FDI/GDP)
- Assumes all countries are the same
- Regulatory framework (e.g. tax haven)
- Does not measure the importance of countries
- Misalignment approaches (e.g. ratio FDI/GDP)
Solution: Network science!
Data: Orbis
- 71,201,304 ownership links between firms
Step 1: Construct global ownership chains, representing money flows
- Start from each company, find the owners recursively
- Weight the chain by the revenue of the first chain
- Take the ownership into consideration
Method:
We look at which countries are used disproportionately in transnational ownership chains.
Step 2: Sink OFC
Countries that attract and retain capital. They are situated disproportionately at the end of the chains (where the owners are)
Step 3: Conduit OFC
Countries that are attractive intermediate destinations because their numerous tax treaties, low or zero withholding taxes, strong legal systems and good reputations for enabling the quiet transfer of capital without taxation. In the middle of ownership chains.
Adding the ownership chains entering and country, subtracting the ones leaving the country
Summing the ownership chains going from a sink, into the country analyzed, and out to a third country
Step 1:
weighted by the revenue of Franziskaner
|Source - Sink|
Measures total importance
Step 2: sink OFFshore financial centers
Green: Source>Sink
Yellow: Sink>Source
|Source - Sink|/GDP
Measures relative importance
High relative and total importance
High total importance, low relative importance
Low total importance, high relative importance
15 companies per capita
Step 2: sink OFFshore financial centers
Step 3: conduit OFFshore financial centers
Value(Sink→Country→Third country)/GDP
Value(Third country→Country→Sink)/GDP
Five countries channel 47% of corporate offshore investment from tax havens:
Netherlands (23%), the UK (14%), Switzerland (6%), Singapore (2%) and Ireland (1%).
Not all OFCS are equal
why The netherlands?
Historical reasons:
- Curaçao: Just before World War II, Dutch multinationals moved to CW to avoid the confiscation of assets.
- Curaçao developed a prominent and flexible management industry.
- Used to avoid withholding taxes (no longer applicable)
- Effective tax rate in CW: 2.4 - 3%
During the 80s there was a push towards attracting corporations in the Netherlands.
importance of the netherlands
Reasons
- Logistic:
- Located in the heart of Europe.
- Outstanding infrastructure.
- Highly educated and multilingual workforce.
- Well-developed trust and management services.
- Beneficial tax regime:
- No withholding taxes for interest and royalties.
- No real withholding tax for dividends.
- Patent box
- Lenient anti tax avoidance legislation
- Low transparency
- Advance Tax Rulings (ATR) and Advance Pricing Agreements (APA)
- Investor protection
- Large number of bilateral investment treaties
- Advanced tax ruling system (increases certainty)
The Netherlands is extremely successful at attracting holding companies (assets ~8 times GDP), mainly to avoid taxes.
Tax revenue collected:
- 8 billion / year
Tax revenue lost by other countries:
- 36 billion / year
Employment:
- 3000 of business service professionals
- Some other thousands by headquarters and shared service centers
summary
- Within-country wealth inequality is rising
- Offshore financial centers contribute to this process by allowing corporations and individuals to avoid taxes.
- Defining offshore financial centers is difficult and politiziced
- Corporate ownership networks contain rich information on how corporations organize
- We find that OFCs come in two flavors: conduits and sinks
- Conduits are highly developed countries with strong regulatory environments, not exotic far-flung islands.
- Offshore financial centers contribute to other types of inequalities:
- Within states
- Between capital and states
javier.garcia.bernardo@gmail.com
Copy of PPLE
By Javier GB
Copy of PPLE
sink and conduits in Corporate Structures
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