Computation and Turing Machine

Turing Machine

A (k-tape) turing machine consists of:

1. k tapes that contain symbols(one of them is the input tape)

2. k read-write heads on each tape(the one on the input head is read-only)

3. a register that keeps the state of the TM

4. a finite table of instructions that given the current state and the symbols reading: write a symbol under each read/write head, move the read-write heads , and change the state
 

Turing Machine

Formally, a (k-tape) turing machine \(M\) is defined by a tuple\((\Gamma,Q,\delta)\):

\(\Gamma\) is a finite set,  containing symbols that \(M\)'s tapes can contain

\(Q\) is a finite set, containing the states that \(M\) can be in

\(\delta\) is a function from \(Q \times \Gamma^k\) to \(Q \times \Gamma^{k-1} \times \{L,S,R\}^k\), and is called the "transition function"

We normally assume that \(\Gamma=\{\text{BLANK},\text{START},0,1\}\), and \(Q\) contains \(q_{start}\) and \(q_{halt}\)

Computing a function/Running TIme

Given a function \(f : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*\) and another function \(T: \mathbb N \to \mathbb N\),

we say a TM \(M\) computes \(f\), if for every \(x \in \{0,1\}^*\), whenever \(M\) is initialized to the start configuration on input \(x\), then it halts with \(f(x)\) written on its output tape.

We say  \(M\) computes \(f\) in \(T(n)\)-time, if its computation on every input \(x\) requires at most \(T(|x|)\) steps.

Some useful facts about TM

1. There exists an equivalent TM for any (C,java,...) program.(Operations in the machine language can be simulated by TMs) 
2. If \(f\) is computable on a k-tape TM in \(T(n)\)- time, then \(f\) is computable in time \(5kT(n)^2\) on a single-tape TM whose head movements don't depend on the input and only depends on the input length.
3. Each string represents a TM, and each TM can be represented by infinitely many strings

Universal TM

There exsists TM \(U\) such that for any \(x,\alpha \in \{0,1\}^*\) ,\(U(x,\alpha) = M_\alpha(x)\), where \(M_\alpha\) is the TM represented by \(\alpha\).

Moreover, if \(M_\alpha(x)\) halts within \(T\) steps then \(U(x,\alpha)\) halts within \(CT\log T\) steps, where \(C\) is independent of \(|x|\)

Universal TM with Time Bound

There exsists TM \(U\) such that for any \(x,\alpha \in \{0,1\}^*\) , \(T \in \mathbb N\),\(U(x,\alpha,T) = M_\alpha(x)\) if \(M_\alpha(x)\) halts in \(T\) steps

Uncomputability/Undecidability?

演算法可數，問題不可勝數？

Uncomputable function

Define the function \({\rm UC}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}\):

if \(M_\alpha(\alpha) = 1\),\({\rm UC}(\alpha) = 0\);otherwise, \({\rm UC}(\alpha) = 1\)

Halting problem

\({\rm HALT}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}\):

\({\rm HALT}(\langle \alpha,x \rangle) = 1\), if \(M_\alpha(x)\) halts;

\({\rm HALT}(\langle \alpha,x\rangle) = 0\), otherwise

\({\rm HALT}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}\):

\({\rm HALT}(\langle \alpha,x \rangle) = 1\), if \(M_\alpha(x)\) halts;

\({\rm HALT}(\alpha) = 0\), otherwise

We can REDUCE(\(\infty \star\)) \({\rm UC}\) to \({\rm HALT}\)!

\({\rm UC}: \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}\):

\({\rm UC}(\alpha) = 0\), if \(M_\alpha(\alpha) = 1\);

\({\rm UC}(\alpha) = 1\), otherwise

Uncomputability and

Gödel's Imcompleteness Theorem?

Gödel's Imcompleteness Theorem

First Incompleteness Theorem: "任何可以表達算術且一致的形式系統一定是不完備的。"

一致(consistent): There is no statement \(\phi\) such that both \(\phi\) and \(\neg \phi\) can be proven

完備(complete): For every statement \(\phi\), either \(\phi\) or \(\neg \phi\) can be proven

Gödel's Imcompleteness Theorem

There are true statements that cannot be proven!

(in certain axiomatic systems, like ZFC)

From Halting Problem to
Incompleteness Thorem

Weaker version of First Incompleteness Theorem: "任何可以表達算術且可靠的形式系統一定是不完備的。"

可靠(sound): If a statement \(\phi\) is not true, it cannot be proven(which implies consistent)

完備(complete): For every statement \(\phi\), either \(\phi\) or \(\neg \phi\) can be proven

From Halting Problem to
Incompleteness Thorem

If a axiomatic system(that is powerful enough) is both sound and complete , we can devise an algorithm(or, a TM) that can compute \(\rm HALT\)!

From Halting Problem to
Incompleteness Thorem

step 0: Read the input \(\alpha\) and \(x\)

step 1: Express the statement "\(M_\alpha\) halts on \(x\)" by \(\phi\)

step 2: Enumerate all strings of finite length, and check if it is a proof for \(\phi\) or \(\neg \phi\)(proof checking is not hard!)

step 3: By completeness, step 2 can find the proof, and by soundness, the proven result is true. Thus we can output \(1\) if \(\phi\) is true and output \(0\) otherwise!

Why Turing Machine?

The Church-Turing(CT) Thesis: Every effectively calculable function is a computable function

P

Language/Decision Problem

A language \(L\) is a subset of

\(\{0,1\}^*\)(the set of all (bit)strings)

Language/Decision Problem

Examples of languages:

PAL:\(\{s:s \text{ is a palindrome}\}\)

PRIME:\(\{n: n \text{ is a prime number}\}\)

MAXINDSET:\(\{\langle G,k\rangle:\text{ the size of the largest independent set } \text{ in } G \text{ is } k\}\)

Complexity Class

A complexity class is a set of languages(boolean functions) that can be decided(computed) within given resource bounds.

DTIME and P

\({\rm DTIME}(T(n))\): a language \(L\) is in \({\rm DTIME}(T(n))\) if there is a TM that decides \(L\) in \(O(T(n))\) time

P: \(P = \cup_{c \geq 1} {\rm DTIME}(n^c)\)

NP

NP

a language \(L\) is in \(\rm NP\) :

there exists a polynomial \(p\), a polynomial-time TM \(M\), such that \(\forall x \in \{0,1\}^*, \\ x\in L \Leftrightarrow \exists u \in \{0,1\}^{|p(|x|)|},{\rm s.t.} M(u,x)=1 \)

NP

Examples of languages in NP:

PAL:\(\{s:s \text{ is a palindrome}\}\)

COMPOSITE:\(\{n: n \text{ is a composite number}\}\)

SUBSETSUM:\(\{\langle A_1,A_2,...,A_n,T\rangle:\text{ there is a subset of } A \text{ that sum to } T \}\)

Are they in NP?

INDSET:\(\{\langle G,k\rangle:\text{ there is a independent set of size } k \text{ in } G \}\)

MAXINDSET:\(\{\langle G,k\rangle:\text{ the size of the largest independent set } \text{ in } G \text{ is } k\}\)

GI:\(\{\langle G,G'\rangle: G \text{ is isomorphic to } G' \}\)
GNI:\(\{\langle G,G'\rangle: G \text{ is not isomorphic to } G' \}\)

Non-Deterministic TM

An NDTM \(M\) is almost the same as a TM, but it has a special state \(q_{\rm accept}\) and two transition functions \(\delta_0\) and \(\delta_1\). In each step of computation, \(M\) arbitrarily choose one of them to apply.

NTIME

\({\rm NTIME}(T(n))\): a language \(L\) is in \({\rm NTIME}(T(n))\) if there is a \(O(T(n))\)  NDTM \(M\), such that \(x \in L \Leftrightarrow M(x) = 1\)

Polynomial-time Reduction

A language \(L\) is polynomial-time reducible to another language \(L'\)(\(L \leq_p L'\)), if there exists a polynomial-time computable function \(f:\{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^*\) such that \(x \in L \Leftrightarrow f(x) \in L'\)

NP hard and NP complete

NP-hard: \(L'\) is in NP-hard, if \(L \leq_p L'\) for every \(L\) in NP

NP-complete: \(L'\) is NP-complete if it is in NP and NP-hard 

CNF(CNF formula)

a CNF instance with 5 variables and 4 clauses: 

\(\phi(a_1,a_2,a_3,a_4,a_5) = (a_1\lor \neg a_2 \lor a_3 \lor a_4) \land (\neg a_1 \lor a_2 \lor a_3 \lor a_5) \land (\neg a_1 \lor \neg a_4 \lor a_5) \land (a_2 \lor \neg a_3 \lor \neg a_5)\)

SAT and 3SAT

SAT:\(\{\phi: \phi \text{ is a satisfiable CNF}\}\)

3SAT:\(\{\phi: \phi \text{ is a satisfiable 3CNF}\}\)

useful tool

Every boolean function \(f:\{0,1\}^l \to \{0,1\}\) can be expressed as a CNF with \(2^l\) clauses of \(l\) literals

\(\phi(x) = \bigwedge\limits_{z:f(z) = 0} (x \neq z)\)

CL Theorem Proof

We want to reduce a language \(L\) in NP to SAT(in polynomial time).

CL Theorem Proof

We can assume that:

\(M\) has only two tapes (input + work / output) and it is oblivious(so the location of its heads in the \(i\)-th step only depends on the input length and \(i\))

CL Theorem Proof

Snapshot:

The snapshot of the \(i\)-th step of \(M\)'s computation on input \(y = x \circ u\) is a triple \(\langle a,b,q \rangle \in \Gamma \times \Gamma \times Q\), representing the symbols on the two tapes and the state that \(M\) is in.

CL Theorem Proof

\(z_i\) depends on: the state in step \(i-1\) and the symbols in the currenct cells of the two tapes

There is a function \(F:\{0,1\}^{2c+1} \to \{0,1\}^c\), such that

\(z_i=F(z_{i-1},z_{{\rm prev}(i)},y_{{\rm inputpos}(i)})\)

\(F\) only depends on \(M\); \({\rm prev}(i)\) and \({\rm inputpos}(i)\) only depend on \(M\) and \(|y|\), and can be known by simulating \(M(0^{|y|})\).

CL Theorem Proof

CL Theorem Proof

CL Theorem Proof

CL Theorem Proof

CL Theorem Proof

NP completeness of 3SAT

Reduction 大賽

INDSET: Decide if there is a independent set of size \(k\) on \(G\)

QUADEQ: Decide if the set of boolean quadratic equations (\(\sum_{i,j \in [n]} a_{i,j}u_i u_j = b\)) is satisfiable(addition is modulo 2)

dHAMPATH: Decide if the directed graph \(G\) has a hamiltonian path

TSP:  Decide if there is a closed circuit that visits every node exactly once with total length at most \(k\) on a weighted complete graph \(G\)

HAMPATH: Decide if the undirected graph \(G\) has a hamiltonian path

coNP(順便講)

1. coNP = \(\{L : \bar L \in {\rm NP}\}\)

2. We say a language \(L\) is in coNP if there are a polynomial time TM \(M\) and a polynomial \(p\) such that

\(x \in L \Leftrightarrow \forall u \in \{0,1\}^{p(|x|)}, M(x,u) = 1\)

Why are the two defenitions equivalent?

example:GNI,tautology

Hardness of Approximation

MAX-3SAT

For a 3CNF \(\phi\), we denote \({\rm val}(\phi)\) as the maximum fraction of clauses that can be satisfied by any assigment.

\(\rho\)-approximation

For a CNF \(\phi\), can we find an assignment that satisfies \(\rho \cdot{\rm val}(\phi)\) of \(\phi's\) clauses in polynomial time?

For a graph \(G\) whose maximum independent set has size \(k\), can we find an independent set of size \(\rho \cdot k\) in polynomial time?

For a graph \(G\) whose minimum vertex cover has size \(k\), can we find an vertex cover of size \(\frac{k}{\rho}\) in polynomial time?

PCP Theorem

PCP verifier?

Example: \({\rm GNI} \in {\rm PCP}({\rm poly}(n),1)\)(GNI has a PCP verifier that uses poly(n) random coins and \(O(1)\) queries to the proof)

Verifier(\(V\)): By tosing random coins and making queries to the proof, the verifier should accept if \(G_1\not \equiv G_2\).

Proof(\(\pi\)): The proof is a string, and is expected that for each \(n\)-vertex labeled graph \(H\), \(\pi[H] = 0\) if \(H \equiv G_0\) and \(\pi[H] = 1\) otherwise.

香草口味PCP theorem

\({\rm NP}={\rm PCP}(\log n,1)\)

Each language in NP has a PCP verifier that uses \(O(\log n)\) random coins and makes \(O(1)\) queries to the proof.

巧克力口味PCP theorem

There exists \(\rho < 1\), such that for every \(L \in \rm NP\) there is a polynomial function \(f\) mapping strings to 3CNF such that :

\(x \in L \Rightarrow {\rm val}(f(x)) = 1\)

\(x \not\in L \Rightarrow {\rm val}(f(x)) < \rho\)

Why are they equivalent?

Why are they equivalent?

巧克力：There exists \(\rho < 1\), such that for every \(L \in \rm NP\) there is a polynomial function \(f\) mapping strings to 3CNF such that :

\(x \in L \Rightarrow {\rm val}(f(x)) = 1\)

\(x \not\in L \Rightarrow {\rm val}(f(x)) < \rho\)

香草：Each language in NP has a PCP verifier \(V\) that uses \(O(\log n)\) random coins and makes \(O(1)\) queries to the proof.

巧克力到香草：For an input \(x\), the verifier computes \(f(x)\) and expect the proof to be a satisfying assigment for \(f(x)\). Then the verifier just randomly choose one clause of \(f(x)\) and look at the corresponding three bits of the proof to check.

Maxmimum Independent Set and Minimum Vertex Cover

By the reduction of 3SAT to INDSET, we can transform a CNF \(\phi\) to a \(n\)-vertex graph whose largest independent set has size \({\rm val}(\phi)\frac{n}{7}\)

Approximation of maximum independent set

In fact, we cannot \(\rho'\)-approximate the maximum independent set for any \(\rho'\)!

\(G^k\)

\(G\)

\(G^2\)

Maxmimum Independent Set and Minimum Vertex Cover

By the reduction of 3SAT to INDSET, we can transform a CNF \(\phi\) to a \(n\)-vertex graph whose largest independent set has size \({\rm val}(\phi)\frac{n}{7}\)

\({\rm val}(\phi)\)

\({\rm IS}(G)\)

1

\(<\rho\)

\(\frac{n}{7}\)

\(<\rho\frac{n}{7}\)

\((\frac{n}{7})^k\)

\({\rm IS}(G^k)\)

\(<\rho^k(\frac{n}{7})^k\)

Proof of the PCP theorm

沒了啦><

Reference

Sanjeev Arora and Boaz Barak(2009):Computational Complexity: A Modern Approach 

What is communication complexity?

Communication Complexity

For a function \(f(x,y)\), where \(x\in \mathcal X, y \in \mathcal Y\), we give \(x\) to Alice(A) and \(y\) to Bob(B), and they both need to know \(f(x,y)\). 

Examples!

For \(x,y\in \{0,1\}^n\),

$$ EQ(x,y)=\left\{\begin{matrix}1 & ({\rm if}\ x=y)\\ 0 & ({\rm if}\ x\neq y)\end{matrix}\right.$$

Formal Definition of Protocols

A protocol \(\pi\) can be specified by a full binary tree, where each non-leaf vertex has an owner and an associated function \(f_v: \mathcal X( {\rm or}\ \mathcal Y)  \to \{0,1\}\), and each leaf has an output.

Randomized Protocols?

In the randomized case, A and B can both see an infinitely-long sequence \(R\) of unifromly random bits(independent of their inputs), and the protocol can make errors.

Examples!

For \(x,y\in \{0,1\}^n\),

$$ EQ(x,y)=\left\{\begin{matrix}1 & ({\rm if}\ x=y)\\ 0 & ({\rm if}\ x\neq y)\end{matrix}\right.$$

Some Other Problems

For \(x,y\in \{0,1\}^n\),

$$ GT(x,y)=\left\{\begin{matrix}1 & ({\rm if}\ x\geq y)\\ 0 & ({\rm if}\ x < y)\end{matrix}\right.$$

For \(x,y\in \{0,1\}^n\),

$$ DISJ(x,y)=\left\{\begin{matrix}1 & ({\rm if}\ |x \cap y|=0)\\ 0 & ({\rm otherwise})\end{matrix}\right.$$

For \(x,y\in \{0,1\}^n\),

$$ IP(x,y)=\langle x,y \rangle \% 2$$

Lower Bounds

Deterministic

Functions and Matrices

For a function \(f(x,y)\), we can represent it as a matrix \(M_f\).

\(M_{EQ}\)(2-bit)

Rectangles

A rectangle is a  subset of the input space \(\mathcal X \times \mathcal Y\) of the form \(A\times B\), where \(A\in \mathcal X, B \in \mathcal Y\).

Rectangles and Protocols

After Alice and Bob communicate according to the protocol, a rectangle is induced.

The rectangle must be monochromatic in \(M_f\).

Rectangles and Protocols

Thus, if there exists a protocol of length \(c\) for computing \(f\), then \(M_f\) can be partitioned into \(2^c\) monochromatic rectangles.

Rectangles and Protocols

Thus, if there exists a protocol of length \(c\) for computing \(f\), then \(M_f\) can be partitioned into \(2^c\) monochromatic rectangles.

If every cover of \(M_f\) by monochromatic rectangles requires at least \(t\) rectangles, then the deterministic complexity of \(f\) is at least \(\log t\).

(\(\infty \star\))

Rectangles and Protocols

Is the converse true?

However, if \(M_f\) can be partitioned into \(2^c\) rectangles, then there is a protocol of length \(O(c^2)\) that computes \(f\).

Deterministic Lower Bound of EQ and GT

\(M_{EQ}\)

\(M_{GT}\)

Fooling Set

A fooling set \(F \) of \(f(x,y)\) is a subset of inputs such that

1. \(f\) is constant on \(F\), and

2. for all \((x_1,y_1),(x_2,y_2) \in F\), either \((x_1,y_2) \) or \((x_2,y_1) \) has the opposite \(f-\)value

Deterministic Lower Bound of DISJ

For \(x,y\in \{0,1\}^n\),

$$ DISJ(x,y)=\left\{\begin{matrix}1 & ({\rm if}\ |x \cap y|=0)\\ 0 & ({\rm otherwise})\end{matrix}\right.$$

Rank

The deterministic communication complexity of \(f\) is at least \(\log({\rm rank}(M_f)+1)\)

Lower Bounds from Rank

\(M_{EQ}\)

\(M_{GT}\)

Some Lemmas

\({\rm rank}(M\otimes M') = {\rm rank}(M) \cdot {\rm rank}(M')\)

$${\rm rank}(A) - {\rm rank}(B) \leq {\rm rank}(A+B) \leq {\rm rank}(A) + {\rm rank}(B)$$

Lower Bounds from Rank

\(M_{DISJ}\)

\(M_{IP}\)

Lower Bounds from Rank

\(M_{DISJ_2}\)

\(P= J-2M_{IP}\)

Lower Bounds from Rank

$$M_{DISJ_n} = \begin{bmatrix} 1&1 \\ 1&0\end{bmatrix} \otimes M_{DISJ_{n-1}}$$

$$P_{n} = \begin{bmatrix} 1&1 \\ 1&-1\end{bmatrix} \otimes P_{n-1}$$

$${\rm rank}(M_{IP_n}) \geq {\rm rank} (P_n) - {\rm rank} (J_n)$$

Randomized

Public VS Private Coin

Randomized Protocol

=

Distribution of Deterministic Protocols

Distributional Complexity

von Neumann's minimax principle: For a \(n\times m\) matrix \(M\), 

$$\max\limits_{x\in \mathbb R^n, ||x||_1 =1, x_i > 0} \min\limits_{y\in \mathbb R^m, ||y||_1 =1, y_i > 0} x^T M y = \min_y \max_x x^T M y$$

Discrepancy

For a set \(S\subseteq \mathcal X \times \mathcal Y\), and a distribution \(\mu\)  over the inputs, we say the discrepancy of \(f(x,y)\) w.r.t.  \(S\) and \(\mu\) is 

$$|\mathbb E_\mu [\chi_S(x,y)(-1)^{f(x,y)}]|$$

Randomized Lower Bound of IP

For every rectangle \(R \subseteq \mathcal X \times \mathcal Y\),

$$|\mathbb E_U[\chi_{R}(x,y) (-1)^{IP(x,y)}]| \leq \sqrt{2^{-n}}$$

Randomized Lower Bound of DISJ

Applications

Extension Complexity

Extension Complexity

E.R. Swart. P=NP. Report No. CIS86-02, Department of Computer and Information Science, University of Guelph, Ontario, Canada, 1986

(參考圖片，非當事論文)

Polytope

Intersection of several half-spaces(linear inequalities), and can be expressed as \(P:=\{x|Ax \leq b\}\).

Example

Example

The extension complexity of a polytope \(P\) is the minimum number of facets(inequalities) achieved by any extension of \(P\).

extension

projection

What is  \(xc(TSP(n))\)?

Nondeterministic Communication Complexity

1-rectangle cover

Extension and Nondeterministic Communication?

\(xc(P) = r\) 

\(rank_+(S) = r\), where \(S\) is the slack matrix of \(P\).

The nondeterministic communication complexity of Face-Vertex(P) is \(O(\log r)\).

Yannakakis' Factorization Theorem

Slack Matrix

A slack matrix \(S\) of \(P\) is a \(|F| \times |V|\) matrix, where \(F\) is the set of faces, and \(V\) is the set of vertices.

\(S_{fv} = q_f-p_f^Tx_v\), where \(p_f^Tx \leq q_f\) is the supporting hyperplane of the \(f\)-th face.

Yannakakis' Factorization Theorem-1

\(xc(P) \leq rank_+(S)\) 

Yannakakis' Factorization Theorem-2

\(xc(P) \geq rank_+(S)\) 

Yannakakis' Factorization Theorem-2

\(xc(P) \geq rank_+(S)\) 

Suppose \(xc(P)=r\), and \(Q:=\{(x,y)|Cx + Dy \leq d\}\) is an extension of \(P:\{x|Ax \leq b\}\).

Each supporting hyperplane generating each face of P can be expressed as some nonegative linear combination of the facets of \(Q\).

Extension and Nondeterministic Communication

\(xc(P) = r\) 

\(rank_+(S) = r\), where \(S\) is the slack matrix of \(P\).

The nondeterministic communication complexity of FACE-VERTEX(P) is \(O(\log r)\).

Yannakakis' Factorization Theorem

Example: Correlation Polytope

Define \(CORR(n)\) as the convex hull of \(\{y=x^Tx|x \in \{0,1\}^n\}\)

The Lemma

For every \(s \in \{0,1\}^n\), there exist a face \(f_s\) of \(CORR(n)\), such that \(\forall x \in \{0,1\}^n\)

$$y=x^Tx \in f_s \iff |s \cap x|=1$$

Reduction?

FACE-VERTEX(CORR(n))

SIZE-OF-INTERSECTION-IS-NOT-ONE(n)

easier

Only consider the faces mentioned in the lemma.

UNIQUE-DISJ

UNIQUE-DISJ(2)

1-rectangle size

Lemma: Each 1-rectangle in \(M_{UNIQUE-DISJ}\) contains at most \(2^n\) 1-inputs.

1-rectangle size

Induction hypothesis: For a 1-rectangle \(R = A\times B\), where all \(x\in A,y\in B\) have 0s in their last \(n-k\) coordinates, \(R\) contains at most \(2^k\) 1-inputs.

1-rectangle size

1. \(rect(S_1),rect(S_2)\) are 1-rectangles and have 0s in their last \(n-k+1\) coordinates.

2. The number of 1-entries in \(S_1,S_2\) is at least the number of 1-inputs in \(R\).

1-rectangle size

1. \(rect(S_1),rect(S_2)\) are 1-rectangles and have 0s in their last \(n-k+1\) coordinates.

2. The number of 1-entries in \(S_1,S_2\) is at least the number of 1-inputs in \(R\).

1-rectangle cover

Lemma: Each 1-rectangle in \(M_{UNIQUE-DISJ(n)}\) contains at most \(2^n\) 1-inputs.

How about \(TSP(n)\)?

There is a face of \(TSP(cn^2)\) that is an extension of \(CORR(n)\).

Extension Complexity of TSP(n)

Q

Kolmogorov Complexity and the Incompressibility Method

What's the next number?

\(1,2,4,8,16,\)

What's the next number?

\(1,2,4,8,16,\)

\(7122\)?

\(32\)?

What is randomness?

\(1,2,4,8,16,7122\)

\(1,2,4,8,16,32\)

Kolmogorov Complexity

\(C(x) = \min\{l(p):p \text{ is an encoding/program of }x\}\)

Think of \(x,p\) as binary strings(or natural numbers).

Kolmogorov Complexity

\(C(x) = \min\{l(p):p \text{ is an encoding/program of }x\}\)

Think of \(x,p\) as binary strings(or natural numbers).

A more formal definition

\(C_f(x) = \min\{l(p):f(p) = x\}\)

Where \(f\) is some (partial) function.

Kolmogorov Complexity

\(C(x) = \min\{l(p):p \text{ is an encoding/program of }x\}\)

Think of \(x,p\) as binary strings(or natural numbers).

A more formal definition

\(C_f(x) = \min\{l(p):f(p) = x\}\)

Where \(f\) is some (partial) function.

How should we choose \(f\)? (C++, python, Eric Xiao, ...?)

Kolmogorov Complexity

Maybe \(f\) should be the "minimal" (additively optimal) function:

\(\forall g,x, C_f(x) \leq C_g(x) + c_g\)

Kolmogorov Complexity

Such \(f\) doesn't exist:

Let \(g(i) = x_i\), where \(C_f(x_i) \geq i\)

Maybe \(f\) should be the "minimal" (additively optimal) function:

\(\forall g,x, C_f(x) \leq C_g(x) + c_g\)

Kolmogorov Complexity

Perhaps we should not consider all functions.

Kolmogorov Complexity

Perhaps we should not consider all functions.

Computable functions?

Kolmogorov Complexity

Perhaps we should not consider all functions.

Computable functions?

Let \(f_0\) be a function computed by a universal TM (\(T_0\)) with input  \(11..110np\) (with \(l(n)\) ones ) which simulates \(T_n\) on input \(p\)

Kolmogorov Complexity

Perhaps we should not consider all functions.

Computable functions?

Let \(f_0\) be a function computed by a universal TM (\(T_0\)) with input  \(11..110np\) (with \(l(n)\) ones ) which simulates \(T_n\) on input \(p\)

We have \(C_{f_0}(x) \leq C_{f_n}(x) + 2l(n)+1\)

\(f_0\) is additively optimal!

Kolmogorov Complexity

\(C(x) = C_{f_0}(x) = \min\{l(p):f_0(p) = x\}\)

Kolmogorov Complexity

\(C(x) = C_{f_0}(x) = \min\{l(p):f_0(p) = x\}\)

We can view \(f_0\) as a special compiler.

Is the compiler of C/Java additively optimal?

Conditional Kolmogorov Complexity

\(C(x) = C(x|\epsilon)\)

We also have \(\forall f,x,y\)

\(C_{f_0}(x|y) \leq C_f(x|y) + c_f \)

Upper bounds

\(\forall x,C(x) \leq l(x) + c\)

\(\forall x,y,C(x|y) \leq C(x)+c\)

Uncomputability

\(C(x)\) is uncomputable

(Assume the length of KolmogorovComplexity() is \(700000000\))

Uncomputability

\(C(x)\) is uncomputable

(Assume the length of KolmogorovComplexity() is \(700000000\))

「不能用二十個字以內描述的最小數字」

Uncomputability

\(C(x)\) is uncomputable on any infinite set of points

(Assume the length of KolmogorovComplexity() is \(700000000\))

「不能用二十個字以內描述的最小數字」

Incompressibility Theorem \(\infty \star\)

Let \(c \in \mathbb N\) and \(A\) be a set of size \(m\),

then there are at least \(m(1-2^{-c})+1\) elements \(x\in A\) such that

\(C(x|y) \geq \log m -c\), for any fixed \(y\).

Incompressibility Theorem\(\infty \star\)

Let \(c \in \mathbb N\) and \(A\) be a set of size \(m\),

then there are at least \(m(1-2^{-c})+1\) elements \(x\in A\) such that

\(C(x|y) \geq \log m -c\), for any fixed \(y\).

Because there are only \(\sum\limits_{i=0}^{\log m-c-1} 2^i= m2^{-c}-1\) programs with length less than \(\log m-c\).

Example - Infinite Primes

Assume that there are only \(k\) primes. Then for each \(n \in \mathbb N\), we can write \(n = \prod\limits_{i=1}^k p_i^{\alpha_i}\). Thus we can describe every number in \([1,t]\) by \(k \log\log t\) bits......

Incompressity theorem: Let \(c \in \mathbb N\) and \(A\) be a set of size \(m\),

then there are at least \(m(1-2^{-c})+1\) elements \(x\in A\) such that

\(C(x|y) \geq \log m -c\), for any fixed \(y\).

Example - Infinite Primes

Assume that there are only \(k\) primes. Then for each \(n \in \mathbb N\), we can write \(n = \prod\limits_{i=1}^k p_i^{\alpha_i}\). Thus we can describe every number in \([1,t]\) by \(k \log\log t\) bits......

Incompressity theorem: Let \(c \in \mathbb N\) and \(A\) be a set of size \(m\),

then there are at least \(m(1-2^{-c})+1\) elements \(x\in A\) such that

\(C(x|y) \geq \log m -c\), for any fixed \(y\).

\(\pi(n) \in \Omega(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})\)

Example - TM complexity

Checking if a string is palindrome needs \(\Omega(n^2)\) time for any one-tape Turing Machine.

Example - TM complexity

Checking if a string is palindrome needs \(\Omega(n^2)\) time for any one-tape Turing Machine.

Assume a TM \(T\):

• each state can be described by \(\ell\) bits
• always terminates with the reading head at the rightmost position of the input
• computes PALINDROME

Example - TM complexity

Checking if a string is palindrome needs \(\Omega(n^2)\) time for any one-tape Turing Machine.

Assume a TM \(T\):

• each state can be described by \(\ell\) bits
• always terminates with the reading head at the rightmost position of the input
• computes PALINDROME

Define the crossing seuence of a grid \(g\):   the sequence of states of the TM \(T\) when the reading head crosses the right boundary of \(g\)

Example - TM complexity

By the incompressibility theorem, we can find length-\(n\) string \(x\) with \(C(x|T,n) \geq n\).

Example - TM complexity

By the incompressibility theorem, we can find length-\(n\) string \(x\) with \(C(x|T,n) \geq n\).

Consider running \(T\) on \(x 0^{2n} \bar x\), if the runtime is less than \(\frac{n^2}{\ell}\), then there exists a "middle" grid \(g_0\) with crossing sequence shorter than \(\frac{n}{2 \ell}\).

In fact, given \(T,n\), we can recover \(x\) by the position of \(g_0\)(\(\frac{n}{2}\) bits) and the crossing sequence of \(g_0\)(\(O(\log n)\) bits).

Example - TM complexity

By the incompressibility theorem, we can find length-\(n\) string \(x\) with \(C(x|T,n) \geq n\).

Consider running \(T\) on \(x 0^{2n} \bar x\), if the runtime is less than \(\frac{n^2}{\ell}\), then there exists a "middle" grid \(g_0\) with crossing sequence shorter than \(\frac{n}{2 \ell}\).

In fact, given \(T,n\), we can recover \(x\) by the position of \(g_0\)(\(\frac{n}{2}\) bits) and the crossing sequence of \(g_0\)(\(O(\log n)\) bits).

\(C(x|T,n) \leq \frac{n}{2} + O(\log n)\)

Example - TM complexity

We can recover \(x\) by checking if  the crossing sequence at \(g_0\) with input \(y0^{2n} \bar x\) is the same as  \(x0^{2n} \bar x\) for all \(y \in \{0,1\}^n\) !

Example - TM complexity

We can recover \(x\) by checking if  the crossing sequence at \(g_0\) with input \(y0^{2n} \bar x\) is the same as  \(x0^{2n} \bar x\) for all \(y \in \{0,1\}^n\) !

How about average complexity?

Incompressibility Method

If the statement doesn't hold, then there will be too many compressible objects.

Combinatorial Properties

Some Useful Bounds

\(\dfrac {n^n} {e^{n - 1} } \le n! \le \dfrac {n^{n + 1} } {e^{n - 1} }\)

Transitive Tournament

Tournament: complete directed graph

Transitive tournament: acyclic tournament

\(v(n):\) Largest integer such that every tournament on \(n\) nodes contains a subtournament on \(v(n)\) nodes.

Transitive Tournament

Tournament: complete directed graph

Transitive tournament: acyclic tournament

\(v(n):\) Largest integer such that every tournament on \(n\) nodes contains a subtournament on \(v(n)\) nodes.

\(\lfloor \log n \rfloor \leq \)\(v(n) \leq 1 + \lfloor 2\log n \rfloor\)

Counting

\(v(n) \leq 1 + \lfloor 2\log n \rfloor\)

\(v:= 2 + \lfloor 2\log n \rfloor\)

\(A:\) subset of \([n]\) of size \(v\)

\(\sigma:\) permutation on \([v]\)

\(\Gamma_{A,\sigma}:\) the set of \(n\)- vertex tournaments of whom \(A\) is a subtournament with "order" \(\sigma\)

We count the number \(d(\Gamma')\) of \(n\)- vertex tournaments with a transitive subtournament of size \(v\)

\(d(\Gamma') \leq \sum_A \sum_\sigma d(\Gamma_{A,\sigma}) = C^n_v v! 2^{C^n_2-C^v_2} < 2^{C^n_2}\)

\( (C^n_v v! < n^v \leq 2^{C^v_2})\)

Probabilistic Method

\(v(n) \leq 1 + \lfloor 2\log n \rfloor\)

\(v:= 2 + \lfloor 2\log n \rfloor\)

\(A:\) subset of \([n]\) of size \(v\)

\(\sigma:\) permutation on \([v]\)

Let \(T\) be the random variable uniformly distributed over all \(n\)-vertex tournaments.

We calculate the probability \(P(T\in \Gamma')\).

\(P(T\in \Gamma') \leq \sum_A \sum_\sigma P(T \in \Gamma_{A,\sigma}) = C^n_v v! 2^{-C^v_2} < 1\)

\( (C^n_v v! < n^v \leq 2^{C^v_2})\)

Incompressibility Method

\(v(n) \leq 1 + \lfloor 2\log n \rfloor\)

If \(v(n)\) is too large, then we can compress every \(n\)-vertex tournament. (contradicting the incompressibility theorem)

Formally speaking, by the incompressibility method, there is some tournament \(T'\), where \(C(T'|n,p) \geq n(n-1)/2\).

(\(p\) is some decoding program)

However, for every tournament \(T\), we can describe it by \(v(n) \lfloor \log n \rfloor+ n(n-1)/2 - v(n)(v(n)-1)/2\) bits.

Thus \(v(n) \lfloor \log n \rfloor - v(n)(v(n)-1)/2 \geq 0\), and

\(v(n) \leq 2 \lfloor \log n\rfloor + 1\).

Incompressibility Method

In fact, by the incompressibility method, we can also prove:

For at least a (\(1 - \frac{1}{n}\))th fraction of \(n\)-vertex tournaments, the largest transitive subtournament has at most \((1 + 2\lfloor 2\log n\rfloor)\) nodes for \(n\) large enough.

\(v(n) \leq 1 + \lfloor 2\log n \rfloor\)

Excerises

1. Give an upper bound for \(w(n)\), the largest integer such that for each \(n\)-vertex tournament \(T\), there are two disjoint subsets of vertices \(A,B\), each of size \(w(n)\), and \(A \times B \in T\).

2. Prove that the while loop loops at most \(\log n + 1\) steps in average:

4. What are the differences between the counting argument, the probabilistic method, and the incompressibility method?

5. Ask a question.

3. Prove that almost all \(n\)-vertex labeled tree has maximum degree \(O(\frac{\log n}{\log \log n})\).
W.W. Kirchherr, Kolmogorov complexity and random graphs

Time Complexity

Shell Sort

Average Time Complexity of Shell Sort

Proof Outline

Proof Detail

Regular Language

Regular Language

Pumping Lemma

Pumping Lemma

Example

Example

KC-Regularity

KC-Regularity

More Examples

Regular KC-Characterization

For all \(x,n\), if \(y\) is the \(n\)-th string in \(L_x\), then \(C(y) \leq C(n) + O(1)\).

Regular KC-Characterization

For all \(x,n\), if \(y\) is the \(n\)-th string in \(L_x\), then \(C(y) \leq C(n) + O(1)\).

Thus, (in theory), we can prove non-regularity of every non-regular language and regularity of every regular language.

Last Example

Last Example

Excerises

1. Prove (or disprove) that \(L:=\{0^i 1^j|\gcd(i,j) = 1\}\) is regular.

2. Alice and Bob are playing the number guessing game. Alice chooses some \(x \in [n]\), and Bob can ask her yes/no questions. If Alice can lie once, what is the minimum number \(c\) where Bob can always guess the right answer after asking \(c\) questions?

5. Why is computability important?

6. Ask a question.

4. Prove any (nontrivial?) statement via the incompressibility method.

3. An nni (nearest-neighbor interchange) operation can be done on neighboring internal nodes on an evolutionary tree. Let \(f(A,B)\) denote the nni-distance between two \(n\)-node evolutionary trees. Prove that \(\max_{A,B} f(A,B) = \Omega(n \log n)\). (In fact, \(\Theta(n \log n)\).)

References

[1] Wikipedia contributors. (2023, March 5). Incompressibility method. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 15:03, August 27, 2023, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Incompressibility_method&oldid=1143081380

[2] Wikipedia contributors. (2023, August 22). Kolmogorov complexity. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved 15:03, August 27, 2023, from https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Kolmogorov_complexity&oldid=1171617849

[3] Ming Li , Paul Vitányi. An Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and Its Applications, 2008. 

A Glimpse into

Algorithmic Game Theory

2024.2.15

Other Considerd Topics - Spectral Graph Theory

• Spectrum of Adjacency Matrix/Laplacian
• Expander Graphs/PSRGs
• Expander Codes
• Nearly-linear time Laplacian solvers

Reference: Spectral and Algebraic Graph Theory, by Daniel A. Spielman.

Other Considerd Topics - Sum of Squares Hierachy

• Semidefinite Programming/Polynomial Optimization?
• polynomial-time 0.878-approximation algorithm for max cut (and why this might be optimal)

Reference: Proofs, beliefs, and algorithms through the lens of sum-of-squares, by Boaz Barak and David Steurer

Today's Topic - Algorithmic Game Theory

• Auction Analysis
• Price of Anarchy (PoA, 最壞均衡與最佳解比)

Reference (mostly by Tim Roughgarden): 

Price of Anarchy in Auctions

Barbados Lectures on Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics

Twenty Lectures on Algorithmic Game Theory

What is a Game?

A game is defined by 

1. A set of \(n\) players

2. The pure strategy set for each player: \(S_1,S_2,...,S_n\)

3. The payoff function for each player: \(u_1, u_2, ..., u_n : S_1 \times S_2 \times ... \times S_n \to \mathbb R\)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=-1GDMXoMdaY

Equilibriums

A pure strategy profile \(s^* \in S_1\times S_2\times ... \times S_n\) is a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) if

\({ u}_{i}\left(s^*\right)\,\ge\,{u}_{i}\left(s_{i}\,,\,s_{-i}^{\ast}\right)\, \forall i\in [n] \text{ and }s_i \in S_i\)

A mixed strategy profile \(p^* \in \Delta(S_1)\times \Delta(S_2)\times ... \times \Delta(S_n)\) is a Mixed Nash Equilibrium (MNE) if

\(\mathbb E_{s^* \sim p^*}[{ u}_{i}\left(s^*\right)]\,\ge\,\mathbb E_{s_{-i}^*\sim p^*_{-i}}[{u}_{i}\left(s_{i}\,,\,s_{-i}^{\ast}\right)]\, \forall i\in [n] \text{ and }s_i \in S_i\)

Equilibriums

A pure strategy profile \(s^* \in S_1\times S_2\times ... \times S_n\) is a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) if

\({ u}_{i}\left(s^*\right)\,\ge\,{u}_{i}\left(s_{i}\,,\,s_{-i}^{\ast}\right)\, \forall i\in [n] \text{ and }s_i \in S_i\)

A mixed strategy profile \(p^* \in \Delta(S_1)\times \Delta(S_2)\times ... \times \Delta(S_n)\) is a Mixed Nash Equilibrium (MNE) if

\(\mathbb E_{s^* \sim p^*}[{ u}_{i}\left(s^*\right)]\,\ge\,\mathbb E_{s_{-i}^*\sim p^*_{-i}}[{u}_{i}\left(s_{i}\,,\,s_{-i}^{\ast}\right)]\, \forall i\in [n] \text{ and }s_i \in S_i\)

Nash's theorem:  There is at least one MNE for each game.

Q: What is an MNE for two-player rock paper scissors?

Equilibriums

A pure strategy profile \(s^* \in S_1\times S_2\times ... \times S_n\) is a Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) if

\({ u}_{i}\left(s^*\right)\,\ge\,{u}_{i}\left(s_{i}\,,\,s_{-i}^{\ast}\right)\, \forall i\in [n] \text{ and }s_i \in S_i\)

A mixed strategy profile \(p^* \in \Delta(S_1)\times \Delta(S_2)\times ... \times \Delta(S_n)\) is a Mixed Nash Equilibrium (MNE) if

\(\mathbb E_{s^* \sim p^*}[{ u}_{i}\left(s^*\right)]\,\ge\,\mathbb E_{s_{-i}^*\sim p^*_{-i}}[{u}_{i}\left(s_{i}\,,\,s_{-i}^{\ast}\right)]\, \forall i\in [n] \text{ and }s_i \in S_i\)

Nash's theorem:  There is at least one MNE for each game.

Q: Why are equilibriums important?

What is Economics?

What is Economics?

• 經世濟民
• 尋找最有效率分配資源的方式

An Efficient Auction Mechanism:

Single-Item Second-Price Auction

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_i\) of the item.

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_k=\max_{i} b_i\) and charges \(p(b) = \max_{j\neq k} b_j\)

An Efficient Auction Mechanism:

Single-Item Second-Price Auction

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_i\) of the item.

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_k=\max_{i} b_i\) and charges \(p(b) = \max_{j\neq k} b_j\)

• Bidding truthfully \((b_i = v_i)\) maximizes the utility \(u_i(b) = (v_i -p(b)) \cdot [ i = k]\) for every bidder.
• The social welfare \(\mathrm{SW}(b) = v_{k}\) is always maximized when all bidders bid truthfully.

How about Single-Item First-Price Auctions?

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_i\) of the item.

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_k=\max_{i} b_i\) and charges \(b_k\)

How about Single-Item First-Price Auctions?

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_i\) of the item.

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_k=\max_{i} b_i\) and charges \(b_k\)

Q:What  will the bidders' strategy be? Is the welfare always maximzied?

How about Single-Item First-Price Auctions?

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_i\) of the item.

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_k=\max_{i} b_i\) and charges \(b_k\)

Questions we will consider:

• How can we define the efficiency(inefficiency) of the first-price auction?
• How can we find/prove the efficiency of the first-price auction?
• Other kinds of auctions? More than one item?

Model:

Games(Auctions) of Incomplete Information

Assumption:

The valuation \(v_i\) of each bidder is drawn independently from some publicly-known distribution \(\cal F_i\). (\(\cal F_i\) Corresponds to the common beliefs that bidders have about everyone’s valuations.)

A strategy of the \(i\)-th bidder is a function \(s_i: \mathrm{SUPP}(\cal F_i) \to \mathbb R^+\). (When my valuation is \(v_i\) , I will bid \(s_i(v_i)\).)

A strategy profile \(s\) is a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium(BNE) if \(\forall i \in [n], v_i \in \mathrm{SUPP}(\cal F_i)\)

\(\mathbb E_{v_{-i} \sim \cal F_{-i}}[u_i(s(v_{-i},v_i))] \geq \mathbb E_{v_{-i} \sim \cal F_{-i}}[u_i(s_{-i}(v_{-i}),r')]\), \(\forall r' \in \mathbb R^+\)

Model:

Games(Auctions) of Incomplete Information

Assumption:

The valuation \(v_i\) of each bidder is drawn independently from some publicly-known distribution \(\cal F_i\). (\(\cal F_i\) Corresponds to the common beliefs that bidders have about everyone’s valuations.)

A strategy of the \(i\)-th bidder is a function \(s_i: \mathrm{SUPP}(\cal F_i) \to \mathbb R^+\). (When my valuation is \(v_i\) , I will bid \(s_i(v_i)\).)

A strategy profile \(s\) is a Bayes-Nash Equilibrium(BNE) if \(\forall i \in [n], v_i \in \mathrm{SUPP}(\cal F_i)\)

\(\mathbb E_{v_{-i} \sim \cal F_{-i}}[u_i(s(v_{-i},v_i))] \geq \mathbb E_{v_{-i} \sim \cal F_{-i}}[u_i(s_{-i}(v_{-i}),r')]\), \(\forall r' \in \mathbb R^+\)

Q : The mixed version?

Example:
Two bidders, symmetric uniform valuation

Q:

There are two bidders in a first-price auction, and \(v_1, v_2\) i.i.d. follow \(U[0,1]\). Please find a (pure) BNE.

Example:
Two bidders, symmetric uniform valuation

Q:

There are two bidders in a first-price auction, and \(v_1, v_2\) i.i.d. follow \(U[0,1]\). Please find a (pure) BNE.

Hint: The two bidders' strategies are identical and monotone.

Example:
Two bidders, symmetric uniform valuation

Q:

There are two bidders in a first-price auction, and \(v_1, v_2\) i.i.d. follow \(U[0,1]\). Please find a (pure) BNE.

Q:

Is the BNE easy to solve?

Does the BNE maximize the welfare?

Is the auction efficient in this case?

Example:
Two bidders, asymmetric uniform valuation

Q:

There are two bidders in a first-price auction, and \(v_1 \sim U[0,1], v_2\sim U[0,2]\) where \(v_1 \perp v_2\). Please find the BNE.

Example:
Two bidders, asymmetric uniform valuation

Q:

There are two bidders in a first-price auction, and \(v_1 \sim U[0,1], v_2\sim U[0,2]\) where \(v_1 \perp v_2\).

\(s_{1}(v_{1})=\;\frac{4}{3v_{1}}\left(1-\sqrt{1-\frac{3v_{1}^{2}}{4}}\right)\)

\(s_{2}(v_{2})=\;\frac{4}{3v_{2}}\left(\sqrt{1+\frac{3v_{2}^{2}}{4}}-1\right)\)

Example:
Two bidders, asymmetric uniform valuation

Q:

There are two bidders in a first-price auction, and \(v_1 \sim U[0,1], v_2\sim U[0,2]\) where \(v_1 \perp v_2\).

Q:

Is the BNE easy to solve?

Does the BNE maximize the welfare?

Is the auction efficient in this case?

\(s_{1}(v_{1})=\;\frac{4}{3v_{1}}\left(1-\sqrt{1-\frac{3v_{1}^{2}}{4}}\right)\)

\(s_{2}(v_{2})=\;\frac{4}{3v_{2}}\left(\sqrt{1+\frac{3v_{2}^{2}}{4}}-1\right)\)

Some notations

Valuation profile:  \(v = (v_1, v_2, ..., v_n)\)

Bid profile:  \(b = (b_1, b_2, ..., b_n)\)

Whether or not bidder \(i\) is the winner: \(x_i(b)\)

Selling price: \(p(b) = \max_i b_i\)

Utility: \(u_i(b,v_i)=(v_i-b_i) \cdot x_i(b)\)

Strategy profile: \(s = (s_1, s_2, ..., s_n): \mathrm{SUPP}(\cal F) \to \mathbb R^n\)

Social Welfare: \(\mathrm{SW}(b;v) = \sum\limits_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot x_i(b)\)

Whether or not bidder \(i\) has the highest valuation: \(x_i^*(v)\)

Optimal social welfare: \(\mathrm{OPT}(v) = \max_i v_i = \sum\limits_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot x_i^*(v)\)

\(\infty \star\) Price of Anarchy

Social Welfare: \(\mathrm{SW}(b;v) = \sum\limits_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot x_i(b)\)

Optimal social welfare: \(\mathrm{OPT}(v) = \max_i v_i\) \( = \sum\limits_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot x_i^*(v)\)

Price of Anarchy:  \(\mathrm{PoA} = \min_{s \text{ is a BNE}} \frac{\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{SW}(s(v);v)]}{\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{OPT}(v)]} \)

\(\infty \star\) Price of Anarchy

Social Welfare: \(\mathrm{SW}(b;v) = \sum\limits_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot x_i(b)\)

Optimal social welfare: \(\mathrm{OPT}(v) = \max_i v_i\) \( = \sum\limits_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot x_i^*(v)\)

Price of Anarchy:  \(\mathrm{PoA} = \min_{s \text{ is a BNE}} \frac{\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{SW}(s(v);v)]}{\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{OPT}(v)]} \)

High PoA \(\implies\) efficient auction?

Low PoA \(\implies\) inefficient auction?

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\(u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq (\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\(u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq (\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v)\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\(u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq (\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v)\)

2. For every BNE \(s\), bidder \(i\), and its valuation \(v_i\)

\(\mathbb{E}_{v_{-i}}\left[u_{i}({s}({v});v_{i})\right]\geq\mathbb{E}_{{v}_{-i}}\left[u_{i}(\frac{v_i}{2},{s}_{-i}({v}_{-i});v_{i})\right].\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\( \sum_i u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq \sum_i(\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v) = \frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}(v)-p(b)\)

2. For every BNE \(s\), bidder \(i\), and its valuation \(v_i\)

\(\mathbb{E}_{v_{-i}}\left[u_{i}({s}({v});v_{i})\right]\geq\mathbb{E}_{{v}_{-i}}\left[u_{i}(\frac{v_i}{2},{s}_{-i}({v}_{-i});v_{i})\right].\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\( \sum_i u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq \sum_i(\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v) = \frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}(v)-p(b)\)

2. For every BNE \(s\), bidder \(i\),

\(\mathbb E_{v_i}\mathbb{E}_{v_{-i}}\left[u_{i}({s}({v});v_{i})\right]\geq\mathbb E_{v_i}\mathbb{E}_{{v}_{-i}}\left[u_{i}(\frac{v_i}{2},{s}_{-i}({v}_{-i});v_{i})\right].\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\( \sum_i u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq \sum_i(\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v) = \frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}(v)-p(b)\)

2. For every BNE \(s\), bidder \(i\),

\(\mathbb{E}_{v}\left[u_{i}({s}({v});v_i)\right]\geq\mathbb{E}_{{v}}\left[u_{i}(\frac{v_i}{2},{s}_{-i}({v}_{-i});v_{i})\right].\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\( \sum_i u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq \sum_i(\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v) = \frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}(v)-p(b)\)

2. For every BNE \(s\), bidder \(i\),

\(\mathbb{E}_{v} \sum_i\left[u_{i}({s}({v});v_i)\right]\geq\mathbb{E}_{{v}} \sum_i\left[u_{i}(\frac{v_i}{2},{s}_{-i}({v}_{-i});v_{i})\right].\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\( \sum_i u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq \sum_i(\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v) = \frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}(v)-p(b)\)

2. For every BNE \(s\), bidder \(i\),

\(\mathbb E_v \mathrm{SW}(s(v);v) - p(s(v))=\mathbb{E}_{v} \sum_i\left[u_{i}({s}({v});v_i)\right]\geq\mathbb{E}_{{v}} \sum_i\left[u_{i}(\frac{v_i}{2},{s}_{-i}({v}_{-i});v_{i})\right].\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Proof: We will proof the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound. There are two main inequalities.

1. For every valuation profile \(v\), bid profile \(b\), and bidder \(i\):

\( \sum_i u_i(b_{-i},\frac{v_i}{2};v_i)\geq \sum_i(\frac{1}{2} v_i - p(b))\cdot x_i^*(v) = \frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}(v)-p(b)\)

2. For every BNE \(s\), bidder \(i\),

\(\mathbb E_v \mathrm{SW}(s(v);v) - p(s(v))=\mathbb{E}_{v} \sum_i\left[u_{i}({s}({v});v_i)\right]\geq\mathbb{E}_{{v}} \sum_i\left[u_{i}(\frac{v_i}{2},{s}_{-i}({v}_{-i});v_{i})\right].\)

\(\implies \mathrm{PoA} \geq \frac{1}{2}\)

Theorem 1

The PoA of first-price single-item auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

* The \(1-\frac{1}{e}\) bound can be proved similarly.

* The bound holds even if the valuations are correlated!

More Items? Simultaneous First-price Auctions

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_{ij}(i \in [n], j \in [m])\) to each of the \(m\) item. (Assume \(v_i \sim \cal F_i\))

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i = (b_{i1},b_{i2}, ..., b_{im})\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the \(j\)-th item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_{kj}=\max_{i} b_{ij}\) and charges \(b_{kj}\)

More Items? Simultaneous First-price Auctions

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_{ij}(i \in [n], j \in [m])\) to each of the \(m\) item. (Assume \(v_i \sim \cal F_i\))

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i = (b_{i1},b_{i2}, ..., b_{im})\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the \(j\)-th item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_{kj}=\max_{i} b_{ij}\) and charges \(b_{kj}\)

Denote by \(S_i(b)\) the set of items given to bidder \(i\).

We assume the bidders are unit-demand:

\(u_i(b;v_i) = \max_{j \in S_i(b)} v_{ij} - \sum_{j \in S_i(b)} b_{ij}\)

More Items? Simultaneous First-price Auctions

1. Each of the \(n\) bidders has a private valuation \(v_{ij}(i \in [n], j \in [m])\) to each of the \(m\) item. (Assume \(v_i \sim \cal F_i\))

2. Each bidder submits its bid \(b_i = (b_{i1},b_{i2}, ..., b_{im})\) to the auctioneer simultaneously.

3. The auctioneer gives the \(j\)-th item to the \(k\)-th bidder where \(b_{kj}=\max_{i} b_{ij}\) and charges \(b_{kj}\)

Denote by \(S_i(b)\) the set of items given to bidder \(i\).

We assume the bidders are unit-demand:

\(u_i(b;v_i) = \max_{j \in S_i(b)} v_{ij} - \sum_{j \in S_i(b)} b_{ij}\)

Maximum weight matching?

Is there a PoA bound for

S1A with unit-demand bidders?

Theorem 2

The PoA of S1A with unit demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e} \approx 0.63\). 

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

We will first prove the complete-information version:

Every MNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and fixed valuations (\(\cal F_i\) is a degenarate distribution at \(v_i\)) achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Theorem 2

Every MNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and fixed valuations (\(\cal F_i\) is a degenarate distribution at \(v_i\)) achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

Denote by \(j^*(i)\), the item bidder \(i\) gets in some fixed optimal allocation. Define bidder \(i\)'s deviation \(b_i^*\) as bidding \(\frac{v_{ij^*(i)}}{2}\) on \(j^*(i)\) and \(0\) on other items.

Theorem 2

Every MNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and fixed valuations (\(\cal F_i\) is a degenarate distribution at \(v_i\)) achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

Denote by \(j^*(i)\), the item bidder \(i\) gets in some fixed optimal allocation. Define bidder \(i\)'s deviation \(b_i^*\) as bidding \(\frac{v_{ij^*(i)}}{2}\) on \(j^*(i)\) and \(0\) on other items.

Like the proof of theorem 1, we have for every bid profile \(b\),

\(u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{b}_{-i}^{};\upsilon_{i})\,\ge\,\frac{v_{i j^{*}(i)}}{2}\,-\,p_{j^*(i)}(b)\)

Theorem 2

Every MNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and fixed valuations (\(\cal F_i\) is a degenarate distribution at \(v_i\)) achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

Like the proof of theorem 1, we have for every bid profile \(b\),

\(u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{b}_{-i}^{};\upsilon_{i})\,\ge\,\frac{v_{i j^{*}(i)}}{2}\,-\,p_{j^*(i)}(b)\)

Thus \(\sum_{i\in[n]}u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{ b}_{-i};v_{i})\geq\frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}({ v})-\sum_{j\in[m]}p_{j}({ b}).\)

Theorem 2

Every MNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and fixed valuations (\(\cal F_i\) is a degenarate distribution at \(v_i\)) achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

Like the proof of theorem 1, we have for every bid profile \(b\),

\(u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{b}_{-i}^{};\upsilon_{i})\,\ge\,\frac{v_{i j^{*}(i)}}{2}\,-\,p_{j^*(i)}(b)\)

Thus \(\sum_{i\in[n]}u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{ b}_{-i};v_{i})\geq\frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}({ v})-\sum_{j\in[m]}p_{j}({ b}).\)

Like the proof of theorem 1, using the definition of MNE, we can have PoA \(\geq \frac{1}{2}\).

Theorem 2

Every MNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and fixed valuations (\(\cal F_i\) is a degenarate distribution at \(v_i\)) achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

Like the proof of theorem 1, we have for every bid profile \(b\),

\(u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{b}_{-i}^{};\upsilon_{i})\,\ge\,\frac{v_{i j^{*}(i)}}{2}\,-\,p_{j^*(i)}(b)\)

Thus \(\sum_{i\in[n]}u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{ b}_{-i};v_{i})\geq\frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}({ v})-\sum_{j\in[m]}p_{j}({ b}).\)

Like the proof of theorem 1, using the definition of MNE, we can have PoA \(\geq \frac{1}{2}\).

Can we use the same proof for the incomplete-information case?

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We fix some BNE, where bidder \(i\) samples its bid from the distribution \(D_i(v_i)\) when its valuation is \(v_i\). Denote by \(\cal G_i\) the distribution of bidder \(i\)'s bid, and \(\cal G = \cal G_1 \times \cal G_2 \times ... \times \cal G_n\).

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We fix some BNE, where bidder \(i\) samples its bid from the distribution \(D_i(v_i)\) when its valuation is \(v_i\). Denote by \(\cal G_i\) the distribution of bidder \(i\)'s bid, and \(\cal G = \cal G_1 \times \cal G_2 \times ... \times \cal G_n\).

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE, for every \(i\) and \(v_i\):

\(\mathbb E_{b_i \sim D(v_i), b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b;v_i)] \geq \) \(\mathbb E_{b_i' \sim D'(v_i), b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b_{-i},b_i';v_i)]\)

\(=\mathbb E_{v_{-i} \sim \cal F_{-i}, b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b_{-i},b_i^*(v);v_i)]\)

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE, for every \(i\) and \(v_i\):

\(\mathbb E_{b_i \sim D(v_i), b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b;v_i)] \geq \) \(\mathbb E_{v_{-i} \sim \cal F_{-i}, b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b_{-i},b_i^*(v);v_i)]\)

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE, for every \(i\):

\(\mathbb E_{v_i \sim \cal F_i,b_i \sim D(v_i), b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b;v_i)] \geq \) \(\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F, b \sim \cal G}[u_i(b_{-i},b_i^*(v);v_i)]\)

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE:

\(\sum_i \mathbb E_{v_i \sim \cal F_i,b_i \sim D(v_i), b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b;v_i)] \geq \) \(\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F, b \sim \cal G}[\sum_i u_i(b_{-i},b_i^*(v);v_i)]\)

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE:

\(\sum_i \mathbb E_{v_i \sim \cal F_i,b_i \sim D(v_i), b_{-i} \sim \cal G_{-i}}[u_i(b;v_i)] \geq \) \(\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F, b \sim \cal G}[\sum_i u_i(b_{-i},b_i^*(v);v_i)]\)

Last Proof:

\(\sum_{i}u_{i}(b_{i}^{*},{ b}_{-i};v_{i})\geq\frac{1}{2}\mathrm{OPT}({ v})-\sum_{j\in[m]}p_{j}({ b}).\)

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE:

\(\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F,b_i \sim D(v_i)\forall i}[\sum_i u_i(b;v_i)] \geq \) \(\frac{1}{2} \mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{OPT}(v)] - \mathbb E_{b \sim \cal G}[R(b)] \)

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE:

\(\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F,b_i \sim D(v_i)\forall i}[(\sum_i u_i(b;v_i))+R(b)] \geq \) \(\frac{1}{2} \mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{OPT}(v)]\)

Expected social welfare under the BNE.

Theorem 2

Every BNE of the S1A with unit-demand bidders and independent valuations achieves expected social welfare at least \(1 − \frac{1}{e}\) times the expected optimal welfare.

Proof: (We will still prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound only.)

We will use the randomized deviation \(b_i' \sim D_i'(v_i)\): sample \(v_{-i}\) from \(\cal F_{-i}\) and then performs \(b_i^*(v)\).

By the definition of BNE:

\(\mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F,b_i \sim D(v_i)\forall i}[(\sum_i u_i(b;v_i))+R(b)] \geq \) \(\frac{1}{2} \mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{OPT}(v)]\)

Expected social welfare under the BNE.

DONE!

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with unit-demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with unit-demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)

The proof techniques are similar:

1. Choose some deviation \(b_i'\).

2. Find some lower bound for \(\sum_i u_i(b_{-i},b_i';v_i)\) where the lower bound is related with \(\mathrm{OPT}(v)\).

3. By the definition of BNE, the lower bound in 2. is also a lower bound for the expected social welfare under the BNE.

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with unit-demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)

The proof techniques are similar:

Can the proof technique be used to prove PoA for other auctions?

Can we turn the proof technique into some general theorem?

General Auction Mechanisms

1. The auctioneer receives an action \(a_i\in \cal A_i\) from each player

2. Given \(a = (a_1, a_2, ..., a_n)\), the auctioneer decides an outcome \(o(a) \in \cal O\)

3. Each player derives some utility \(u_i(a;v_i) := u_i(o(a);v_i)\), where \(v_i\) is the valuation of the player

4. \(R(a) := R(o(a))\) is the revenue of the auctioneer

*The BNE, social welfare, optimal welfare, PoA can also be defined.

General Auction Mechanisms

1. The auctioneer receives an action \(a_i\in \cal A_i\) from each player

2. Given \(a = (a_1, a_2, ..., a_n)\), the auctioneer decides an outcome \(o(a) \in \cal O\)

3. Each player derives some utility \(u_i(a;v_i) := u_i(o(a);v_i)\), where \(v_i\) is the valuation of the player

4. \(R(a) := R(o(a))\) is the revenue of the auctioneer

Examples:
- combinatorial auctions: \(m\) items and \(n\) players, each player has a valuation for each of the \(2^m\) subsets of items

    - single item auctions (first price, second price, all pay auctions, ...)

    - S1A with unit-demand bidders

General Auction Mechanisms

1. The auctioneer receives an action \(a_i\in \cal A_i\) from each player

2. Given \(a = (a_1, a_2, ..., a_n)\), the auctioneer decides an outcome \(o(a) \in \cal O\)

3. Each player derives some utility \(u_i(a;v_i) := u_i(o(a);v_i)\), where \(v_i\) is the valuation of the player

4. \(R(a) := R(o(a))\) is the revenue of the auctioneer

Examples:
- combinatorial auctions

- public good: There is some cost \(c\) publicly known, and each of the \(n\) players has its own valuation \(v_i\).

Smooth Auction

For \(\lambda \geq 0, \mu \geq 1\), an auction is \((\lambda, \mu)\)-smooth if for every valuation profile \(v\), there exists action distributions \(D_1^*(v), D_2^*(v), ..., D_n^*(v)\) such that for every action profile \(a\):

\(\sum_{i}\mathbb{E}_{a_{i}^{*}\sim D_{i}^{*}({v})}\left[u_{i}(a_{i}^{*},{a}_{-i};v_{i})\right]\geq\lambda\mathrm{OPT}({v})-\mu R({a}).\)

Smooth Auction

For \(\lambda \geq 0, \mu \geq 1\), an auction is \((\lambda, \mu)\)-smooth if for every valuation profile \(v\), there exists action distributions \(D_1^*(v), D_2^*(v), ..., D_n^*(v)\) such that for every action profile \(a\):

\(\sum_{i}\mathbb{E}_{a_{i}^{*}\sim D_{i}^{*}({v})}\left[u_{i}(a_{i}^{*},{a}_{-i};v_{i})\right]\geq\lambda\mathrm{OPT}({v})-\mu R({a}).\)

Almost same proof of Theorem 2

(complete information version)

If an auction is \((\lambda, \mu)\)-smooth, then for every valuation profile \(v\), every complete-information MNE of the auction has expected welfare at least \(\frac{\lambda}{\mu} \cdot \mathrm{OPT}(v)\).

Smooth Auction

For \(\lambda \geq 0, \mu \geq 1\), an auction is \((\lambda, \mu)\)-smooth if for every valuation profile \(v\), there exists action distributions \(D_1^*(v), D_2^*(v), ..., D_n^*(v)\) such that for every action profile \(a\):

\(\sum_{i}\mathbb{E}_{a_{i}^{*}\sim D_{i}^{*}({v})}\left[u_{i}(a_{i}^{*},{a}_{-i};v_{i})\right]\geq\lambda\mathrm{OPT}({v})-\mu R({a}).\)

Almost same proof of Theorem 2

(incomplete information version)

\(\infty \star\) If an auction is \((\lambda, \mu)\)-smooth, then for all valuation distributions \(\cal F_1, \cal F_2, ..., \cal F_n\), every BNE of the auction has expected welfare at least \(\frac{\lambda}{\mu} \cdot \mathbb E_{v \sim \cal F}[\mathrm{OPT}(v)]\).

Excercises!

1. Prove the \(\frac{1}{2}\) PoA bound for single-item all-pay auction. 

2. Prove the \((1-\frac{1}{e})\) PoA bound for single-item first-price auction.

3*. Prove a PoA bound for the single-item auction where the two bidders with the highest bids needs to pay and the bidder with the highest bid gets the item (or prove that no PoA bound holds).

4. 剛剛講的那些東西"algorithmic"在哪裡？

5. When were the mentioned results derived?
     1920 (A) 1940 (B) 1960 (C) 1980 (D) 2000 (E) 2020
 

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with unit-demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with unit-demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.

Critique: The strategies of the players do not always form BNE in reality!

No-Regret Learning

In this scenario, we assume that the same \(n\) bidders participate in the same auction for \(T\) rounds, with their valuations fixed (and kept private). At the end of each round, every bidder knows each other's bid. 

No-Regret Learning

In this scenario, we assume that the same \(n\) bidders participate in the same auction for \(T\) rounds, with their valuations fixed (and kept private). At the end of each round, every bidder knows each other's bid. 

We assume that all players choose their bidding stategies \(a^t_i\) to have \(o(T)\) regret (no regret), where the regret is defined as 

\(R_T = \left (\max_{a'} \sum\limits_{t = 1}^T u^t_i(a')\right) - \left( \sum\limits_{t=1}^T u^t_i(a^t_i)  \right)\)

No-Regret Learning

In this scenario, we assume that the same \(n\) bidders participate in the same auction for \(T\) rounds, with their valuations fixed (and kept private). At the end of each round, every bidder knows each other's bid. 

We assume that all players choose their bidding stategies \(a^t_i\) to have \(o(T)\) expected regret (no regret), where the regret is defined as 

\(R_T = \left (\max_{a'} \sum\limits_{t = 1}^T u^t_i(a')\right) - \left( \sum\limits_{t=1}^T u^t_i(a^t_i)  \right)\)

Q: Is there really a way to have \(o(T)\) expected regret surely?

No-Regret Learning

In this scenario, we assume that the same \(n\) bidders participate in the same auction for \(T\) rounds, with their valuations fixed (and kept private). At the end of each round, every bidder knows each other's bid. 

We assume that all players choose their bidding stategies \(a^t_i\) to have \(o(T)\) expected regret (no regret), where the regret is defined as 

\(R_T = \left (\max_{a'} \sum\limits_{t = 1}^T u^t_i(a')\right) - \left( \sum\limits_{t=1}^T u^t_i(a^t_i)  \right)\)

Q: Is there really a way to have \(o(T)\) expected regret surely?

Yes! For example, the Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm.

For those interested, please refer to Prediction, Learning, and Games.

No-Regret Learning

If every bidder uses an no-regret learning algorithm, we get a vanishing regret sequence \(a^1, a^2, a^3, ...\) of action profiles, That is, for every \(i\) and \(a_i' \in \cal A_i\)

\(\operatorname*{lim}_{T\to\infty}\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\left(u_{i}(a_{i}^{\prime},{ a}_{-i}^{t};v_{i})-u_{i}({ a}^{t};v_{i})\right)\le0.\)

No-Regret Learning

If every bidder uses an no-regret learning algorithm, we get a vanishing regret sequence \(a^1, a^2, a^3, ...\) of action profiles, That is, for every \(i\) and \(a_i' \in \cal A_i\)

\(\operatorname*{lim}_{T\to\infty}\frac{1}{T}\sum_{t=1}^{T}\left(u_{i}(a_{i}^{\prime},{ a}_{-i}^{t};v_{i})-u_{i}({ a}^{t};v_{i})\right)\le0.\)

We have the following theorem for PoA of vanishing regret sequence:

If an auction is \((\lambda, \mu)\)-smooth, then for every valuation profile \(v\), every vanishing regret sequence of the auction has expected welfare at least \(\frac{\lambda}{\mu} \cdot \mathrm{OPT}(v)\) as \(T \to \infty\).

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with unit-demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.(Also in regret-vanishing sequences.)

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with unit-demand bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.(Also in regret-vanishing sequences.)

Critique: How about S1A for more general bidders?

S1A for bidders with Monotone Submodular Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone submodular, if

1. For \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

2. For \(S \subseteq T\) and any item \(j\), \( v_i(T \cup \{j\}) - v_i(T)\leq v_i(S \cup \{j\}) - v_i(S)\)

S1A for bidders with Monotone Submodular Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone submodular, if

1. For \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

2. For \(S \subseteq T\) and any item \(j\), \( v_i(T \cup \{j\}) - v_i(T)\leq v_i(S \cup \{j\}) - v_i(S)\)

diminishing returns

S1A for bidders with Monotone Submodular Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone submodular, if

1. For \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

2. For \(S \subseteq T\) and any item \(j\), \( v_i(T \cup \{j\}) - v_i(T)\leq v_i(S \cup \{j\}) - v_i(S)\)

* Additive and unit-demand valuations are monotone submodular.

S1A for bidders with Monotone Submodular Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone submodular, if

1. For \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

2. For \(S \subseteq T\) and any item \(j\), \( v_i(T \cup \{j\}) - v_i(T)\leq v_i(S \cup \{j\}) - v_i(S)\).

We can prove that S1A for bidders with monotone submodular valuations is \((1-\frac{1}{e},1)\) - smooth, thus the PoA bound is \(1-\frac{1}{e}\).

S1A for bidders with Monotone Submodular Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone submodular, if

1. For \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

2. For \(S \subseteq T\) and any item \(j\), \( v_i(T \cup \{j\}) - v_i(T)\leq v_i(S \cup \{j\}) - v_i(S)\).

We can prove that S1A for bidders with monotone submodular valuations is \((1-\frac{1}{e},1)\) - smooth, thus the PoA bound is \(1-\frac{1}{e}\).

The bound is proven with the composition theorem:

If players have complement-free utility functions, then the simultaneous composition of \((\lambda,\mu)\)-smooth auctions is again a \((\lambda,\mu)\)-smooth auction. (See theorem 6.1, Price of Anarchy in Auctions)

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone submodular bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.(Also in regret-vanishing sequences.)

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone submodular bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.(Also in regret-vanishing sequences.)

Critique: How about S1A for more general bidders?

S1A for bidders with Monotone Subadditive Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone subadditive, if

1. For \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

2. For all \(S, T\), \(v_i(S \cup T) \leq v_i(S) + v_i(T)\)

* Submodular valuations are subadditive.

S1A for bidders with Monotone Subadditive Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone subadditive, if

1. For \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

2. For all \(S, T\), \(v_i(S \cup T) \leq v_i(S) + v_i(T)\)

* Submodular valuations are subadditive.

In fact, a PoA bound of \(\frac{1}{2}\) can be proven for S1A for bidders with monotone subadditive valuations.

* Not proven by the smoothness argument, see Tim's lecture notes.

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone submodular bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone subadditive bidders is at least \(\frac{1}{2}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.(Also in regret-vanishing sequences.)

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone submodular bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone subadditive bidders is at least \(\frac{1}{2}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.(Also in regret-vanishing sequences.)

Critique: How about S1A for more general bidders?

S1A for bidders with General (Monotone) Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone, if

for all \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

S1A for bidders with General (Monotone) Valuations

For a set \(I\) of items, a valuation \(v_i:2^{I} \to \mathbb R\) is monotone, if

for all \(S \subseteq T\), \(v_i(S) \leq v_i(T)\)

Is there a PoA bound for S1A for bidders with general valuations?

Imposssibility Result

With general valuations, every simple auction can have equilibria with social welfare arbitrarily worse than the maximum possible.

* Even when we consider fixed valuation and MNE.

Imposssibility Result

With general valuations, every simple auction can have equilibria with social welfare arbitrarily worse than the maximum possible.

The non-deterministic communication complexity of Welfare-Maximization(n) is high

A good PoA bound for simple auctions yields a good communication protocal for Welfare-Maximization(n)

Non-Deterministic Communication Complexity

Fix some function \(f: \cal X \times \cal Y \to \{0,1\}\). 

Alice gets the input \(x \in \cal X\), Bob gets the input \(y \in \cal Y\), and Charlie gets both \(x\) and \(y\). Charlie needs to convince Alice and Bob that \(f(x,y) = 1\).

Non-Deterministic Communication Complexity

Fix some function \(f: \cal X \times \cal Y \to \{0,1\}\). 

Alice gets the input \(x \in \cal X\), Bob gets the input \(y \in \cal Y\), and Charlie gets both \(x\) and \(y\). Charlie needs to convince Alice and Bob that \(f(x,y) = 1\).

A protocal for Charlie is a function \(P: \{(x,y)|f(x,y) = 1\} \to \{0,1\}^*\) that "can convince" Alice and Bob.

The complexity of the protocal \(P\) is \(\min_{f(x,y) = 1} |P(x,y)|\).

The non-deterministic communication complexity of \(f\) is the minimum complexity over all protocal.

Non-Deterministic Communication Complexity

Fix some function \(f: \cal X \times \cal Y \to \{0,1\}\). 

Alice gets the input \(x \in \cal X\), Bob gets the input \(y \in \cal Y\), and Charlie gets both \(x\) and \(y\). Charlie needs to convince Alice and Bob that \(f(x,y) = 1\).

A protocal for Charlie is a function \(P: \{(x,y)|f(x,y) = 1\} \to \{0,1\}^*\) that "can convince" Alice and Bob.

The complexity of the protocal \(P\) is \(\min_{f(x,y) = 1} |P(x,y)|\).

The non-deterministic communication complexity of \(f\) is the minimum complexity over all protocal.

Example: NDISJ(n)

Non-Deterministic Communication Complexity

Fix some function \(f: \cal X \times \cal Y \to \{0,1\}\). 

Alice gets the input \(x \in \cal X\), Bob gets the input \(y \in \cal Y\), and Charlie gets both \(x\) and \(y\). Charlie needs to convince Alice and Bob that \(f(x,y) = 1\).

A protocal for Charlie is a function \(P: \{(x,y)|f(x,y) = 1\} \to \{0,1\}^*\) that "can convince" Alice and Bob.

The complexity of the protocal \(P\) is \(\min_{f(x,y) = 1} |P(x,y)|\).

The non-deterministic communication complexity of \(f\) is the minimum complexity over all protocal.

There can be more than two parties!

Welfare-Maximization(n)

There are \(n\) players and \(m\) items. Each player has some general monotone valuation for each subset of items.
The goal is to identify the case:

(1) Every allocation of items (partition of items into \(T_1, T_2, ..., T_n\)) has welfare at most 1.

from

(0) There is some allocation with welfare at least \(n\).

Welfare-Maximization(n)

There are \(n\) players and \(m\) items. Each player has some general monotone valuation for each subset of items.
The goal is to identify the case:

(1) Every allocation of items (partition of items into \(T_1, T_2, ..., T_n\)) has welfare at most 1.

from

(0) There is some allocation with welfare at least \(n\).

We will prove that the non-deterministic complexity of this "promise" problem is \(\exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\) by reduction!

Multi-Disjointness

There are \(n\) parties, and each party has a string \(x^i \in \{0,1\}^l\)(viewed as a subset \(S_i \subseteq [l]\))
The goal is to identify the case:

(1) For all \(i,i'\), \(S^i \cap S^{i'}= \emptyset\)

from

(0) \(\large\cap_{i=1}^n S_i \neq \emptyset\)

Multi-Disjointness

There are \(n\) parties, and each party has a string \(x^i \in \{0,1\}^l\)(viewed as a subset \(S_i \subseteq [l]\))
The goal is to identify the case:

(1) For all \(i,i'\), \(S^i \cap S^{i'}= \emptyset\)

from

(0) \(\large\cap_{i=1}^n S_i \neq \emptyset\)

Fact: The non-determinsitic communication complexity of Multi-Disjointness is \(\Omega(l/n)\)

Multi-Disjointness

There are \(n\) parties, and each party has a string \(x^i \in \{0,1\}^l\)(viewed as a subset \(S_i \subseteq [l]\))
The goal is to identify the case:

(1) For all \(i,i'\), \(S^i \cap S^{i'}= \emptyset\)

from

(0) \(\large\cap_{i=1}^n S_i \neq \emptyset\)

Fact: The non-determinsitic communication complexity of Multi-Disjointness is \(\Omega(l/n)\)

Questions?

Multi-Disjointness

There are \(n\) parties, and each party has a string \(x^i \in \{0,1\}^l\)(viewed as a subset \(S_i \subseteq [l]\))
The goal is to identify the case:

(1) For all \(i,i'\), \(S^i \cap S^{i'}= \emptyset\)

from

(0) \(\large\cap_{i=1}^n S_i \neq \emptyset\)

Fact: The non-determinsitic communication complexity of Multi-Disjointness is \(\Omega(l/n)\)

Reduction, starts!

Intersecting Family of Partitions

We say \(t\) partitions \(P^1,P^2, ..., P^t\) of \(m\) items into \(n\) players are an "intersecting family", if for all \(i \neq i',j \neq j', P^i_j \cap P^{i'}_{j'} \neq \emptyset\)

Example: \(m = 6, n = 3\)

\(P^1 = [(1,2), (3,4), (5,6)]\)

\(P^2 = [(3,6), (1,5), (2,4)]\)

\(P^3 = [(4,5), (2,6), (1,3)]\)

Lemma

For every \(m,n \geq 1\), there exists an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) with \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\).

Lemma

For every \(m,n \geq 1\), there exists an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) with \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\).

Prove by the probabilistic method!

Lemma

For every \(m,n \geq 1\), there exists an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) with \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\).

Prove by the probabilistic method!

We choose \(t\) (a number to be determined) partitions randomly and independently:

In each partition, each item is assigned to one player, independently and uniformly at random. 

Lemma

For every \(m,n \geq 1\), there exists an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) with \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\).

Prove by the probabilistic method!

We choose \(t\) (a number to be determined) partitions randomly and independently.

For some \(i \neq i', j \neq j'\),

\(\Pr[P^i_j \cap P^{i'}_{j'} = \emptyset] = (1-\frac{1}{n^2})^m \leq {e^{-m/n^2}}\)

Lemma

For every \(m,n \geq 1\), there exists an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) with \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\).

Prove by the probabilistic method!

We choose \(t\) (a number to be determined) partitions randomly and independently.

For some \(i \neq i', j \neq j'\),

\(\Pr[P^i_j \cap P^{i'}_{j'} = \emptyset] = (1-\frac{1}{n^2})^m \leq {e^{-m/n^2}}\)

Union bound:

\(\Pr[\exists {i \neq i' , j \neq j'} \mathrm{ s.t. } P^i_j \cap P^{i'}_{j'} = \emptyset]  \leq t^2n^2{e^{-m/n^2}}\)

Lemma

For every \(m,n \geq 1\), there exists an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) with \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\).

Prove by the probabilistic method!

\(\Pr[\exists {i \neq i' , j \neq j'} \mathrm{ s.t. } P^i_j \cap P^{i'}_{j'} = \emptyset]  \leq t^2n^2{e^{-m/n^2}}\)

Thus for \(t < \frac{1}{n} e^{m/2n^2}\), the probability (of not being an intersecting family) is less than 1, and the lemma is proven.

Multi-Disjointness to Welfare Maximization

Let \(S_1, S_2, ..., S_n\) be the input to the Multi-Disjointness problem with \(t\)-bit inputs, where \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\) is the same value as in the lemma.

The players coordinate an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) in advance.

Multi-Disjointness to Welfare Maximization

Let \(S_1, S_2, ..., S_n\) be the input to the Multi-Disjointness problem with \(t\)-bit inputs, where \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\) is the same value as in the lemma.

The players coordinate an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) in advance.

When each player \(i\) gets the input \(S_i\), one forms the following valuation:

\(v_{i}(T)=\left\{\begin{array}{l l}{{1}}&{{\mathrm{if~}T\supseteq P_{i}^{j}\mathrm{~for~some}\mathrm{~}j\in S_{i}\mathrm{~}}}\\ {{0}}&{{\mathrm{otherwise.}}}\end{array}\right.\)

Multi-Disjointness to Welfare Maximization

Let \(S_1, S_2, ..., S_n\) be the input to the Multi-Disjointness problem with \(t\)-bit inputs, where \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\) is the same value as in the lemma.

The players coordinate an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) in advance.

When each player \(i\) gets the input \(S_i\), one forms the following valuation:

\(v_{i}(T)=\left\{\begin{array}{l l}{{1}}&{{\mathrm{if~}T\supseteq P_{i}^{j}\mathrm{~for~some}\mathrm{~}j\in S_{i}\mathrm{~}}}\\ {{0}}&{{\mathrm{otherwise.}}}\end{array}\right.\)

(1) For all \(i,i'\), \(S^i \cap S^{i'}= \emptyset\) \(\implies\) the maximum welfare is at most \(1\)

(0) \(\large\cap_{i=1}^n S_i \neq \emptyset\) \(\implies\) the maximum welfare is at least \(n\)

Multi-Disjointness to Welfare Maximization

Let \(S_1, S_2, ..., S_n\) be the input to the Multi-Disjointness problem with \(t\)-bit inputs, where \(t = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\) is the same value as in the lemma.

The players coordinate an intersecting family \(P^1, P^2, ..., P^t\) in advance.

When each player \(i\) gets the input \(S_i\), one forms the following valuation:

\(v_{i}(T)=\left\{\begin{array}{l l}{{1}}&{{\mathrm{if~}T\supseteq P_{i}^{j}\mathrm{~for~some}\mathrm{~}j\in S_{i}\mathrm{~}}}\\ {{0}}&{{\mathrm{otherwise.}}}\end{array}\right.\)

(1) For all \(i,i'\), \(S^i \cap S^{i'}= \emptyset\) \(\implies\) the maximum welfare is at most \(1\)

(0) \(\large\cap_{i=1}^n S_i \neq \emptyset\) \(\implies\) the maximum welfare is at least \(n\)

Reduction complete!

Since we have the \(\Omega(l/n)\) bound for Multi-Disjointness, the non-deterministic communication complexity of Welfare-Maximization(n) is \(\Omega(t/n) = \exp(\Omega(m/n^2))\).

Imposssibility Result

With general valuations, every simple auction can have equilibria with social welfare arbitrarily worse than the maximum possible.

The non-deterministic communication complexity of Welfare-Maximization(n) is \(\exp({\Omega(m/n^2)})\)

A good PoA bound for simple auctions yields a good communication protocal for Welfare-Maximization(n)

?

Theorem

Fix a class \(\cal V\) of possible bidder valuations.

Suppose that, for some \(\alpha \in (0,1]\), there is no nondeterministic communication protocal with subexponential (in \(m\)) communication for the following problem:

(1) Every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

(0) There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)

Let \(\epsilon \geq 1/\mathrm{poly}(m,n)\).  Then, for every auction with sub-doubly-exponential (in \(m\)) strategies per player, the worst-case PoA of \(\epsilon\)-approximate MNE with bidder valuations in \(\cal V\) is at most \(\alpha\).

Theorem

Fix a class \(\cal V\) of possible bidder valuations.

Suppose that, for some \(\alpha \in (0,1]\), there is no nondeterministic communication protocal with subexponential (in \(m\)) communication for the following problem:

(1) Every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

(0) There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)

Let \(\epsilon \geq 1/\mathrm{poly}(m,n)\).  Then, for every auction with sub-doubly-exponential (in \(m\)) strategies per player, the worst-case PoA of \(\epsilon\)-approximate MNE with bidder valuations in \(\cal V\) is at most \(\alpha\).

Theorem

Fix a class \(\cal V\) of possible bidder valuations.

Suppose that, for some \(\alpha \in (0,1]\), there is no nondeterministic communication protocal with subexponential (in \(m\)) communication for the following problem:

(1) Every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

(0) There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)

Let \(\epsilon \geq 1/\mathrm{poly}(m,n)\).  Then, for every auction with sub-doubly-exponential (in \(m\)) strategies per player, the worst-case PoA of \(\epsilon\)-approximate MNE with bidder valuations in \(\cal V\) is at most \(\alpha\).

Theorem

Fix \(\cal V\) to be general monotone valuations.

Suppose that, for some \(\alpha \in (0,1]\), there is no nondeterministic communication protocal with subexponential (in \(m\)) communication for the following problem:

(1) Every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

(0) There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)

Let \(\epsilon \geq 1/\mathrm{poly}(m,n)\).  Then, for every auction with sub-doubly-exponential (in \(m\)) strategies per player, the worst-case PoA of \(\epsilon\)-approximate MNE with bidder valuations in \(\cal V\) is at most \(\alpha\).

Theorem

Fix \(\cal V\) to be general monotone valuations.

Suppose that, for some \(\alpha \in (0,1]\), there is no nondeterministic communication protocal with subexponential (in \(m\)) communication for the following problem:

(1) Every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

(0) There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)

Let \(\epsilon \geq 1/\mathrm{poly}(m,n)\).  Then, for every auction with sub-doubly-exponential (in \(m\)) strategies per player, the worst-case PoA of \(\epsilon\)-approximate MNE with bidder valuations in \(\cal V\) is at most \(\alpha\).

With general valuations, every simple auction can have equilibria with social welfare arbitrarily worse than the maximum possible!

Lemma

For every \(\epsilon > 0\) and every game with \(n\) players with strategy sets \(A_1, A_2, ... , A_n\) , there exists an \(\epsilon\)-approximate MNE with description length polynomial in \(n\), \(\log(\max |A_i|)\), and \(1/\epsilon\) .

Lemma

For every \(\epsilon > 0\) and every game with \(n\) players with strategy sets \(A_1, A_2, ... , A_n\) , there exists an \(\epsilon\)-approximate MNE with description length polynomial in \(n\), \(\log(\max |A_i|)\), and \(1/\epsilon\) .

Proof of Theorem:

So if  \(\max|A_i|\) is sub-doubly-exponential, we can write down the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE, and the contribution to the welfare of each player under the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE in subexponential bits.
If PoA \(> \alpha\), this is in fact a proof for "every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)"(from "There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)").

Proof of Theorem:

So if  \(\max|A_i|\) is sub-doubly-exponential, we can write down the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE, and the contribution to the welfare of each player under the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE in subexponential bits..
If PoA \(> \alpha\), this is in fact a proof for "every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)"(from "There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)").

The players only need to check:

1. The declared \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE is "true" for him/her.

2. The declared contribution to the welfare of his/hers is "true"

3. The sum of all declared players' contribution to the welfare is smaller than \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

Proof of Theorem:

So if  \(\max|A_i|\) is sub-doubly-exponential, we can write down the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE, and the contribution to the welfare of each player under the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE in subexponential bits..
If PoA \(> \alpha\), this is in fact a proof for "every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)"(from "There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)").

The players only need to check:

1. The declared \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE is "true" for him/her.

2. The declared contribution to the welfare of his/hers is "true"

3. The sum of all declared players' contribution to the welfare is smaller than \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

Why is this a valid proof to the players?

Proof of Theorem:

So if  \(\max|A_i|\) is sub-doubly-exponential, we can write down the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE, and the contribution to the welfare of each player under the \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE in subexponential bits..
If PoA \(> \alpha\), this is in fact a proof for "every allocation has welfare at most \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)"(from "There is some allocation with welfare at least \(W^*\)").

The players only need to check:

1. The declared \(\epsilon-\)approximate MNE is "true" for him/her.

2. The declared contribution to the welfare of his/hers is "true"

3. The sum of all declared players' contribution to the welfare is smaller than \(\alpha \cdot W^*\)

But we assumed there is no subexponential communication protocal! \(\implies \mathrm{PoA} \leq \alpha\)

What we've done

• Prove that the PoA of single-item first-price auction is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone submodular bidders is at least \(1-\frac{1}{e}\)
• Prove that the PoA of S1A with monotone subadditive bidders is at least \(\frac{1}{2}\)
• Prove PoA bounds for general smooth auctions.(Also in regret-vanishing sequences.)
• Prove that no PoA bounds holds for "simple auctions" for general monotone valuations (considering approximate equilibrium).

Open Problems

• Can we prove that no PoA bound holds for general monotone valuations considering exact equilibria?
• What is the PoA of first-price single-item auctions? (Currently known in \([1-\frac{1}{e},0.87]\))
• PoA in reverse auctions?

AGT beyond PoA of Auctions

• Complexity of computing a Nash Equilibrium (PLS, PPAD)
• Algorithmic Mechanism Design (Knapsack auction)
• ...

End!