Dethroning the Dollar?

Optimal Multi-Asset Market Making

Katya Malinova · McMaster University
Andreas Park · University of Toronto

SMU & NTU Seminars 2026

1

Agenda

1
  1. Some motivation of what we study and why
  2. Crash course on
    • blockchain in finance and why the tech matters
    • automated market makers
  3. Multi-asset portfolio market making
    • features and a model
    • lowest cost
    • when are they optimal, when are they robust

Disclaimer: In the general AMM theory section I am using results from two other papers: "Learning from DeFi" (2024) and "A Simple Theory of Portfolio Market Making (2026), both with Katya Malinova

Motivation for this paper and results preview

FX Transactions today and in days past

  • 90% of FX transactions pass through a "vehicle" currency even when neither counterparty needs USD
  • Krugman (1984); Rey (2001) — a dominant currency emerges endogenously whenever it minimizes transaction costs through thick-market externalities.
  • Somogyi (2026): 13% of volume in dollar pairs is vehicle routing.
  • Bordier, Frei, and Stalder (2026):vehicle-routed cross-trades increase volatility of USD FX.
  • OUR QUESTIONS: can DeFi tools do one better? How to design such tools?

denarius

sterling

USD

???

Roman Empire

British imperial trade

post-Bretton Woods
"Pax" Americana
1944-

multi-lateral stablecoins

Florin

Medici

Why does it matter?
A firm in Mexico pays a supplier in Thailand

MXN

USD

THB

spread + fee

spread + fee

today: routing through the vehicle; two legs, two spreads, two fees

what they want: direct conversion

The World of MONEY is in flux

Stablecoin FX infrastructure
is being built

  • GENIUS Act (2025) — U.S. framework for payment stablecoins
  • Project Mariana (BIS, 2023) — three-currency AMM proof-of-concept for wholesale CBDC FX
  • Project Rialto (BIS, 2024–25) — applies the Mariana FX layer to retail cross-border payments
  • Major banks launching multi-currency stablecoin products; Arc, Tempo, etc.

The World's Dependence on the USD is a Risk and has a Cost

  • USD-vehicle status has geopolitical risks
  • USD-routing status quo has cost because every non-USD pair pays twice — two spreads, two fees
  • May be a burden on smaller firms and smaller economies

Two things are happening at once

This paper

One pool, many assets: how to design it, and when does it beat routing?

Design: the asset mix and trading fees that minimize total trading costs

Trading demand is given; fees cover LPs’ expected losses.

A necessary and sufficient condition for beating routing

Two things matter: return correlation and cross-pair volume.

Fee schedules that deter entry by a dollar-pair competitor

We characterize when a cost-minimizing fee schedule can deter such entry.

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2

3

Not only currencies: any assets traded against cash, e.g. tokenized stocks.

Illustration of theoretical findings

Above the dotted line
Optimal pooling beats dollar routing.

Between dotted and dashed
The capital weights matter.

Higher correlation and more cross-pair flow favor pooling.

4

Illustration of theoretical findings for real life

92 currencies, many small

13 currencies, all major

Illustration of multi-asset pool savings relative to routing

PairCross-trade saving vs USD
EUR/SEK64%
EUR/NOK58%
EUR/CHF57%
EUR/GBP52%
EUR/AUD51%
NZD/JPY46%
ZAR/JPY45%
EUR/CAD44%
BRL/JPY43%
EUR/JPY40%
AUD/JPY38%
EUR/CNY35%
CAD/JPY30%

What has to be explained

  • How does an AMM work and why is it like a limit order book.
  • How fees attract liquidity, and how shared deposits for multiple assets change costs.
  • When optimized pooling beats dollar routing, and whether dollar-pair entry can undo it.
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Nothing in this paper requires a blockchain or decentralized finance but I'll talk about it anyway...

July 31, 2025: "today I am announcing the launch of “Project Crypto”—a Commission-wide initiative to modernize the securities rules and regulations to enable America’s financial markets to move on-chain."

  • Jul 2025 — GENIUS Act

  • Aug 2025: Liquid staking guidance

  • Dec 2025: DTC tokenization: conditional SEC no-action relief
  • Jan 2026: Tokenized securities guidance.
  • Mar 2026: Crypto classification: token categories v. investment contracts
  • Apr 2026: DeFi interfaces permitted without broker-dealer registration.
  • Jun 2026: rescission of Reg NMS Rule 611 and Rule 610(e)
  • Sep 2026: Innovation Exemption for tokenized-stock AMM venues and liquidity providers.
  • Oct 2026: Crypto custody: SEC proposes conditional adviser/fund self-custody

What our financial infrastructure looks like

payments

stocks, bonds, and options

swaps, CDS, MBS, CDOs

insurance contracts

What would the most efficient financial infrastructure look like?

payments

stocks, bonds, and options

swaps, CDS, MBS, CDOs

insurance contracts

\(\Rightarrow\) a single common resource

  • easy value management
  • straightforward transfers & ownership accounting
  • new types of contracts and usage of assets
  • \(\ldots\)

What would the most efficient financial infrastructure look like?

But there is more: TradFi = Intermediated

  • everything is driven by intermediaries
    • access to infrastructure
    • holding and operation of assets

DeFi = self-determined & open

  • holding and operation of assets by individuals
  • using autonomous "smart contracts"

Broker

Exchange

Internalizer

Wholeseller

Darkpool

Venue

Settlement

Traditional Institutions

Investors

Trading Infrastructure

payments network

Stock Exchange

Clearing House

custodian

custodian

beneficial ownership record

seller

buyer

Broker

Broker

1

2

4

3

5

6

7

1

4

6

Blockchain Trading

"laptop on to of a blockchain"

"direct on-chain trading"

"rollup based trading"

DeFi Trading: Liquidity Pools

Principles for "optimal" AMM design

DEX liquidity provision mechanisms

Uniswap V2: Passive Pure pooled — all LPs share fees and risk pro-rata. Adverse selection from informed trades.
Lehar & Parlour (2025, JF)
Malinova & Park (2025)
Milionis et al. (2022) - "loss vs. rebalancing"
V3 (2021): Concentrated LPs choose ranges, can reposition. Heterogeneity emerges.
Hasbrouck, Rivera & Saleh (2025, Mgmt Sci) - LP provision = options strangle
Klein, Kozhan, Viswanath-Natraj, Wang (2026) - are LPs informed?
V4 (2025): Programmable Even more choice for LPs via hooks and custom pools.
Bachu, Hasbrouck, Saleh & Wan (2025) — " v4 Explainer"

Our work and this talk is all V2

An AMM in three pictures

A pool of reserves + a pricing rule \(R_0\cdot R_1=k\). Three things to know:

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)

① Price = slope
S = R₀ / R₁

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)

② Trade walks the curve
price moves → impact

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)

③ LPs shift it out
more depth, same price

Only the imbalance matters

A trade ("swap") moves the price along the curve.

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)buy MXN → R₁ falls → price of MXN ↑start

Liquidity providers have no positional gains on a round trip → they earn on AMM fees.

Fees accrue on all volume; adverse selection only on the imbalance.

  • A round trip brings the dot back — LP positions unchanged.
  • Only the net imbalance impacts LP positional payoffs.
  • Imbalance maps to the period's return 1:1 \(\to\) LP losses are set by holding period returns.

Modern electronic markets are organized as limit order books ...

The math:

  • constant product AMM holds constant product of asset deposits (\(a\) assets, \(c\) cash)
  • Buy \(q\) assets, pay \(\Delta c(q)\) \[\text{const}=a\cdot c=(a-q)(a+\Delta c(q))\]
  • Solving get cost \[\Delta c(q)=\frac{cq}{a-q}=\int_0^q\frac{ac}{(a-x)^2}dx\]
  • \(\to\) constant product is a particular limit order book

... and constant product is a particular limit order book-like price

Arbitrageurs pick off the pool whenever fundamentals move

buy & hold

AMM LP: concave relative to buy & hold

exchange rate change

holding value one currency rel. to other

"Impermanent loss" = adverse selection

Proposition: Adverse selection, priced from returns + volume alone.

Our closed form (Learning from DeFi):

\(\mathbb{E}[\text{IL}] = \dfrac{\sigma^2}{8}\)

LPs require compensation for this loss \(\to\) the AMM fee income must cover this loss.

Provide-and-Forget Liquidity Provision

Basic idea of liquidity provision: earn more on balanced flow than what you lose on price movement

\[\text{fee income} +\underbrace{\text{what I sold it for}-\text{value of net position}}_{\text{adverse selection loss}} \ge \text{cost of capital} \]

in AMMs:
protocol fee

in tradFi: bid-ask spread

  • depends on deposited capital
  • \(\searrow\) in capital
  • \(\to\) there is a break-even deposit

The Fee Pins Down the Depth of the Pool

Break-even condition: fee revenue return = expected IL on LP capital

Step 1

Pool Designer picks fee \(F\)

A protocol parameter, set at the pool level.

Step 2

LPs commit liquidity until depth equates \(F\) to expected IL

Competitive break-even provision \(\to\) equilibrium pool size \(D\)

Step 3

Traders face price impact (liquidity driven) and fee

Deeper pool \(\to\) lower PI for given trade

  • Fee revenue must cover LPs' expected loss \(F = \sigma^2D/8\)
  • traders pay price impact \(2\Delta/D\) per dollar
  • so the designer solves

 

\[ \min_{F\gt 0} \; F + \frac{\sigma^2 \Delta v}{4F} \]

Large-volume approximation

When period volume is large relative to any single trade:

Optimal fee (per dollar)

\[f^{*}=\frac{\sigma}{2}\sqrt{\frac{\Delta}{v}}\]

Pool depth

\[D^{*}=\frac{4}{\sigma}\sqrt{\Delta v}\]

Cost per dollar traded

\[c^{*}=\sigma\sqrt{\frac{\Delta}{v}}\]

\(\sigma\) = period return volatility — captures adverse selection, reminiscent of the square-root price-impact law

\(v\) = expected "noise" (balanced) volume · \(\Delta\) = representative order size · \(D\) = pool depth

Total fee revenue \(F^*=f^*v=\tfrac{\sigma}{2}\sqrt{\Delta v}\); total cost \(C^*=\sigma\sqrt{\Delta v}\)

How close is constant product to the optimum?

For log-return variance \(S=\log(1+\sigma^2)\) over the commitment horizon, total cost for volume \(v\) is

\[\underbrace{C_\ell^*=\sigma\sqrt{\Delta v}}_{\text{local minimum}}\qquad\qquad\underbrace{C_g^*=\sqrt{\Delta v S}}_{\text{global infimum}}\]

Optimized constant product cost

\[ C_{\rm CP,\ell}^*=C_\ell^*,\qquad C_{\rm CP,g}^*=8\sqrt{\frac{\Delta v}{3S}\big(1-e^{-S/8}\big)\big(e^{3S/8}-1\big)}.\]

Excess cost over the commitment horizon

\[ \frac{C_{\rm CP,g}^*}{C_g^*}-1=\frac{\sigma^2}{16}+O(\sigma^4)\qquad (0.0025\%\text{ at }\sigma=2\%;\quad 0.246\%\text{ at }\sigma=20\%).\]
\(\to\) Constant product AMM is "pretty close" to global optimum

An AMM commits to the whole book. Absent news about risk or order flow, its cost benchmarks a discriminatory limit order book à la Glosten (1994).

Kyle’s lambda and the cost of immediacy

Kyle (1985), continuous trading

\[\lambda_{\rm Kyle}=\frac{\operatorname{sd}(\text{fundamental return})}{\operatorname{sd}(\text{cumulative noise flow})}=\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\Delta v}}\quad\Longrightarrow\quad c^*=\Delta\lambda_{\rm Kyle}.\]

Cost per dollar in the pool

\[c^*=\underbrace{\frac{\sigma^2}{2v\lambda_{\rm Kyle}}}_{\text{fee }f^*:\,\text{LP loss to arbitrage}}+\underbrace{\frac{\Delta\lambda_{\rm Kyle}}{2}}_{\text{average price impact}}=2f^*=\Delta\lambda_{\rm Kyle}.\]

In Kyle, \(\mathbb E[\text{insider profit}]=\lambda_{\rm Kyle}\Delta v=vc^*\), the pool’s total customer cost.

Amihud (2002), empirical illiquidity

\(\displaystyle \mathrm{ILLIQ}=\operatorname{mean}_d\!\left(\frac{|r_d|}{v_d}\right)\): return movement per dollar of volume; for the AMM the denominator is \(\sqrt{\Delta v}\).

Optimal multi-currency pools

FX trading: three structures

Dollar routingUSDMXNTHBThree bilateral poolsUSDMXNTHBOne shared poolUSDMXNTHB
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Capital multiplexing — the key intuition #1

Same total capital \(D\): split it across three pools, or pool it.

Three separate poolsUSDMXN⅓ DUSDTHB⅓ DMXNTHB⅓ D

pool the capital →

One shared poolUSDw₀MXNw₁THBw₂D

each reserve backs both of its pairs

Pool rule: \(a_0^{w_0}\cdot a_1^{w_1}\cdot a_2^{w_2}=\) constant. Weights \(w_i\) = shares of the pool’s value.

each pool: 50–50 weights, capital ⅓ \(D\)

price impact \(\;\dfrac{2\Delta}{\tfrac13 D}=\dfrac{6\Delta}{D}\)

\(\Delta\) = trade size

weights ⅓ each, capital \(D\)

price impact \(\;\dfrac{3\Delta}{D}\)

One pool helps liquidity suppliers w auto-adjusting quotes: key intuition #2

Illustration: common news raises the values of A and B together. Their quotes are stale until someone trades on the news.

Two separate markets

Arbitrageur
sees the news first

buys A

Pool A
quote stale: gain

buys B

Pool B
also stale: gain

Separate stale-price losses

One portfolio pool

Arbitrageur
sees the news first

buys A

Pool A + B
raises the quote of A, and of B, which moves with it

B also adjusts: less remaining arbitrage

Smaller combined loss

Less adverse selection, less compensation, lower cost. Competitive providers enter until fees cover their expected losses, so what helps them is passed on to investors as lower fees. The pool needs no coordination: the joint update is governed by market infrastructure and part of the trade itself.

Overall idea

  • As with one risky asset:

    • For given fee income, liquidity providers add deposits until fee income covers their expected losses to arbitrage.
    • The designer chooses fee income to minimize total customer cost: fees plus price impact.
  • With several risky assets:

    • The designer also chooses capital weights. These affect both losses to arbitrage and price impact on each pair.
    • The optimum pins down total fee income. Pair-specific fees determine how traders share the cost.
     

The geometric-mean pool

\[\prod_i a_i^{w_i}=\text{constant}\qquad\sum_i w_i=1 \qquad w_i\gt 0\qquad p_{ij}^{\mathrm{pool}}=\frac{w_i a_j}{w_j a_i}\]

  • \(a_i\) is the deposit of currency \(i\); \(a_0\) is the dollar (vehicle currency).
  • A pair’s marginal quote is currency \(j\) per unit of currency \(i\).
  • Initially, pool dollar quotes equal external dollar prices.

37 ·

One set of deposits supports every pair

total depth is price times deposits but
relative prices also imply \(p_i a_i=Dw_i\)

  • Currency \(i\) has capital share \(w_i\) in a pool of dollar depth \(D\).
  • The peso deposit supports both peso–dollar and peso–baht trades.
  • The weights determine the allocation of capital across the shared books.
13

A trade uses the two relevant deposits

\[\text{Price impact}_{ij}=\underbrace{\frac12\left(\frac1{w_i}+\frac1{w_j}\right)}_{\text{price impact coefficient}}\frac{\Delta}{D}\]

  • A larger weight on either currency reduces price impact on that pair.
  • The same deposit reduces impact on every pair that uses it.
  • Price impact for a trade of \(\Delta\) between \(i,j\) is
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  • The volume-weighted price impact factor is \(\Gamma=\tfrac12\sum_{i=0}^{N}\frac{V_i}{w_i}\)
  • Total price impact is

\[\frac{\Delta\Gamma}{D}\]

Relative-price risk determines the loss

16

\[\begin{aligned}\text{Two assets:}\quad&\mathbb E[\text{LP loss}]\simeq\tfrac12\,w_0w_1\,\sigma^{2}\,D\\[10pt]\text{Many assets:}\quad&\mathbb E[\text{LP loss}]\simeq\tfrac12\,\Phi(w)\,D,\qquad \Phi(w)=\sum_{i<j}w_iw_j\,\sigma_{ij}^{2}\end{aligned}\]

\(\sigma_{ij}\) = volatility of the \(i\)–\(j\) exchange rate. The sum includes dollar pairs.

  • Higher correlation \(\rho_{ij}\) of dollar returns → lower cross-rate volatility \(\sigma_{ij}\), at given individual volatilities.
  • → lower expected LP losses per dollar of capital, at given weights.

Fees must cover expected loss

\[F=\frac12\Phi D\quad\Longrightarrow\quad D=\frac{2F}{\Phi}\]

  • Let \(F\) be total fee revenue with \(F=\tfrac12\sum_{i=0}^{N}\sum_{j=0}^{N}V_{ij}f_{ij}\).
  • Free entry makes fee income equal the expected loss from supplying liquidity.
  • Higher fee revenue attracts more deposits and reduces price impact.
17

For given weights: minimizing the total trading cost

LPs break even: fees collected \(F\) = LP losses \(\tfrac12\Phi D\) → depth \(D=2F/\Phi\).

Traders pay fees plus price impact:

\[C(F)=\underbrace{F}_{\text{fees}}+\underbrace{\frac{\Gamma\,\Delta}{D}}_{\text{price impact}}=F+\frac{\Delta\,\Phi\,\Gamma}{2F}\]

\(\displaystyle\Gamma(w)=\sum_{i<j}V_{ij}\Big(\frac{1}{2w_i}+\frac{1}{2w_j}\Big)\)

\(f_{ij}\) = fee rate, \(V_{ij}\) = volume traded on pair \(i,j\)

Result: fee schedules that collect the same total give the same depth and the same total trading cost. Two assets: one fee. Many assets: many schedules.

Optimal fees balance fees and price impact

\[C(F;w)=F+\frac{\Delta\Gamma(w)\Phi(w)}{2F}\]

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\(\Leftrightarrow\)

C=F+\frac{\Delta\Gamma}{D}

\[\begin{aligned}F^*(w)&=\sqrt{\frac{\Delta\Phi(w)\Gamma(w)}2}\\[0.5em]D^*(w)&=\sqrt{\frac{2\Delta\Gamma(w)}{\Phi(w)}}\\[0.5em]C^*(w)&=\sqrt{2\Delta\Phi(w)\Gamma(w)}=2F^*(w)\end{aligned}\]

Proposition 3: For given weights, optimizing Fees and Minimal Costs are

Next task: find the cost-minimizing capital weights

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\[C^*=\min_w C^*(w) =\min_{w}\sqrt{2\Delta\Phi\Gamma}\]

  • For given weights, only total fee revenue determines depth and aggregate cost.
  • \(\to\) how do we allocate fees to pairs?
    • volume per pair \(w\cdot V\)
    • adverse selection risk per pair \(w\cdot \epsilon\)

Next task: find the cost-minimizing capital weights

\[C^*=\min_w\sum_i\sqrt{\Delta V_i}\,\sigma_{iw}\]

  • \(V_i\) is total volume involving currency \(i\).
  • \(\sigma_{iw}\) is its volatility relative to the pool’s deposits \(\sigma_{iw}=\sqrt{Var(\varepsilon_i-w\epsilon)}\)

Theorem: The minimized volume-weighted sum of these relative volatilities is

 

with optimal weights are \(a_i^*=\frac{\sqrt{\Delta V_i}}{p_i\sigma_{i w^*}}\)

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  • For three currencies, we can express the weights in closed form

When does pooling beat routing?

The general condition

Theorem: a multi-asset pool can be designed to achieve lower total trading costs than dollar routing if and only if \(T \gt 0\).

\[T=\underbrace{\sum_{i\lt j}\sqrt{V_iV_j}\,\rho_{ij}}_{\text{how currencies move together}}\;+\;\underbrace{\sum_{i\lt j}v_{ij}}_{\text{cross-pair volume}}\]

\(V_i\) = total volume that currency \(i\)'s dollar market serves under routing
\(\rho_{ij}\) = correlation of dollar returns · \(v_{ij}\) = direct cross-pair demand
Sums over non-dollar currencies.

  • This existence condition depends only on correlations and volumes.

Three currencies: correlation and cross-pair flow

With two non-dollar currencies, the theorem’s \(T\) becomes:

\[T=\sqrt{V_1V_2}\,(\rho+\beta),\qquad \beta=\frac{v_{12}}{\sqrt{V_1V_2}}\]

\(\rho\): correlation of dollar returns
\(\beta\): cross-pair flow intensity; with equal volumes, the cross-pair share of demand

A pool can be designed to beat routing if and only if \(\rho\gt-\beta\).

More cross-pair demand increases the savings from direct trading. These savings can outweigh the extra LP compensation that negative correlation requires.

Why correlation and cross-flow enter together

Positive correlation lowers the loss from realigning cross rates.

Direct cross-pair trading avoids impact on an intermediate dollar deposit in separate dollar markets.

More cross-flow therefore permits some negative correlation.

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Back to the theory picture

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above dashed: equal thirds (BIS Project Mariana’s design) beats routing.

above dotted: the optimally weighted pool beats routing: \(\rho > -\beta\).

With no cross-pair flow (\(\beta = 0\)): equal thirds needs \(\rho > 0.5\); optimal weights need only \(\rho > 0\).

above solid: three separate pools beat vehicle routing (but not multi-asset pool)

Cross-trade cost (bps)Pool saving vs USD
PairDirectVia USDPoolCrossAggregate
EUR/SEK0.460.450.1664%9.5%
EUR/NOK0.800.600.2558%5.9%
EUR/CHF0.220.210.0957%10.0%
EUR/GBP0.220.200.1052%9.5%
EUR/AUD0.640.270.1351%6.1%
NZD/JPY2.040.510.2746%1.6%
ZAR/JPY5.060.840.4645%0.4%
EUR/CAD0.640.200.1144%3.3%
BRL/JPY16.520.860.4943%0.1%
EUR/JPY0.380.170.1040%3.5%
AUD/JPY0.830.310.1938%1.8%
EUR/CNY0.890.140.0935%1.7%
CAD/JPY1.570.240.1730%0.3%
  • Volumes: BIS Triennial Survey, April 2025, net-net turnover. Direct dollar flow and cross flow for each pair come from the published USD legs and crosses.
  • Volatilities and correlations: daily log returns of USD exchange rates, Refinitiv, 2019–2024.
  • Sample: the 14 crosses for which the BIS publishes both USD legs, excluding TRY. Costs are one-way, in bps, for a $5M trade.

Some Stylized Facts

Insight 1: vehicle routing through dollar is cheaper than a direct pool

Insight 2: via the pool, the cross trade is cheaper

Insight 3: the pool on the whole is also cheaper than routing

How the data map into the condition

  • Daily dollar returns give correlations: Refinitiv, 2019–2024.
  • Bilateral goods trade proxies pair demands: IMF DOTS, 2019–2023.
  • For the small-\(\beta\) measure, all external trade counts as dollar-invoiced, net of the pair’s bilateral trade.
  • The sample contains 3,164 pairs across 92 currencies.
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Dollar-invoicing proxy: small cross-pair flow intensity

3,164 pairs, 92 currencies

About 70% pass
30% fail ρ > −β.

Failures: near-zero intensity, slightly negative correlation.

Pass = some cheaper design exists. Not measured savings.

\(\beta=q_{12}/\sqrt{Q_1Q_2}\). The test also holds for unequal volumes and volatilities. Data: Refinitiv 2019–24; IMF DOTS 2019–23 (goods trade).

Defensibility against dollar-pair entry

Can a dedicated dollar market undercut the pool?

  • Suppose the empire strikes back: a dealer tries to serve one currency’s direct dollar demand.
  • Cross-pair demand stays with the incumbent pool.
  • Key feature of the pool:
    • Fee \(F\) determines the aggregate amount
    • \(\to\) The pool can redistribute its required fee revenue across pairs.
  • Question: when is the pool defensible?
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  • When \(T>0\), the multi-asset pool is better, but does that mean that it will prevail?

Two Conditions for Defensibility

  • Price impact on every dollar pair must leave enough wiggle room for a nonnegative fee below the entrant’s total cost.
  • The available fee room, summed over served volumes, must cover the pool’s required fee revenue.
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Theorem: Suppose the optimum is interior and volume positive. There exists a nonnegative fee schedule that raises the required revenue, is internally consistent and prevents every dedicated dollar-pair entrant from offering a strictly lower cost if and only if

*consistency= cross-pair fees cannot exceed the sum of the two within-pool dollar fees.

Best defensible splitNo dollar trader above routing
PairVia USDCostSavingCostSaving
EUR/SEK0.450.1274%0.1274%
EUR/NOK0.600.2165%0.2165%
EUR/CHF0.210.0575%0.0575%
EUR/GBP0.200.0673%0.0673%
EUR/AUD0.270.0968%0.0968%
NZD/JPY0.510.2159%0.2159%
ZAR/JPY0.840.3953%0.4250%
EUR/CAD0.200.0764%0.0764%
BRL/JPY0.860.4251%0.4251%
EUR/JPY0.170.0664%0.0761%
AUD/JPY0.310.1260%0.1842%
EUR/CNY0.140.0560%0.0560%
CAD/JPY0.240.1154%0.1632%

One-way cost in bps of a $5M cross trade; savings relative to routing via USD.

Back to Stylized Facts: all three-currency pools here are defensible

Cost of vehicle routing

the best scenario for the cross pool relative to routing that is defensible

the best defensible scenario for the cross pool where no pair costs more than under routing

Conclusions

Take home: when multi-asset pools are superior

  • Shared deposits can support direct trading without fragmenting liquidity across bilateral markets.
  • An expression based on primitives (volatility and volume) determines
    • lowest possible trading costs
    • feasibility of a pool to beat vehicle routing
  • The pooling condition uses correlations and cross-pair demands: positive correlation is good, sufficient cross-flow income can offset negative correlation risk
  • Fee allocation "wiggling" can be used to defend the pool against dedicated dollar-market entry \(\to\) ex ante condition available
35

Backup

Backup: the two cost components

\[\begin{aligned}\Phi&=\sum_{i<j}w_iw_j\sigma_{ij}^2\\[0.4em]\Gamma&=\frac12\sum_i\frac{V_i}{w_i}\end{aligned}\]

\(\sigma_{ij}^2=\operatorname{Var}(\varepsilon_i-\varepsilon_j)\) includes dollar pairs.

Expected loss is \(\frac12\Phi D\). Aggregate price impact is \(\Delta\Gamma/D\).

38 · Backup

Backup: the reference-return argument

For fixed reference \(\alpha\), each deposit minimizes its own impact-plus-risk term.

Conditional dollar deposit: \(p_i a_i=\sqrt{\Delta V_i}/\sigma_{i\alpha}\).

The auxiliary objective equals actual cost plus a nonnegative mismatch term.

\[\text{Mismatch}=\frac12D\operatorname{Var}\!\left[(w-\alpha)^\prime\varepsilon\right]\]

40 · Backup

Backup: the directional derivative

Start at the dollar reference. For small \(t>0\), set \(\alpha_i(t)=t\sqrt{V_i}/\sigma_i\).

Set \(\alpha_0(t)\) so that weights sum to one.

After omitting the positive factor \(\sqrt{\Delta}\), the derivative is:

\[\sqrt{V_0+2T}\left[\sqrt{V_0}-\sqrt{V_0+2T}\right]\]

It is negative if and only if \(T>0\).

41 · Backup

Backup: symmetric optimal weights

\[w_0^*=\sqrt{\frac{(1-\rho)(1-\beta)}{(1+\rho)(1+\beta)}}\]

\(V_1=V_2=V\) and \(\sigma_1=\sigma_2=\sigma\).

\(v_{12}=\beta V\), so cross-flow share equals cross-flow intensity.

\(w_1^*=w_2^*=(1-w_0^*)/2\).

42 · Backup

Backup: operational defensibility test

\(\omega_i\) = entrant cost − incumbent dollar-pair impact.

Need \(\omega_i\ge0\) for every \(i\), and \(\sum_i V_i\omega_i\ge F^*\).

Choose dollar fees in proportion to \(\omega_i\) to raise \(F^*\).

Set each cross fee to the sum of its two dollar fees.

43 · Backup

Backup: the larger-\(\beta\) empirical measure

Backup: what the model holds fixed

Underlying pair demands and average trade size.

The currencies assigned to the pool and the geometric-mean rule.

Competitive liquidity supply and an external efficient-price process.

Extensions include elastic demand, pool membership and competition among trading routes.

45 · Backup

Optimally designing an multi-currency AMM

FX Trading: Three Structures

MXN

USD

THB

MXN

USD

THB

USD

MXN

THB

Status Quo (SQ)

Two bilateral USD pools. MXN/THB route through USD

Three Bilateral Pools (BP)

One pool per pair. No forced routing but fragmented capital and volume

Single multilateral pool (MP)

all three currencies in one pool; direct trading of all pairs

Same approach as single pool: LP break even, cost-minimizing planner

Capital multiplexing — the key intuition

Split the capital and each pair gets a book only ⅓ as deep — price impact rises. Pool it, and every dollar backs all three pairs.

⅓ D

⅓ D

⅓ D

USD/MXN
USD/THB
MXN/THB

capital split 3 ways

pool the capital →

D

every dollar backs all 3 pairs

price impact, split capital:

\[\frac{2\Delta}{D/3}=\frac{6\Delta}{D}\]

price impact, pooled:

\[\frac{2\Delta}{\frac{2}{3}D}=\frac{3\Delta}{D}\]

Multi-asset AMM: the setup behind the intuition

liquidity invariant (equal weights) \[R_0\cdot R_1\cdots R_n = k\]

marginal rate vs numeraire \((S_0\equiv 1)\) \[S_i=\frac{R_0}{R_i}\]

pool depth (at market prices) \[D=\sum_i S_i R_i = n\,R_0\]

Lemma (equal thirds). Each currency holds one third of pool depth: \(\;S_i R_i = \dfrac{D}{3}\)

Price impact. A trade \(i\to j\) touches 2 of 3 currencies — backed by \(\tfrac{2}{3}D\):

\[\Pi=\frac{2\Delta}{\frac{2}{3}D}=\frac{3\Delta}{D}\]

Impermanent loss— our closed-form approximation:

\[\mathbb{E}[\text{IL}]=\frac{\Sigma}{18},\quad \Sigma=\sigma_{01}^2+\sigma_{02}^2+\sigma_{12}^2\]

extends bilateral \(\;\sigma^2/8\) · this is what the AMM fee must cover

Bilateral pools vs one multilateral pool

① LPs commit liquidity

until fee revenue covers expected IL — this pins down depth D.

② Designer picks fee F

to minimize price impact + fee — depth substitutes out, leaving the cost.

Principles of AMM design

An AMM supplies a limit order book

Each point on its price schedule is an executable marginal order.
Marginal dollars per unitCumulative currency purchased1035Small limit orderstrace this schedule.A market orderwalks up the book.
The AMM fixes how the standing orders adjust as deposits change.
9

Only the imbalance matters

A trade ("swap") moves the price along the curve.

USDC (R₀)MXN (R₁)buy MXN → R₁ falls → price of MXN ↑start

Liquidity providers have no positional gains on a round trip → they earn on AMM fees.

Fees accrue on all volume; adverse selection only on the imbalance.

  • A round trip brings the dot back — LP positions unchanged.
  • Only the net imbalance impacts LP positional payoffs.
  • Imbalance maps to the period's return 1:1 →\to LP losses are set by holding period returns.
10

Arbitrageurs pick off the pool whenever fundamentals move

buy & hold

AMM LP: concave relative to buy & hold

exchange rate change

holding value one currency rel. to other

"Impermanent loss" = adverse selection

Proposition: Adverse selection, priced from returns + volume alone.

Our closed form (Learning from DeFi):

\(\mathbb{E}[\text{IL}] = \dfrac{\sigma^2}{8}\)

The AMM fee must cover it.

11

The economic environment

Competitive, risk-neutral liquidity providers can enter and exit freely.

Traders have fixed pair demands and a common small trade size \(\Delta\).

Arbitrage aligns terminal pool quotes with external exchange rates.

Small trades and small returns give tractable cost approximations.

12

Dethroning the Dollar? SG Seminars 2026

By Andreas Park

Dethroning the Dollar? SG Seminars 2026

My slides for seminars at SMU and NTU in Singapore in November 2026.

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