Politics through the Lens of Economics

Lecture 6: Probabilitic Voting Model

Masayuki Kudamatsu

8 November, 2017

What evidence do we need to explain

whether the citizen-candidate model explains

the lack of tuition-free higher education

in Japan?

Discussion Time

Background information #1

Source: OECD (2017)

Nordic countries offer tuition-free higher education

Background information #2

Germany eliminated

tuition for higher education

in 2015

But the public opinion is divided

Aim to come up with a wrong answer

What evidence do we need to explain

whether the citizen-candidate model explains

the lack of tuition-free higher education

in Japan?

Discussion Time

Today's Road Map

Probabilistic Voting Model

Testing the Swing Voter Hypothesis

Motivation

There doesn't always exist the "median policy"

Median policy beats any other policies in majority voting

Median

policy

More than 50%

Vote for median policy

Other

policy

Motivation

Most important example:

Division of a pie

There doesn't always exist the "median policy"

An example of the division-of-a-pie problem

A fixed budget for building shinkansen

Which prefecture gets shinkansen stations?

In the "division-of-a-pie" problem

No policy wins the majority against any policy

Consider 3 districts with equal # of voters

Once fixing

the shares

of two districts

e.g.

The 3rd district's share is automatically determined

the "division-of-a-pie" problem with three groups of voters

District 2's share

District 1's share

(0,0)

(0,100)

(100,0)

So a two-dimensional diagram can represent

District 3 gets all

the "division-of-a-pie" problem with three groups of voters

District 2's share

District 1's share

(0,0)

(0,100)

(100,0)

(50, 50)

So a two-dimensional diagram can represent

District 3 gets nothing

the "division-of-a-pie" problem with three groups of voters

District 2's share

District 1's share

(0,0)

(0,100)

(100,0)

(50, 50)

(1/3,1/3)

So a two-dimensional diagram can represent

District 3 gets 1/3

District 2's share

District 1's share

(0,0)

(50,50)

(0,0) is defeated by, say, (50,50)

In the "division-of-a-pie" problem

No policy wins the majority against any policy

District 2's share

District 1's share

(50,50)

(50,50) is defeated by, say, (55,0)

(55,0)

In the "division-of-a-pie" problem

No policy wins the majority against any policy

District 2's share

District 1's share

(0,50)

(55,0) is defeated by, say, (0,50)

(55,0)

In the "division-of-a-pie" problem

No policy wins the majority against any policy

District 2's share

District 1's share

(0,50)

(0,50) is defeated by, say, (45,55)

(45,55)

and so on...

In the "division-of-a-pie" problem

No policy wins the majority against any policy

District 2's share

District 1's share

How can we analyze this type of policy issues?

Two approaches

Probabilistic Voting Model

Legislative Bargaining Model

(This lecture)

(Lecture 12)

Probabilistic Voting Model

Step 1. Two parties offer how to divide a pie across groups of voters

By promising

how to divide a pie

By selecting a candidate

whose ideal policy is

the proposed way of

dividing a pie

OR

This model doesn't rely on the commitment assumption

Probabilistic Voting Model

Step 2. Voters choose which party to vote based on 2 considerations

i.  Amount of a pie allocated to their group

ii. Which party wins the election

Examples of voter group

Probabilistic Voting Model: Assumption 1

Voters care about the share of a pie to their group

District

Occupation

Class / Ethnicity

All voters in the same group equally benefit from a given share

Probabilistic Voting Model: Assumption 1

Voters care about the share of a pie to their group

Probabilistic Voting Model: Assumption 2

Voters also care about which party wins the election

e.g.

Ideology

That is, parties cannot commit to the 2nd "policy"

Candidate's appearance

Probabilistic Voting Model: Assumption 2

Voters also care about which party wins the election

In this dimension, voters differ within the same group

How voters choose which party to vote

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Line up voters by their ideological bias to party B

For a group of voters

Each voter's optimization

How voters choose which party to vote

Ideological bias

to party B

0

If parties A and B offer the same division of a pie:

Vote for A

Vote for B

Each voter's optimization

Ideological bias

to party B

0

If party A offers more than party B does

Vote for A

Vote for B

Switch to A

How voters choose which party to vote

Each voter's optimization

Ideological bias

to party B

0

If party B offers more than party A does

Vote for A

Vote for B

Switch to B

Each voter's optimization

How voters choose which party to vote

Now for the ease of exposition, imagine:

Voters are grouped into different districts

Parties offer the provision of local public goods to each district

Everyone in the district benefits

but no one else in other districts

e.g. roads, railway stations, public schools, public hospitals

Consider a district

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

In the absence of local public goods:

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Vote for A

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Vote for B

In the absence of local public goods:

Now party A proposes local public good to this district

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Vote for A

Benefit from

local public good

Now party A proposes local public good to this district

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Still Vote for B

These party B supports "swing" to party A

in response to local public good offer

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Now consider another district

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Citizens are more heterogeneous in ideology

Now consider another district

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Vote for A

In the absence of local public good

Now consider another district

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Vote for B

In the absence of local public good

If party A proposes local public good to this district

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Benefit from

local public good

These party B supporters "swing" to party A

Which district will party A target local public good provision?

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Benefit from

local public good

Answer: the district with more "swing voters"

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Benefit from

local public good

Now consider three districts ideologically different

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

1

2

3

District 1 citizens will vote for party A anyway

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

1

Party A doesn't need to offer local public good

District 3 citizens will vote for party B

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

3

unless a lot of local public good is provided by party A

District 2 citizens are cheapest to swing

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

2

Which district will party A target, then?

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

1

2

3

Answer: district 2

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

2

Vote for A

(even if it's less populous)

To summarize, party A targets its local public good provision to

1. Districts ideologically neutral

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

To summarize, party A targets its local public good provision to

2. Districts more homogenous (among those neutral)

Now we know which district is offered with local public goods

But how much?

# citizens

Ideological bias

to party B

0

How much of local public goods does Party A offer?

Consider two ideologically neutral districts

Ideological bias

to party B

0

0

Benefit (net of tax)

Tax burden

Citizens in both districts pay taxes to produce local public goods

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Some citizens in the other district swing to party B

0

Benefit (net of tax)

Tax burden

Loss of votes

Gain of votes

Local

public goods

Extra benefit

Net income

Extra benefit

Local

public goods

Extra benefit

Net income

Extra benefit

First few units of local public goods

Large benefit

Small

cost

Ideological bias

to party B

0

0

Benefit (net of tax)

Tax burden

Loss of votes

Gain of votes

For first few units, gain of votes exceeds loss of votes

Local

public goods

Extra benefit

Net income

Extra benefit

More units of local public goods

Smaller benefit

Larger

cost

Ideological bias

to party B

0

0

Benefit (net of tax)

Tax burden

Extra loss

Extra gain

For more units, gain of votes becomes smaller than loss of votes

Ideological bias

to party B

0

0

Benefit (net of tax)

Extra loss = Extra gain

For party A's optimization (i.e. maximizing # of votes)

Tax burden

Ideological bias

to party B

0

0

Offer exactly the same policy to swing voters back

For party B's optimization

Ideological bias

to party B

0

0

At the cost of losing voters in the other district

For party B's optimization

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Equilibrium: both parties offer the same policy

Vote for A

Vote for B

Ideological bias

to party B

0

Neither party wants to deviate:

Vote for A

Vote for B

By increasing local public good, they lose votes

The equilibrium is more like a "fairy tale", not very realistic

Key lesson from the probabilistic voting model:

Politicians target

districts with more swing voters

known as the swing voter hypothesis

Today's Road Map

Probabilistic Voting Model

Testing the Swing Voter Hypothesis

Core vs Swing voter debate

Political scientists often argue:

Politicians target loyal voters, not swing voters

They propose (at least) two reasons for this claim

Politicians know better

how to please

their loyal supporters

Loyal supporters

more likely to turn out

in return for favour

(For economists, these claims are not "micro-founded".)

Core vs Swing voter debate

Evidence is inconclusive, because...

Voters' ideological bias is difficult to observe

Popular measure: incumbent's winning margin in previous election

e.g. the 2012 Lower House Election in Japan (Yamaguchi 4th district)

Winning margin

78.2-12.7=65.5pt

Source: ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E5%B1%B1%E5%8F%A3%E7%9C%8C%E7%AC%AC4%E5%8C%BA

Core vs Swing voter debate

But the election outcome is

voters' response to previous policy

And policy is often sticky across periods

Winning margin

in previous election

Policy during

the previous period

Policy during

the current period

Core vs Swing voter debate

Large

winning margin

Receive transfer

the previous period

Receive transfer

the current period

If the swing voter hypothesis is correct,

we should see in the swing district:

Correlation 

with

loyal voters

Core vs Swing voter debate

How can we obtain

a measure of voters' ideology 

that's NOT a response to policy?

Sierra Leone as a testing ground

Sierra Leone as a testing ground

Various ethnic groups live in different parts of the country

Sierra Leone as a testing ground

SLPP

APC

Two parties have dominated politics since independence in 1961

Sierra Leone as a testing ground

SLPP

APC

Anecdotally, ethnicity is known to predict which party to vote

Since ethnicity cannot be changed, 

Ethnicity can be used as

a measure of voters' ideology 

that's NOT a response to policy !

Measuring "swing" districts

Step 1: Calculate each ethnic group's bias towards APC by:

% of those

who voted for

APC

% of those

who voted for

SLPP

-

Based on the nation-wide voting data

(not the district-level, which is a response to district-targeting policy)

Table 1 of Casey (2015)

Ethnicity

Population share (%)

Bias to APC

Loyal to APC

Loyal to SLPP

Swing voters

For each district of Sierra Leone, calculate:

population-weighted average

of bias to APC across ethnic groups

e.g.

60% Temne (bias 0.83) and 40% Limba (bias 0.89)

0.83 x 0.6 + 0.89 x 0.4 = 0.854

Measuring "swing" districts

Step 2

Appendix Figure 1 of Casey (2015)

Light-coloured areas: swing districts

Measure of government policy #1

Electoral campaign spendings during the national elections

in 2007

Local Government Development Grants (LGDG) during 2004-2007

Fiscal transfer from central to local governments

Spent on roads, agriculture, etc.

Measure of government policy #2

Appendix Figure 4 of Casey (2015)

Swing districts attract campaign spendings

Figure 1 of Casey (2015)

Swing districts attract campaign spendings

Biased to either party

Source: page 2430 of Casey (2015)

Swing districts attract more fiscal transfer

Difference between most biased and most neutral districts

19,575 US dollars

Summary

Politicians target swing voters for the division-of-a-pie policy

(More evidence needed, though)

Next lecture

Applying the probabilistic voting model to analyze

1. Impact of electoral rules

Proportional Representation

Majoritarian

vs

Next lecture

Applying the probabilistic voting model to analyze

2. Voter intimidation

This lecture is based on the following academic articles and books:

Casey, Katherine. 2015. “Crossing Party Lines: The Effects of Information on Redistributive Politics.” American Economic Review 105(8): 2410–48.

Lindbeck, Assar, and Jörgen W. Weibull. 1987. “Balanced-Budget Redistribution as the Outcome of Political Competition.” Public Choice 52: 273–97.

See also section 3.4 of Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Politics through the Lens of Economics: Lecture 6 Probabilistic Voting Model

By Masayuki Kudamatsu

Politics through the Lens of Economics: Lecture 6 Probabilistic Voting Model

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